To get started, there is an introduction with background and motivation, and an overview, summarizing the project as a whole.
Although Principia Cybernetica Web has received very positive reviews, the work is of course never finished. The material in this web is continuously being added to and improved. Nodes followed by the mention "[empty]" don't contain any text yet, only a menu of linked nodes. Some important results have not yet been converted to hypertext, but may be found in the papers in our FTP-archive.
Comments about content and presentation of the information are appreciated. If you have any technical problems, questions or suggestions on our Web, please contact the "Webmaster", Francis Heylighen (PCP@vub.ac.be). Comments about the content of a node can be addressed to its author(s). You can also directly annotate each node separately, or add general comments to the User Annotations.
We apologize for difficulties you might have in getting files from this server: Internet connections between Belgium and especially America are often overloaded. Try to avoid the most busy periods: 15.00 to 0.00 hrs (European time), i.e. 9.00 to 18.00 (US East Coast) or 6.00 to 15.00 (US West Coast), on weekdays. We would like to establish a mirror site in the US in order to avoid this problem in the future: proposals welcome! At present we only have a Belgian back-up FTP-server with WWW documents at ftp.vub.ac.be for emergencies, but it is not kept up-to-date. These servers are part of the network of the Free University of Brussels.
If you plan to regularly consult this server, you might keep a copy of this home page on your own computer.
Every time has its own approach to these eternal philosophical questions, deriving from its knowledge and technology. We hold that in our time, the age of information, it is systems science and cybernetics, as the general sciences of organization and communication, that can provide the basis for contemporary philosophy. Therefore, this philosophical system is derived from, and further develops, the basic principles of cybernetics.
Moreover, we start from the thesis that systems at all levels have been constructed by evolution, which we see as a continuing process of self-organization, based on variation and natural selection of the "fittest" configuration. Evolution continuously creates complexity and makes systems more adaptive by giving them better control over their environments. We consider the emergence of a new level of control as the quantum of evolution, and call it a "metasystem transition".
As cybernetic theory informs our philosophy, so cybernetic technology lets us do things that philosophers of other times could only dream of. Using computer technology, we develop a large philosophical text from many nodes which are linked together with different relationships. Readers can navigate among the many concepts, guided by their individual understanding and interests. Disparate material can be integrated together while being written and read by collaborators from all around the world, undergoing variation and selection. Thus we apply theories about the evolution of cybernetic systems to the practical development of this very system of philosophy.
We hold that PCP is more than an interesting experiment, and that there is an acute need for an approach similar to PCP. The on-going explosion and fragmentation of knowledge demands a renewed effort at integration. This has always been the dream of the systems theorists; all they lacked was the appropriate technology to attack the complexity of the task.
PCP draws its inspiration from many predecessors in intellectual history, including philosophers, systems scientists and cyberneticians, and others who have tried to collaboratively develop complex systems of thought.
This effort has been on-going since 1989, and is now in the stage of implementation (see our history). Of course, the task is enormous, and we are still beginning. If you are really interested in our Project, we invite you to join our efforts and become a contributor.
For further introductory reading, see the following documents:
The present document brings these different questions and answers together, in the form of a "FAQ" (Frequently Asked Questions). The answers given here are by necessity short. They barely scratch the surface of a profound and complex issue. However, where available, we have included links to other documents which discuss the problem in more detail. The present document can be seen as a roadmap, which will help philosophically interested readers to better explore the Principia Cybernetica world view.
We begin with the idea that philosophy is a kind of clear, deep thought; essentially putting our thought and language in order. This apparently analytic and linguistic understanding arises from the explicit recognition that all expression and communication, in particular all works of philosophy, the body of Principia Cybernetica, and this article itself, exist in a physical form as a series of symbol tokens in a particular modality and interpretable in a specific language and interpretational framework. It is impossible to consider philosophy in particular outside of the context of its processes and products. In that respect, philosophy must be understood as a process of philosophizing in which linguistic symbol tokens are produced and received. This includes the normal linguistic forms of speaking, hearing, reading, and writing, but also other linguistic forms such as diagrams, mathematics, and sign language. The authors of this paper philosophize as they write it; the readers philosophize as they read it. This article itself cannot have any existence "as philosophy" outside of this context of its production and/or reception.
What then distinguishes philosophical linguistic productions from any other? It is tempting to distinguish philosophy on the basis of its content, that is its referents, or what it is "about". Then we would believe, as some cybernetic philosophers have suggested \cite{BAA53a}, that philosophy is linguistic thought which refers to specific deep questions, e.g. about existence and knowledge, the nature of thought, and the ultimate good. We do not deny this, but do not believe that it is a good place to start in finding a definition.
Rather the focus on philosophizing as a process leads us to consider philosophy as any language conducted in a certain manner. In particular, whenever we deal with issues in depth, continually asking "why" and "how" to critically analyze underlying assumptions and move to the foundations of our complex knowledge structures, then that is necessarily philosophy. Thus we construct philosophy of language, of mind, or of law when we consider these specific subjects in their depth. Surely we could have a philosophy of plumbing or gum chewing should we wish.
As we proceed in the question asking mode towards deep thought and thus philosophy, then of course we are naturally drawn to the traditional philosophical questions outlined above. But what distinguishes them as the quintessential philosophical problems is their generality. Thus if we restrict ourselves specifically to (say) philosophy of law or plumbing, then perhaps we can avoid certain general philosophical issues. Philosophy per se is simply the result of philosophizing in an unrestricted domain of discourse.
See also: 
Cybernetics and Philosophy(paper by Turchin in tex format)
When we look at the history of epistemology, we can discern a clear trend, in spite of the confusion of many seemingly contradictory positions. The first theories of knowledge stressed its absolute, permanent character, whereas the later theories put the emphasis on its relativity or situation-dependence, its continuous development or evolution, and its active interference with the world and its subjects and objects. The whole trend moves from a static, passive view of knowledge towards a more and more adaptive and active one.
Let us start with the Greek philosophers. In Plato's view knowledge is merely an awareness of absolute, universal Ideas or Forms, existing independent of any subject trying to apprehend to them. Though Aristotle puts more emphasis on logical and empirical methods for gathering knowledge, he still accepts the view that such knowledge is an apprehension of necessary and universal principles. Following the Renaissance, two main epistemological positions dominated philosophy: empiricism, which sees knowledge as the product of sensory perception, and rationalism which sees it as the product of rational reflection.
The implementation of empiricism in the newly developed experimental sciences led to a view of knowledge which is still explicitly or implicity held by many people nowadays: the reflection-correspondence theory. According to this view knowledge results from a kind of mapping or reflection of external objects, through our sensory organs, possibly aided by different observation instruments, to our brain or mind. Though knowledge has no a priori existence, like in Plato's conception, but has to be developed by observation, it is still absolute, in the sense that any piece of proposed knowledge is supposed to either truly correspond to a part of external reality, or not. In that view, we may in practice never reach complete or absolute knowledge, but such knowledge is somehow conceivable as a limit of ever more precise reflections of reality.
The following important theory developed in that period is the Kantian synthesis of rationalism and empiricism. According to Kant, knowledge results from the organization of perceptual data on the basis of inborn cognitive structures, which he calls "categories". Categories include space, time, objects and causality. This epistemology does accept the subjectivity of basic concepts, like space and time, and the impossibility to reach purely objective representations of things-in-themselves. Yet the a priori categories are still static or given.
The next stage of development of epistemology may be called pragmatic. Parts of it can be found in early twentieth century approaches, such as logical positivism, conventionalism, and the "Copenhagen interpretation" of quantum mechanics. This philosophy still dominates most present work in cognitive science and artificial intelligence. According to pragmatic epistemology, knowledge consists of models that attempt to represent the environment in such a way as to maximally simplify problem-solving. It is assumed that no model can ever hope to capture all relevant information, and even if such a complete model would exist, it would be too complicated to use in any practical way. Therefore we must accept the parallel existence of different models, even though they may seem contradictory. The model which is to be chosen depends on the problems that are to be solved. The basic criterion is that the model should produce correct (or approximate) predictions (which may be tested) or problem-solutions, and be as simple as possible. Further questions about the "Ding an Sich" or ultimate reality behind the model are meaningless.
The pragmatic epistemology does not give a clear answer to the question where knowledge or models come from. There is an implicit assumption that models are built from parts of other models and empirical data on the basis of trial-and-error complemented with some heuristics or intuition. A more radical point of departure is offered by constructivism. It assumes that all knowledge is built up from scratch by the subject of knowledge. There are no 'givens', neither objective empirical data or facts, nor inborn categories or cognitive structures. The idea of a correspondence or reflection of external reality is rejected. Because of this lacking connection between models and the things they represent, the danger with constructivism is that it may lead to relativism, to the idea that any model constructed by a subject is as good as any other and that there is no way to distinguish adequate or 'true' knowledge from inadequate or 'false' knowledge.
We can distinguish two approaches trying to avoid such an 'absolute relativism'. The first may be called individual constructivism. It assumes that an individual attempts to reach coherence among the different pieces of knowledge. Constructions that are inconsistent with the bulk of other knowledge that the individual has will tend to be rejected. Constructions that succeed in integrating previously incoherent pieces of knowledge will be maintained. The second, to be called social constructivism, sees consensus between different subjects as the ultimate criterion to judge knowledge. 'Truth' or 'reality' will be accorded only to those constructions on which most people of a social group agree.
In these philosophies, knowledge is seen as largely independent of a hypothetical 'external reality' or environment. As the 'radical' constructivists Maturana and Varela argue, the nervous system of an organism cannot in any absolute way distinguish between a perception (caused by an external phenomenon) and a hallucination (a purely internal event). The only basic criterion is that different mental entities or processes within or between individuals should reach some kind of equilibrium.
Though these constructivistic approaches put much more emphasis on the changing and relative character of knowledge, they are still absolutist in the primacy they give to either social consensus or internal coherence, and their description of construction processes is quite vague and incomplete. A more broad or synthetic outlook is offered by different forms or evolutionary epistemology. Here it is assumed that knowledge is constructed by the subject or group of subjects in order to adapt to their environment in the broad sense. That construction is an on-going process at different levels, biological as well as psychological or social. Construction happens through blind variation of existing pieces of knowledge, and the selective retention of those new combinations that somehow contribute most to the survival and reproduction of the subject(s) within their given environment. Hence we see that the 'external world' again enters the picture, although no objective reflection or correspondence is assumed, only an equilibrium between the products of internal variation and different (internal or external) selection criteria. Any form of absolutism or permanence has disappeared in this approach, but knowledge is basically still a passive instrument developed by organisms in order to help them in their quest for survival.
A most recent, and perhaps most radical approach, extends this evolutionary view in order to make knowledge actively pursue goals of its own. This approach, which as yet has not had the time to develop a proper epistemology, may be called memetics. It notes that knowledge can be transmitted from one subject to another, and thereby loses its dependence on any single individual. A piece of knowledge that can be transmitted or replicated in such a way is called a 'meme'. The death of an individual carrying a certain meme now no longer implies the elimination of that piece of knowledge, as evolutionary epistemology would assume. As long as a meme spreads more quickly to new carriers, than that its carriers die, the meme will proliferate, even though the knowledge it induces in any individual carrier may be wholly inadequate and even dangerous to survival. In this view a piece of knowledge may be succesful (in the sense that it is common or has many carriers) even though its predictions may be totally wrong, as long as it is sufficiently 'convincing' to new carriers. Here we see a picture where even the subject of knowledge has lost his primacy, and knowledge becomes a force of its own with proper goals and ways of developing itself. That this is realistic can be illustrated by the many superstitions, fads, and irrational beliefs that have spread over the globe, sometimes with a frightening speed.
Like social constructivism, memetics attracts the attention to communication and social processes in the development of knowledge, but instead of seeing knowledge as constructed by the social system, it rather sees social systems as constructed by knowledge processes. Indeed, a social group can be defined by the fact that all its members share the same meme (Heylighen, 1992). Even the concept of 'self', that which distinguishes a person as a individual, can be considered as a piece of knowledge, constructed through social processes (HarrŽ, 19), and hence a result of memetic evolution. From a constructivist approach, where knowledge is constructed by individuals or society, we have moved to a memetic approach, which sees society and even individuality as byproducts constructed by an ongoing evolution of independent fragments of knowledge competing for domination.
We have come very far indeed from Plato's immutable and absolute Ideas, residing in an abstract realm far from concrete objects or subjects, or from the naive realism of the reflection-correspondence theory, where knowledge is merely an image of external objects and their relations. At this stage, the temptation would be strong to lapse into a purely anarchistic or relativistic attitude, stating that 'anything goes', and that it would be impossible to formulate any reliable and general criteria to distinguish 'good' or adequate pieces of knowledge from bad or inadequate ones. Yet in most practical situations, our intuition does help us to distinguish perceptions from dreams or hallucinations, and unreliable predictions ('I am going to win the lottery') from reliable ones ('The sun will come up tomorrow morning'). And an evolutionary theory still assumes a natural selection which can be understood to a certain degree. Hence we may assume that it is possible to identify selection criteria, but one of the lessons of this historical overview will be that we should avoid to quickly formulate one absolute criterion. Neither correspondence, nor coherence or consensus, and not even survivability, are sufficient to ground a theory of knowledge. At this stage we can only hope to find multiple, independent, and sometimes contradictory criteria, whose judgment may quickly become obsolete. Yet if we would succeed to formulate these criteria clearly, within a simple and general conceptual framework, we would have an epistemology that synthesizes and extends al of the traditional and less traditional philosophies above.
Such a theory would obviously be priceless for judging and constructing more specific physical theories. When we understand language as a hierarchical model of reality, i.e. a device which produces predictions, and not as a true static picture of the world, metaphysics is understood as much more valuable than just the "free fantasy" of philosophers. To say that the real nature of the world is a certain way means to propose the construction of a model of the world along those lines. Metaphysics creates a linguistic model (logical or conceptual structure) to serve as a basis for further refinements. Even though a mature physical theory fastidiously distinguishes itself from metaphysics by formalizing its basic notions and introducing verifiable criteria, metaphysics, in a very important sense, is physics.
Philosophies traditionally start with an ontology or metaphysics: a theory of being in itself, of the essence of things, of the fundamental principles of existence and reality. In a traditional systemic philosophy, "organization" might be seen as the fundamental principle of being, rather than God, matter, or the laws of nature. However this still begs the question of where this organization comes from. In a constructive systemic philosophy, on the other hand, the essence is the process through which this organization is created.
Alfred North Whitehead, Teilhard de
Chardin, Herbert Spencer, and Henry Bergson. Their main idea is to ground a philosophy on change or development, rather than on static concepts like matter or mind.
However, these early process philosophies are characterized by vagueness
and mysticism, and they tend to see evolution as teleological, goal
directed, guided by some supra-physical force, rather than as the blind
variation and selection process that we postulate. They are thus not
constructivist in the sense discussed in section constructivism. See further:
Australasian Association for Process Thought
Center
for Process Studies
Whitehead for dummies
Whitehead's even
more dangerous idea
Review of "L'Évolution Créatrice" by
Henri Bergson
Process Philosophy and the new thought movementDefinition according to Webster's Dictionary:
Recently, the term of "(formal) ontology" has been up taken by researchers in Artificial Intelligence, who use it to designate the building blocks out of which models of the world are made.(see e.g. "What is an ontology?"). An agent (e.g. an autonomous robot) using a particular model will only be able to perceive that part of the world that his ontology is able to represent. In a sense, only the things in his ontology can exist for that agent. In that way, an ontology becomes the basic level of a knowledge representation scheme. See for example my set of link types for a semantic network representation which is based on a set of "ontological" distinctions: changing-invariant, and general-specific.
What we need is a framework that ties everything together, that allows us to understand society, the world, and our place in it, and that could help us to make the critical decisions which will shape our future. It would synthesize the wisdom gathered in the different scientific disciplines, philosophies and religions. Rather than focusing on small sections of reality, it would provide us with a picture of the whole. In particular, it would help us to understand, and therefore cope with, complexity and change. Such a conceptual framework may be called a "world view".
The Belgian philosopher Leo Apostel has devoted his life to the development of such an integrating world view. As he quickly understood, the complexity of this task is too great for one man. Therefore, a major part of Apostel's efforts were directed at gathering other people, with different scientific and cultural backgrounds, to collaborate on this task. Only in the last years of his life, after several failed attempts, did he managed to create such an organization: the "Worldviews" group, which includes people from disciplines as diverse as engineering, psychiatry, theology, theoretical physics, sociology and biology.
Their first major product was a short book entitled "World views, from fragmentation to integration". This booklet is a call to arms, a program listing objectives rather than achievements. Its main contribution is a clear definition of what a world view is, and which are its necessary components. The "Worldviews" group has continued to work on different components and aspects of this general objective. Many of its members are also involved in a new interdisciplinary research center at the Free University of Brussels, which is named after Leo Apostel: the "Center Leo Apostel".
The book lists seven fundamental components of a world view. I will discuss them one by one, using a formulation which is slightly different from the one in the book, but which captures the main ideas.
Cybernetics and Systems Theory is an interdisciplinary academic domain. Although there are relatively few research centers and even fewer educational programs devoted to the domain, a lot of activity is going on in between established departments. This is shown by the number of associations, conferences and journals active in the domain.
The best way of getting acquainted with the main ideas of cybernetics and systems theory is to read a few of the classic books or papers defining the domain. Other, specific bibliographic references can be found in the library database of the Department of Medical Cybernetics and AI at the University of Vienna. There also exists more general reference material, including our own Web Dictionary of basic concepts.
You can get in touch with cybernetics and systems people via existing mailing lists and newsgroups, personal or departmental home pages, or by visiting conferences in the field (see the Calendar of events from the International Federation of Systems Research).
Systems theory or systems science argues that however complex or diverse the world that we experience, we will always find different types of organization in it, and such organization can be described by principles which are independent from the specific domain at which we are looking. Hence, if we would uncover those general laws, we would be able to analyse and solve problems in any domain, pertaining to any type of system. The systems approach distinguishes itself from the more traditional analytic approach by emphasizing the interactions and connectedness of the different components of a system.
Many of the concepts used by system scientists come from the closely related approach of cybernetics: information, control, feedback, communication... Cybernetics, deriving from the Greek word for steersman (kybernetes), was first introduced by the mathematician Wiener, as the science of communication and control in the animal and the machine (to which we now might add: in society and in individual human beings). It grew out of Shannon's information theory, which was designed to optimize the transmission of information through communication channels, and the feedback concept used in engineering control systems. In its present incarnation of "second-order cybernetics", its emphasis is on how observers construct models of the systems with which they interact (see constructivism).
In fact cybernetics and systems theory study essentially the same problem, that of organization independent of the substrate in which it is embodied. Insofar as it is meaningful to make a distinction between the two approaches, we might say that systems theory has focused more on the structure of systems and their models, whereas cybernetics has focused more on how systems function, that is to say how they control their actions, how they communicate with other systems or with their own components, ... Since structure and function of a system cannot be understood in separation, it is clear that cybernetics and systems theory should be viewed as two facets of a single approach.
This insight has had as a result that the two domains have in practice almost merged: many, if not most, of the central associations, journals and conferences in the field include both terms, "systems" and "cybernetics", in their title.
The following links should provide plenty of introductory material and references. An excellent, easy to read overview of the systems approach can be found in our web edition of the book "The Macroscope". Together with our dictionary, and list of basic books and papers, this should be sufficient for an introductory course in the domain:
Outside links:
Curriculum for Cybernetics and Systems Theory
review paper on cybernetics and its applications to social systems
General Systems Theory and Earth Science: an introduction to systems thinking
definition of Cybernetics in the Macmillan Encyclopedia of Computers
Systemic University on the Net (SUN): development and teaching of Systems Dynamics concepts
information on cybernetics from the ASC
ISSS project developing a primer on systems science
Educational Cybernetics: a course by Gary Boyd at Concordia University
description of an introductory course on Cybernetics and Systems Theory
course description on Systems Theory
a digest of systems theory, consisting of excerpts from basic books and papers
Systems Science Archives (mostly French) of the European Systems Union
| Synopsys: |
Systems theory was proposed in the 1940's by the biologist Ludwig von Bertalanffy (: General Systems Theory, 1968), and furthered by Ross Ashby (Introduction to Cybernetics, 1956). von Bertalanffy was both reacting agaInst reductionism and attempting to revive the unity of science. He emphasized that real systems are open to, and interact with, their environments, and that they can acquire qualitatively new properties through emergence, resulting in continual evolution. Rather than reducing an entity (e.g. the human body) to the properties of its parts or elements (e.g. organs or cells), systems theory focuses on the arrangement of and relations between the parts which connect them into a whole (cf. holism). This particular organization determines a system, which is independent of the concrete substance of the elements (e.g. particles, cells, transistors, people, etc). Thus, the same concepts and principles of organization underlie the different disciplines (physics, biology, technology, sociology, etc.), providing a basis for their unification. Systems concepts include: system-environment boundary, input, output, process, state, hierarchy, goal-directedness, and information.
The developments of systems theory are diverse (Klir, Facets of Systems Science, 1991), including conceptual foundations and philosophy (e.g. the philosophies of Bunge, Bahm and Laszlo); mathematical modeling and information theory (e.g. the work of Mesarovic and Klir); and practical applications. Mathematical systems theory arose from the development of isomorphies between the models of electrical circuits and other systems. Applications include engineering, computing, ecology, management, and family psychotherapy. Systems analysis, developed independently of systems theory, applies systems principles to aid a decisIon-maker with problems of identifying, reconstructing, optimizing, and controlling a system (usually a socio-technical organization), while taking into account multiple objectives, constraints and resources. It aims to specify possible courses of action, together with their risks, costs and benefits. Systems theory is closely connected to cybernetics, and also to system dynamics, which models changes in a network of coupled variables (e.g. the "world dynamics" models of Jay Forrester and the Club of Rome). Related ideas are used in the emerging "sciences of complexity", studying self-organization and heterogeneous networks of interacting actors, and associated domains such as far-from-equilibrium thermodynamics, chaotic dynamics, artificial life, artificial intelligence, neural networks, and computer modeling and simulation.
Francis Heylighen and Cliff Joslyn
Prepared for the Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy.(Copyright Cambridge University Press)
de Rosnay The analytic and the systemic approaches are more complementary than opposed, yet neither one is reducible to the other.
The analytic approach seeks to reduce a system to its elementary elements in order to study in detail and understand the types of interaction that exist between them. By modifying one variable at a time, it tries to infer general laws that will enable one to predict the properties of a system under very different conditions. To make this prediction possible, the laws of the additivity of elementary properties must be invoked. This is the case in homogeneous systems, those composed of similar elements and having weak interactions among them. Here the laws of statistics readily apply, enabling one to understand the behavior of the multitude-of disorganized complexity.
The laws of the additivity of elementary properties do not apply in highly complex systems composed of a large diversity of elements linked together by strong interactions. These systems must be approached by new methods such as those which the systemic approach groups together. The purpose of the new methods is to consider a system in its totality, its complexity, and its own dynamics Through simulation one can "animate" a system and observe in real time the effects of the different kinds of interactions among its elements. The study of this behavior leads in time to the determination of rules that can modify the system or design other systems.
The following table compares, one by one, the traits of the two approaches.
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This table, while useful in its simplicity, is nevertheless a caricature of reality. The presentation is excessively dualist; it confines thought to an alternative from which it seems difficult to escape. Numerous other points of comparison deserve to be mentioned. Yet without being exhaustive the table has the advantage of effectively opposing the two complementary approaches, one of which-the analytic approach-has been favored disproportionately in our educational system.
Some recent fashionable approaches have their roots in ideas that were proposed by cyberneticians many decades ago: e.g. artificial intelligence, neural networks, complex systems, human-machine interfaces, self-organization theories, systems therapy, etc. Most of the fundamental concepts and questions of these approaches have already been formulated by cyberneticians such as Wiener, Ashby, von Bertalanffy \cite{V L56}, Boulding, von Foerster, von Neumann, McCulloch, and Pask in the 1940's through 1960's.
But since its founding, Cybernetics and Systems Science have struggled to find a degree of "respectability" in the academic community. While little interdisciplinary work has prospered recently, cyberneticians especially have failed to find homes in academic institutions, or to create their own. Very few academic programs in Cybernetics and Systems Science exist, and those working in the new disciplines described above seem to have forgotten their cybernetic predecessors.
What is the reason that cybernetics does not get the popularity it deserves? What distinguishes cyberneticians from researchers in the previously mentioned areas is that the former stubbornly stick to their objective of building general, domain independent theories, whereas the latter focus on very specific applications: expert systems, psychotherapy, thermodynamics, pattern recognition, etc. General integration remains too abstract, and is not sufficiently successful to be really appreciated.
As an interdisciplinary field, Cybernetics and Systems Science sees common concepts used in multiple traditional disciplines and attempts to achieve a consensual unification by finding common terms for similar concepts in these multiple disciplines. Thus sometimes Cybernetics and Systems Science abstracts away from concepts, theories, and terminologies in specific discipline towards general, and perhaps idiosyncratic, usages. These new conceptual categories may not be recognizable to the traditional researchers, or they may find no utility in the use of the general concepts.
Clearly the problem of building a global theory is much more complex than any of the more down-to-earth goals of the fashionable approaches. But we may also say that the generality of the approach is dangerous in itself if it leads to being "stuck" in abstractions which are so far removed from the everyday world that it is difficult to use them, interact with them, or test them on concrete problems; in other words, to get a feel for how they behave and what their strengths and weaknesses are.
Although there are many exceptions, researchers in Cybernetics and Systems Science tend to be trained in a traditional specialty (like biology, management, or psychology) and then come to apply themselves to problems in other areas, perhaps a single other area. Thus their exposure to Cybernetics and Systems Science concepts and theory tends to be somewhat ad hoc and specific to the two or three fields they apply themselves to.
Few have even attempted to address foundational theoretical and methodological issues in anything other than an ad hoc manner. Some conceptual "frameworks" exist at the formal, mathematical level \cite{KLG85c,MEMTA88}. Some researchers have presented integrated conceptual frameworks for major areas of systems science \cite{JAE80a,ODH83,POW73,TUV77}, and there have been some attempts to develop the foundations of the philosophy underlying cybernetics and systems theory \cite{BUM74,LAE72}. Yet these works focus specifically on cybernetics and systems theory from the perspectives of the traditional fields of mathematics or philosophy respectively; they are still locked into the traditional forms of development of academic work. There is as yet no systems theory of systems theories.
There is at the same time a lack of researchers who are willing or able to address themselves to the general problems and theories encompassed by cybernetics and systems theory. The lack of a coherent terminology and methodology is reflected in a lack of basic textbooks and glossaries, (with some exceptions \cite{ASR56,KLG91a,WEG75}) and further in a failure to establish even primary educational programs to instruct upcoming generations. What little interdisciplinary work has prospered has profited from the developments in cybernetics and systems theory over the past few decades while either ignoring or deliberately avoiding any reliance on cybernetics and systems theory (e.g. cite{SFI,WOS88}).
The lack of a strong foundation for or consensus within cybernetics and systems theory extends to the very basic information about the field. How do we describe ourselves, what can we tell new students and outsiders? Cybernetics and systems theory has been alternatively described as a science, a point of view, a world-view, an approach, an outlook, or a kind of applied philosophy or applied mathematics. There are those in our community who approve of and even champion this state of affairs. They focus on the creativity of the maverick academics who are drawn to cybernetics and systems theory, and decry any attempts to structure or build a solid theory.(Again, with some notable exceptions \cite{UMS90}.) Clearly this lack of balance has led to rather poor review standards in systems journals and conferences, and a low "signal to noise ratio".
What can account for the current state of affairs in cybernetics and systems theory, the lack of a consensually held fundamental theory? Is it inherent in the field, and necessary in any broad interdisciplinary studies? Or is it an historical accident, exacerbated by the personalities and careers of individual researchers? The Principia Cybernetica Project holds that there are in fact fundamental and foundational concepts, principles, and theories immanent in the body and literature of cybernetics and systems theory which do hold to general information systems, including all living and evolving systems at all levels of analysis. We contend that the lack of a fundamental theory is due to a lack of investment in the field. Support for and investment in a field are mutually reinforcing. A lack of either will lead to a lack of the other.
The domain of computing applications has grown so quickly that labeling anything that uses a computer as "cybernetic" is more obscuring than enlightening. Therefore we would restrict the label "cybernetic technology" to those information processing and transmitting tools that somehow increase the general purpose "intelligence" of the user, that is to say the control the user has over information and communication.
Especially all "value-added" computer-supported communication technologies (electronic mailing list, such as PRNCYB-L, newsgroups and bulletin boards, various forms of groupware, electronic publishing tools such as FTP or WWW) fall under this heading. They make it possible to exchange information in a very fast, simple and reliable way, so that it is automatically stored and ready for immediate further processing or transfer. The practical implication is that communication channels between far-away locations becomes so flexible and direct that they remind us of nerves, connecting and controlling different parts of an organism. The group of cooperators thus can behave more like a single system, with a vastly increased knowledge and intelligence, rather than like a collection of scattered individuals who now and then exchange limited messages, that need a lot of time to reach their destination and be processed.
In addition to communication, there is the aspect of increased control over information. The is especially obvious in computing tools that offer some kind of additional intelligence to the user: 1) everything deriving from artificial intelligence, and its daughter fields, such as expert systems, machine learning, and neural networks, where certain cognitive processes are automatized and thus taken over from the user; 2) the different tools that offer better ways to organize and represent information or knowledge, i.e. that support the user in building useful models. This category includes all types of computer simulation (e.g. virtual reality), knowledge representation tools, hypertext and multimedia, databases and information retrieval. The two features of computer intelligence and modelling are merged in what may be called "knowledge structuring": the use of computer programs that reorganize models in order to make them more adequate (more correct, simple, rich, easy-to-use, ...). (see a short paper by me, suggesting a possible way to introduce knowledge structuring in hypertexts)
The merging of the twin cybernetic dimensions of communication and control leads us to envision an all-encompassing, "intelligent" communication network, cyberspace, which may form the substrate for an emerging world-wide super-brain.
See also: Cybermedia
The word "cyberspace" was coined by the science fiction author William Gibson, when he sought a name to describe his vision of a global computer network, linking all people, machines and sources of information in the world, and through which one could move or "navigate" as through a virtual space.
The word "cyber", apparently referring to the science of cybernetics, was well-chosen for this purpose, as it derives from the Greek verb "Kubernao", which means "to steer" and which is the root of our present word "to govern". It connotes both the idea of navigation through a space of electronic data, and of control which is achieved by manipulating those data. For example, in one of his novels Gibson describes how someone, by entering cyberspace, could steer computer-controlled helicopters to a different target. Gibson's cyberspace is thus not a space of passive data, such as a library: its communication channels connect to the real world, and allow cyberspace navigators to interact with that world. The reference to cybernetics is important in a third respect: cybernetics defines itself as a science of information and communication, and cyberspace's substrate is precisely the joint network of all existing communication channels and information stores connecting people and machines.
The word "space", on the other hand, connotes several aspects. First, a space has a virtually infinite extension, including so many things that they can never be grasped all at once. This is a good description of the already existing collections of electronic data, on e.g. the Internet. Second, space connotes the idea of free movement, of being able to visit a variety of states or places. Third, a space has some kind of a geometry, implying concepts such as distance, direction and dimension.
The most direct implementation of the latter idea is the technology of virtual reality, where a continuous three-dimensional space is generated by computer, which reacts to the user's movements and manipulations like a real physical space would. In a more metaphorical way, the geometry (or at least topology) of space can be found in the network of links and references characterizing a hypertext (which can be seen as the most general form for a collection of interlinked data). Nodes in a hypertext can be close or distant, depending on the number of links one must traverse in order to get from the one to the other. Moreover, the set of links in a given node define a number of directions in which one can move. However, a hypertext does not seem to have any determined number of dimensions (except perhaps infinity), it is not continuous but "chunky", and the distance between two points is in general different depending on the point from which one starts to move.
One of the challenges for the researchers who are trying to make present computer networks look more like a Gibsonian cyberspace is to integrate the intuitive geometry of 3-D virtual reality, with the more general, but cognitively confusing, infinite dimensionality of hypertext nets (see e.g. NCSA's project on navigation through information space). A first step in that direction are the extensions to World-Wide Web which allow the user to do hypermedia navigation in a two-dimensional image (e.g. a map of Internet Resources), by associating clicks in different areas of the image with different hyperlinks. More ambitious proposals to develop a Virtual Reality interface to the World-Wide Web are being discussed.
As a description for what presently exists, the word "cyberspace" is used in a variety of significations, which each emphasize one or more of the meanings sketched above. Some use it as a synonym for virtual reality, others as a synonym for the World-Wide Web hypermedia network, or for the Internet as a whole (sometimes including the telephone, TV, and other communication networks).
None of the uses already seems to incorporate the most intrinsically cybernetic aspect of the concept: that of a shared medium through which one can exert control over one's environment. Control can apply as well to objects in cyberspace (e.g. when you alter the information in database through a Web form interface), as to objects in the real world (telepresence or teleoperation). As a first example of the control possibilities offered by the World-Wide Web, it is possible to steer a operated robot arm to do excavations. I would venture that it is that last dimension which will turn out to be the most important one in the future, as it may form the substrate for a cybernetic "superbeing" or "metabeing"...
See also:
definition of cyberspace in the Hacker's dictionary
Settling Cyberspace: the ethical frontier
It is therefore not surprising that the use of this same technology is the bedrock of practicing cyberneticians, and further holds the promise to resolve some of these conflicts between the objects and nature of cybernetic theory and the nature of academic work. In particular, it is now possible to develop representational media which share the characteristics of the systems being studied:
multiple orderings, and thus a nonlinear structure.
Traditional analytic methods tend to focus on individual, simple subsystems in isolation, while only occasionally (and frequently inaccurately) extrapolating to group traits. Temporal and physical levels of analysis are abstracted and isolated, and disciplinary divisions cut off consideration of their interaction.
This inadequacy is reflected in the actual products of academic and scientific work, the books, papers, and lectures which are the coin in trade for academic workers. Such works (like all traditional publications) have a linear structure, ranging from long treatises to collections of short paragraphs or sections (e.g. the work of Aristotle \cite{AR43} or Wittgenstein \cite{WIL58}). Various indexing and other methods are available to gain "random access" within documents. Dictionaries, encyclopedias, and other reference works partially introduce nonlinear structures through internal references (e.g. \cite{EDP67,KRK84,FLA79}). Some authors have made halting efforts in the direction of nonlinear documents \cite{MIM86}; others have used pictures and graphical notation to aid in understanding \cite{VOH81,ABRSHC85,VAF75,HAD88}. And certainly the use of formal systems (mathematics and logical notations) have given the ability to construct large, complex linguistic systems.
Nevertheless, over the years the fundamental linear textual form has been maintained. Works are produced by single or at most small groups of authors. Collaborative work among more than two people remains next to impossible. Work proceeds almost entirely in natural language. The development of large, complex systems of philosophical thought in non-formal domains has been difficult. Once published, the works sit on library shelves in mute inactivity. They are not even open to revision except through further publications and errata. The connections among and within works are revealed only through laborious reference searches and synthetic works by diligent authors. Tracing the historical development of ideas is as laborious as that of bibliographical relation. The physical form of texts required that the products of one author or the writings on one subject be physically scattered throughout a vast published literature, leading to a cacophonous din of argument and discourse.
The disciplinary divisions of academic work also place a regimented, linear, and highly specific structure to the categorization of published books and papers. Cybernetics and systems science researchers, on the other hand, typically utilize a great deal of the library shelves, including mathematics, all the traditional sciences, psychology and sociology, philosophy, linguistics, etc. In fact, ultimately there can be little doubt that cybernetics and systems science are not "academic disciplines" at all in the traditional sense of the word. As the trans- (inter-, meta-, anti-) disciplinary studies of general systems and information systems, cybernetics and systems science has long fought against the traditional disciplinary divisions of intellectual specialization.
This critique can be extended to the ultimate reflexivity of cybernetics and systems science, in which the academic milieu in which they operate is regarded as another cybernetic system, and therefore an object of study which itself should be understood through cybernetic principles.(Similarly, Turchin \cite{TUV77} describes the ultimate end of science as the reflexive study of the scientific process.)
Fe Institute),
and associated research in the natural sciences such as far-from-equilibrium thermodynamics, catastrophe theory, chaos and dynamical systems. A third strand are different high-level computing applications such as artificial intelligence, neural networks, man-machine interaction and computer
modeling and simulation. Unfortunately, few practitioners in these recent disciplines seem to be aware that many of their concepts and methods were proposed or used by cyberneticians since many years. Subjects like complexity, self-organization, connectionism and adaptive systems have already been extensively studied in the 1940's and 1950's, by researchers like Wiener, Ashby, von Neumann and von Foerster, and in discussion forums like the famous Josiah Macy meetings on cybernetics [Heims, 1991]. Some recent popularizing books on "the sciences of complexity" (e.g. Waldrop, 1992) seem to ignore this fact, creating the false impression that work on complex adaptive systems only started in earnest with the creation of the Santa Fe Institute in the 1980's.
Reference: S. Heims. The Cybernetics Group. MIT Press, Cambridge MA, 1991.
Santa Fe Institute is the gathering point for a new approach, which is usually presented as the study of "complex adaptive systems" (CAS). Whereas the authors in the "natural science" tradition are mostly European, while the cybernetics and systems researchers come from different continents, the CAS movement is predominantly American. Though it shares its subject, the general properties of complex systems across traditional disciplinary boundaries, with cybernetics and systems theory , the CAS approach is distinguished by the extensive use of computer simulations as a research tool, and an emphasis on systems, such as ecologies or markets, which are less integrated or "organized" than the ones, such as organisms, companies and machines, studied by the older tradition. Two popular science books, one by the science writer Mitchell Waldrop and one by the Nobel laureate and co-founder of the Santa Fe Institute Murray Gell-Mann, offer good reviews of the main ideas underlying the CAS approach. Another Santa Fe collaborator, the systems analyst John Casti, has written several popular science books, discussing different issues in the modelling of complex systems, while integrating insights from the CAS approach with the two older traditions.
John Holland is the founder of the domain of genetic algorithms. These are parallel, computational representations of the processes of variation, recombination and selection on the basis of fitness that underly most processes of evolution and adaptation (Holland, 1992). They have been successfully applied to general problem solving, control and optimization tasks, inductive learning (classifier systems, Holland et al., 1986), and the modelling of ecological systems (the ECHO model, Holland, 1996). The biologist Stuart Kauffman has tried to understand how networks of mutually activating or inhibiting genes can give rise to the differentiation of organs and tissues during embryological development. This led him to investigate the properties of Boolean networks of different sizes and degrees of connectedness. Through a reasoning reminiscent of Ashby, he proposes that the self-organization exhibited by such networks of genes or chemical reactions is an essential factor in evolution, complementary to Darwinian selection by the environment.
Holland's and Kauffman's work, together with Dawkins' simulations of evolution and Varela's models of autopoietic systems, provide essential inspiration for the new discipline of artificial life, This approach, initiated by Chris Langton (1989, 1992), tries to develop technological systems (computer programs and autonomous robots) that exhibit lifelike properties, such as reproduction, sexuality, swarming, and co-evolution. Tom Ray's Tierra program proposes perhaps the best example of a complex, evolving ecosystem, with different species of "predators", "parasites" and "prey", that exists only in a computer.
Backed by Kauffman's work on co-evolution, Wolfram's cellular automata studies, and Bak's investigations of self-organized criticality, Langton (1990) has proposed the general thesis that complex systems emerge and maintain on the edge of chaos, the narrow domain between frozen constancy and chaotic turbulence. The "edge of chaos" idea is another step towards an elusive general definition of complexity. Another widely cited attempt at a definition in computational terms was proposed by Charles Bennett.
Another investigation which has strongly influenced the artificial life community is Robert Axelrod's game theoretic simulation of the evolution of cooperation. By letting different strategies compete in a repeated Prisoner's Dilemma game, Axelrod (1984) showed that mutually cooperating, "tit-for-tat"-like strategies tend to dominate purely selfish ones in the long run. This transition from biological evolution to social exchanges naturally leads into the modelling of economic processes (Anderson, Arrow & Pines, 1988). W. Brian Arthur has systematically investigated self-reinforcing processes in the economy, where the traditional law of decreasing returns is replaced by a law of increasing returns, leading to the path-dependence and lock-in of contingent developments. More recently (1994), he has simulated the seemingly chaotic behavior of stock exchange-like systems by programming agents that are continuously trying to guess the future behavior of the system to which they belong, and use these predictions as basis for their actions. The conclusion is that the different predictive strategies cancel each other out, so that the long term behavior of the system becomes intrinsically unpredictable. This result leads back to von Foerster's second-order cybernetics, according to which models of social systems change the very systems they intend to model.
Bibliography: see the "classic publications on complex, evolving systems".
See also: Web servers on complexity and self-organization
The physicist Hermann Haken (1978) has suggested the label of synergetics for the field that studies the collective patterns emerging from many interacting components, as they are found in chemical reactions, crystal formations or lasers. Another Nobel laureate, Manfred Eigen (1992), has focused on the origin of life, the domain where chemical self-organization and biological evolution meet. He has introduced the concepts of hypercycle, an autocatalytic cycle of chemical reactions containing other cycles, and of quasispecies, the fuzzy distribution of genotypes characterizing a population of quickly mutating organisms or molecules (1979).
The modelling of non-linear systems in physics has led to the concept of chaos, a deterministic process characterized by extreme sensitivity to its initial conditions (Crutchfield, Farmer, Packard & Shaw, 1986). Although chaotic dynamics is not strictly a form of evolution, it is an important aspect of the behavior of complex systems. The science journalist James Gleick has written a popular history of, and introduction to, the field. Cellular automata, mathematical models of distributed dynamical processes characterized by a discrete space and time, have been widely used to study phenomena such as chaos, attractors and the analogy between dynamics and computation through computer simulation. Stephen Wolfram has made a fundamental classification of their types of behavior. Catastrophe theory proposes a mathematical classification of the critical behavior of continuous mappings. It was developed by René Thom (1975) in order to model the (continuous) development of (discontinuous) forms in organisms, thus extending the much older work by the biologist D' Arcy Thompson (1917).
Another French mathematician, Benoit Mandelbrot (1983), has founded the field of fractal geometry, which models the recurrence of similar patterns at different scales which characterizes most natural systems. Such self-similar structures exhibit power laws, like the famous Zipf's law governing the frequency of words. By studying processes such as avalanches and earthquakes, Per Bak (1988, 1991) has shown that many complex systems will spontaneously evolve to the critical edge between order (stability) and chaos, where the size of disturbances obeys a power law, large disturbances being less frequent than small ones. This phenomenon, which he called self-organized criticality, may also provide an explanation for the punctuated equilibrium dynamics seen in biological evolution.
Bibliography: see the "classic publications on complex, evolving systems".
See also: Web servers on complexity and self-organization
de Rosnay In illustrating a new current of thought, it is often useful to follow a thread. Our thread will be the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT). In three steps, each of about ten years, MIT was to go from the birth of cybernetics to the most critical issue, the debate on limits to growth. Each of these advances was marked by many travels back and forth--typical of the systemic approach--between machine, man, and society. In the course of this circulation of ideas there occurred transfers of method and terminology that later fertilized unexplored territory.
In the forties the first step forward led from the machine to the living organism, transferring from one to the other the ideas of feedback and finality and opening the way for automation and computers. In the fifties it was the return from the living organism to the machine with the emergence of the important concepts of memory and pattern recognition, of adaptive phenomena and learning, and new advances in bionics (Bionics attempts to build electronic machines that imitate the functions of certain organs of living beings.): artificial intelligence and industrial robots. There was also a return from the machine to the living organism, which accelerated progress in neurology, perception, the mechanisms of vision In the sixties MIT saw the extension of cybernetics and system theory to industry, society, and ecology.
Three men can be regarded as the pioneers of these great breakthroughs: the mathematician Norbert Wiener, who died in 1964, the neurophysiologist Warren McCulloch, who died in 1969; and Jay Forrester, professor at the Sloan School of Management at MIT. There are of course other men, other research teams, other universities--in the United States as well as in the rest of the world--that have contributed to the advance of cybernetics and system theory. I will mention them whenever their course of research blends with that of the MIT teams.
In 1940 Wiener worked with a young engineer, Julian H. Bigelow, to develop automatic range finders for antiaircraft guns. Such servomechanisms are able to predict the trajectory of an airplane by taking into account the elements of past trajectories. During the course of their work Wiener and Bigelow were struck by two astonishing facts: the seem.ingly "intelligent" behavior of these machines and the "diseases" that could affect them. Theirs appeared to be "intelligent" behavior because they dealt with "experience" (the recording of past events) and predictions of the future. There was also a strange defect in performance: if one tried to reduce the friction, the system entered into a series of uncontrollable oscillations.
Impressed by this disease of the machine, Wiener asked Rosenblueth whether such behavior was found in man. The response was affirmative: in the event of certain injuries to the cerebellum, the patient cannot lift a glass of water to his mouth; the movements are amplified until the contents of the glass spill on the ground. From this Wiener inferred that in order to control a finalized action (an action with a purpose) the circulation of information needed for control must form "a closed loop allowing the evaluation of the effects of one's actions and the adaptation of future conduct based on past performances." This is typical of the guidance system of the antiaircraft gun, and it is equally characteristic of the nervous system when it orders the muscles to make a movement whose effects are then detected by the senses and fed back to the brain.
Thus Wiener and Bigelow discovered the closed loop of information necessary to correct any action--the negative feedback loop--and they generalised this discovery in terms of the human organism.
During this period the multidisciplinary teams of Rosenblueth were being formed and organized. Their purpose was to approach the study of living organisms from the viewpoint of a servomechanisms engineer and, conversely, to consider servomechanisms with the experience of the physiologist. An early seminar at the Institute for Advanced Study at Princeton in 1942 brought together mathematicians, physiologists, and mechanical and electrical engineers. In light of its success, a series of ten seminars was arranged by the Josiah Macy Foundation. One man working with Rosenblueth in getting these seminars under way was the neurophysiologist Warren McCulloch, who was to play a considerable role in the new field of cybernetics. In 1948 two basic publications marked an epoch already fertile with new ideas: Norbert Wiener's Cybernetics, or Control and Communication in the Animal and the Machine, and The Mathematical Theory of Communication by Claude Shannon and Warren Weaver. The latter work founded information theory.
The ideas of Wiener, Bigelow, and Rosenblueth caught fire like a trail of powder. Other groups were formed in the United States and around the world, notably the Society for General Systems Research whose publications deal with disciplines far removed from engineering such as sociology, political science, and psychiatry.
The seminars of the Josiah Macy Foundation continued, opening to new disciplines: anthropology with Margaret Mead, economics with Oskar Morgenstern. Mead urged Wiener to extend his ideas to society as a whole. Above all, the period was marked by the profound influence of Warren McCulloch, director of the Neuropsychiatric Institute at the University of Illinois.
At the conclusion of the work of his group on the organization of the cortex of the brain, and especially after his discussions with Walter Pitts, a brilliant, twenty-two-year-old mathematician, McCulloch understood that a beginning of the comprehension of cerebral mechanisms (and their simulation by machines) could come about only through the cooperation of many disciplines. McCulloch himself moved from neurophysiology to mathematics, from mathematics to engineering.
Walter Pitts became one of Wiener's disciples and contributed to the exchange of ideas between Wiener and McCulloch; it was he who succeeded in convincing McCulloch to install himself at MIT in 1952 with his entire team of physiologists.
Paralleling the work of the teams of Wiener and McCulloch at MIT, another group tried to utilize cybernetics on a wider scope. This was the Society for General Systems Research, created in 1954 and led by the biologist Ludwig von Bertalanffy. Many researchers were to join him: the mathematician A. Rapoport, the biologist W. Ross Ashby, the biophysicist N. Rashevsky, the economist K. Boulding. IIn 1954 the General Systems Yearbooks began to appear; their influence was to be profound on all those who sought to expand the cybernetic approach to social systems and the industrial firm in particular.
During the fifties a tool was developed and perfected that would permit organized complexity to be approached from a totally new angle--the computer. The first ones were ENIAC (1946) and EDVAC or EDSAC (1947). One of the fastest was Whirlwind 11, constructed at MIT in 1951. It used--for the first time--a superfast magnetic memory invented by a young electronics engineer from the servomechanisms laboratory, Jay W. Forrester.
As head of the Lincoln Laboratory, Forrester was assigned by the Air Force in 1952 to coordinate the implementation of an alert and defense system, the SAGE system, using radar and computers for the first time. Its mission was to detect and prevent possible attack on American territory by enemy rockets. Forrester realized the importance of the systemic approach in the conception and control of complex organizations involving men and machines in "real time": the machines had to be capable of making vital decisions as the information arrived.
In 1961, having become a professor at the Sloan School of Management at MIT, Forrester created Industrial Dynamics. His object was to regard all industries as cybernetics systems in order to simulate and to try to predict their behavior.
In 1964, confronted with the problems of the growth and decay of cities, he
extended the industrial dynamics concept to urban systems (Urban Dynamics).
Finally, in 1971, he generalized his earlier works by creating a new
discipline, system dynamics, and published World Dynamics. This book was
the basis of the work of Dennis H. Meadows and his team on the limits to
growth. Financed by the Club of Rome these works were to have worldwide impact
under the name MIT Report
See also: the origin of cybernetics and the biographies of the most important cybernetic thinkers at the cybernetics page of the ASC
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1979 by Harper & Row, (New York), but is now out of print. Therefore, we have made it again available on the web.
Dr. Joël de Rosnay, a molecular biologist, systems theorist, science writer,
and futurologist, is presently Director of Strategy of the Cite des
Sciences et de l'Industrie at La Villette (near Paris). He is an associate
of the Principia Cybernetica Project.
This book is an excellent, easy to read introduction to cybernetics and systems thinking, with applications to living organisms, the economy and the world as a whole. The main theme is that the complex systems which govern our life should be looked at as a whole, rather than be taken apart into their constituents. The different systems, processes and mechanisms are beautifully illustrated with examples and pictures. Although the text is over 20 years old, this visionary document is still highly relevant to our present situation and state of knowledge. It is particularly recommended to people who wish to get an understanding of the basic concepts and applications of systems theory and cybernetics. The chapters below can be read independently of each other.
Other, specific bibliographic references of books and a selected number of papers can be found in the library database of the Department of Medical Cybernetics and AI at the University of Vienna. A number of more recent books and papers can be found in our bibliography on the complex, evolving systems.
The books with links below can be securely ordered and paid for over the web from Amazon.com, the largest bookstore on the Net.
Key: ** Required
* Recommended
Excellent graphical introduction to dynamic systems theory.
Ackoff, Russel: (1972) On Purposeful Systems, Aldine Press, Chicago
Grand philosophy of human systems as teleological, goal-seeking. Structure, function, and purpose. Cognitive models and action in psychology; linguistics and semantics; conflict and cooperation; social systems.
Alan, TFH, and Starr, TB: (1982) Hierarchy: Perspective for Explaining Ecological Complexity, U. Chicago, Chicago
Anderson, PW, and Arrow, KJ et. al.: eds. (1988) Economy as an Evolving, Complex System, Addison-Wesley, New York
Critical anthology of system economic theory: applied mathematical techniques, dynamical theory, bounded rationality. Kauffman on "web searching"; Holland; Ruelle on nonlinear dynamics; Baum on neural nets.
Angyal, A: (1969) Logic of Systems, Penguin
Arbib, Michael A: (1972) Metaphorical Brain, Wiley, New York,
* Ashby, Ross: (1952) Design for a Brain, Wiley, New York.
A classic book, introducing fundamental systems concepts with examples related to the brain.
** (1956) Introduction to Cybernetics, Methuen, London
** (1981) Mechanisms of Intelligence: Writings of Ross Ashby/, ..... ed. Roger Conant
Atkin, RH: (1976) Mathematical Structure in Human Affairs, Heineman, London
Introduces Q-analysis, a methodology for identifying structures in data. The methodology uses some ideas of differential geometry.
Auger, Peter: (1990) Dynamics and Thermodynamics in Hier. Organized Sys., to appear
Aulin, AV: (1989) Foundations of Mathematical System Dynamics, Pergamon, Oxford
Causal recursion and its application to social science and economics, fundamental dynamics, self-steering, self-regulation, origins of life and mind.
* Aulin, AY: (1982) Cybernetic Laws of Social Progress, Pergamon, Oxford
Cybernetic social theory, including the Law of Requisite Hierarchy.
..... (1989) Foundations of Mathematical Systems Dynamics, Pergamon Press, Oxford
Barnsley, MF: (1988) Fractals Everywhere, Academic Press, San Diego
Best text on fractal geometry.
** Bateson, Gregory: (1972) Steps to an Ecology of Mind, Ballantine, New York
Bateson's critical essays. For purchase.
..... (1979) Mind and Nature, Bantam, New York
Unlike _Steps to an Ecology of Mind_, _Mind and Nature_ is an attempt at a coherent, popular statement of Bateson's philosophy.
Bayraktar, BA, and et. al., : eds. (1979) Education in Systems Science, Taylor and Francis, London
* Beer, Stafford: (1975) Platform for Change, Wiley, London
Foundational work in management cybernetics.
Bellman, Richard: (1972) Adaptive Control Processes: A Guided Tour, Princeton U, Princeton
An excellent book covering fundamental concept of systems science.
Beltrami, Edward: (1987) Mathematics for Dynamic Modeling, Academic Press, Orlando
Excellent mathematical introduction to dynamic systems theory, including catastrophe theory. Key results and theorems, examples. Many typos.
Blalock, HM: (1969) Systems Theory: From Verbal to Mathematical Formulation, Prentice Hall, Eng.Cliffs NJ
* Blauberg, IV, and Sadovsky, VN: (1977) Systems Theory: Philosophy and Methodological Problems, Progress, Moscow
One of the best overviews of philosphical and methodological development in systems theory, both in the Soviet Union and in the West.
Bogdanov, A.: (1980) Essays in Tektology, Intersystems
Translation of historical foundation of systems science.
Booth, TL: (1967) Sequential Machines and Automata Theory, Wiley, New York
One of the most comprehensive books on finite state machines, both deterministic and probablistic.
* Boulding, Ken: (1978) Ecodynamics, Sage, Beverly Hills
Unified theory of economics and social systems theory in terms of communicative processes.
..... (1985) World as a Total System, Sage, Beverley Hills
Brillouin, Leon: (1964) Scientific Uncertainty and Information, Academic Press, New York
Classic work on the relation between thermodynamics, information theory, and the necessary conditions for observability.
Brooks, DR, and Wiley, EO: (1988) Evolution as Entropy, 2nd edition, U. of Chicago, Chicago
Recent treatise on entropy as a general measure for biological study. Definitions of non-thermodynamic, non-informational entropies at multiple levels of analysis. Severely criticized.
Brown, G. Spencer: (1972) Laws of Form, Julian Press, New York
Philosophy of and notational system for propositional logic.
Basis for a whole school of graphical approaches to classical logic.
Brunner, RD, and Brewer, GD: (1971) Organized Complexity, Free Press, New York
Buckley, W: ed. (1968) Modern Systems Research for the Behavioral Scientist, Aldine, Chicago
Bunge, Mario: Method, Model, and Matter, D. Reydel
Campbell, Jeremy: (1982) Grammatical Man, Simon and Schuster, New York
Popular treatment of many aspects of cognitive science, information theory, and linguistics.
Cariani, Peter A: (1989) On the Design of Devices w/Emergent Semantic Functions, SUNY-Binghamton, Binghamton NY, NOTE: PhD Dissertation
Casti, John: (1979) Connectivity, Complexity and Catastrophe in Large-Scale Systems, J. Wiley, New York
..... * (1989) Alternate Realities: Mathematical Models of Nature and Man, Wiley, New York
Modern and very comprehensive text on mathematical modeling.
* Cavallo, Roger E: (1979) Role of Systems Methodology in Social Science Research, Martinus Nijhoff, Boston
Introduces the GSPS framework and discusses how it can be utilizes in social science research.
* Checkland, Peter: (1981) Systems Thinking, Systems Practice, Wiley, New York
Foundations of an area called soft systems methodology, for social systems management.
Christensen, Ronald: (1980) Entropy Minimax Sourcebook, Entropy Limited, Lincoln, MA, NOTE: Four volumes
..... (1983) Multivariate Statistical Modeling, Entropy Limited, Lincoln MA
Churchman, CW: (1968) Systems Approach, Delta, New York
General introduction to systems thinking in management.
..... (1971) Design of Inquiring Systems, Basic Books, New York
..... (1979) Systems Approach and its Enemies, Basic Books, New York,
Social systems philosophy. But also really about logic and mathematical description, excluded middles as "enemies"; relation of epistemics to action. Lucid, entertaining, critical.
Clemson, Barry: (1984) Cybernetics: A New Management Tool, Abacus Press, Kent
Guide to the theory and practice of management cybernetics. Based on Beer.
Codd, EF: (1968) Cellular Automata, Academic Press, New York,
Csanyi, V: (1982) General Theory of Evolution, Akademia Kiado, Budapest
On universal evolution. Ambitious, non-technical discussion.
Davies, Paul: (1988) Cosmic Blueprint, Simon and Schuster, New York
Excellent popular survey of complex systems theory.
De Chardin, Teilhard: (1959) The Phenomenon of Man, Harper and Row, New York
Early systemic evolutionary theology.
Denbigh, Kenneth G: (1975) An Inventive Universe, Hutchinson, London
On emergence and thermodynamics.
Denbigh, Kenneth G, and Denbigh, JS: (1985) Entropy in Relation to Incomplete Knowledge, Cambridge U., Cambridge
Good survey of quantum statistical dynamics, objectivity and subjecticity, basis of the fundamental assumption of thermodynamics, resolution of Gibbs paradox, relation to information theory.
Distefano, JJ, and et. al., : (1967) Feedback and Control Systems, Schaum, New York
Dretske, Fred: (1982) Knowledge and the Flow of Information, MIT Press, Cambridge
Treatise on information theory, syntax, and semantic.
Edelman, G: (1987) Neural Darwinism, Basic Books, New York
Theory of selectional processes at the neural level.
Eigen, M, and Schuster, P: (1979) The Hypercycle, Springer-Verlag, Heidelberg
Now classic work on the autocatalysis in chemical cycles: the cybernetic basis of metabolism.
Eigen, M, and R. Oswatitsch (1996): Steps Toward Life: a perspective on evolution
Erickson, Gary J: ed. (1988) Maximum-Entropy and Bayesian Methods in Science and Engineering, v. 1,2, Kluwer
Proceedings of the 5th, 6th, and 7th MaxEnt workshops. Foundations and applications. Spectral analysis, inductive reasoning, uncertainty and measurement, information theory in biology, etc.
Farlow, SJ: (1984) Self-Organizing Methods in Modeling, Marcel Dekker, New York
Feistel, Rainer, and Ebeling, Werner: (1988) Evolution of Complex Systems, Kluwer, New York
Oscillation and chaos in mechanical, electrical, chemical, and biological systems. Thermodynamics and spatial structures. Sequences, information, and language. Self-reproducgin systems, Lotka-Volterra systems.
Forrester, JW: (1961) Industrial Dynamics, MIT Press, Cambridge
..... (1971) World Dynamics, Wright and Allen, Cambridge
Influential early attempt at modeling the "world problem": the global economic-ecological web. Like the 's _Limits to Growth_.
..... * ed. (1975) Collected Papers of Jay W. Forrester, Wright-Allen, Cambridge
Papers by the outher of the "DYNAMO" differential systems tool, used for global ecological modeling.
Garey, MR, and Johnson, DS: (1979) Computers and Intractability: Guide to NP-Completeness, WH Freeman, San Francisco
One of the best monographs on computational complexity, NP-completeness and hardness, etc.
Gatlin, L: (1972) Information Theory and the Living System, Columbia U., New York
Classic work on the use of information theory in the analysis of genetic structure, evolution, and general biology.
* Gleick, James: (1987) Chaos: Making of a New Science, Viking, New York
Solid popular introduction to chaotic dynamics and fractal theory.
Glushkov, VM: (1966) Introduction to Cybernetics, Academic Press, New York
Excellent book on cybernetics, translated from Russian.
Greeniewski, H: Cybernetics Without Mathematics, Pergamon, Oxford
Gukhman, AA: (1965) Introduction to the Theory of Similarity, Acadenmic Press, New York
One of the excellent books on the theory of similarity.
* Haken, Herman: (1978) Synergetics, Springer-Verlag, Heidelberg
Original work by this unique developer of a "competitor" to systems science as the study of natural complex systems.
..... (1988) Information and Self-Organization, Springer-Verlag, New York
On synergetics as the science of complex systems. Integrates information theory, bifurcation theory, maximum entropy theory, and semantics.
Hall, AD: (1989) Metasystems Methodology, Pergamon, Oxford
Halme, A, and et. al., : eds. (1979) Topics in Systems Theory, Acta Polytechnica, Scandanavia
Hammer, PC: ed. (1969) Advances in Mathematical Systems Theory, Penn St. U, U. Park, PA
Hanken, AFG, and Reuver, HA: (1981) Social Systems and Learning Systems, Martinus Nijhoff, Boston
Happ, HH: ed. (1973) Gabriel Kron and Systems Theory, Union College Press, Schenectady NY
Hartnett, WE: ed. (1977) Systems: Approaches, Theories, Applications, Reidel, Boston
Herman, GT, and Rozenberg, G: (1975) Developmental Systems and Languages, North-Holland, New York
* Holland, John: (1976) Adaptation in Natural and Artificial Systems, U. Michigan, Ann Arbor
On the genetic algorithms method of modeling adaptive systems.
..... Hidden Order : How Adaptation Builds Complexity
..... Induction : Processes of Inference, Learning and Discovery;
Kanerva, Penti: (1988) Sparse Distributed Memory, MIT Press, Cambridge
On the geometry of high dimensional, low cardinality spaces; application to associative memory.
Klir, George: (1969) An Approach to General Systems Theory, van Nostrand, New York
An early book that describes the nucleus of what is known now as the General Systems Problem Solver.
..... ed. (1972) Trends in General Systems Theory, Wiley, New York
Contains overviews of systems conceptual frameworks of Mesarovic, Wymore, and Klir; and other papers on some fundamental issues of systems science.
..... ed. (1981) Special Issue on Reconstructibility Analysis, in: Int. J. Gen. Sys., v. 7:1, pp. 1-107
Broekstra, Cavallo, Conant, Klir, Krippendorff
..... (1985) Architecture of Systems Problem Solving, Plenum, New York
Vast, general theory of epistemological systems, outline of a platform for general systems modeling and inductive inference.
..... **(1992) Facets of Systems Science, Plenum, New York
Reprints of most classical papers in systems science with an up-to-date introduction. Recommended for everyone as a general introduction to the domain
Klir, George, and Folger, Tina: (1987) Fuzzy Sets, Uncertainty, and Information, Prentice Hall
Primary text on fuzzy systems theory and extended information theory.
Koestler, Arthur, and Smythes, J.R.: eds. (1968) Beyond Reductionism, Hutchinson, London
Classical anthology on holism and reductionism.
Krinsky, VI: ed. (1984) Self-Organization: Autowaves and Structures Far From Equilibrium, Springer-Verlag, New York
Langton, Chris: ed. (1988) Artificial Life, Addison-Wesley
Proceedings from first artificial life conference. Pattee, Goel, Hufford, Klir.
Lerner, D: (1963) Parts and Wholes, Free Press, New York
* Lilienfeld, Robert: (1978) Rise of Systems Theory: An Ideological Analysis, Wiley-Intersciences, New York
A good critical view of some undesirable developments in the systems movement.
Lumsden, Charles, and Wilson, Edward: (1981) Genes, Mind, and Culture: the Coevolutionary Process, Harvard, Cambridge
Non-systemic attempt at unified biological evolutionary theory. Mind as necessary explanatory component from genes to culture. Sociobiology, biological constraint and cause of behavior. Epigenetic rules, epigenesis as coevolution. Mathematical, culturgens. Euculture as human culture, vs. protoculture. Bibliography, no thermodynamics.
Mandelbrot, BB: (1982) Fractal Geometry of Nature, WH Freeman, San Francisco
Classical work on the implications of fractal geometry for modeling physical systems.
Margalef, D Ramon: (1968) Perspectives in Sociological Theory, U. Chicago, Chicago
Maturana, HR, and Varela, F: (1987) Tree of Knowledge, Shambala
On cybernetics and constructivist psychology.
McCulloch, Warren: (1965) Embodiments of Mind, MIT Press, Cambridge
Meadows, Donella H, and Meadows, Dennis L: (1972) Limits to Growth, Signet, New York, and its follow-up Beyond the Limits
Famous report of the Club of Rome. First systems dynamics model of world ecology.
Mesarovic, MD: (1964) Views of General Systems Theory, Wiley, New York
Mesarovic, MD, and Macko, D: (1970) Theory of Hierarchical Multi-Level Systems, Academic Press, New York
Mesarovic, MD, and Takahara, Y: (1975) General Systems Theory: Mathematical Foundations, Academic Press, New York
Mesarovic, MD, and Takahara, : (1988) Abstract Systems Theory, Springer-Verlag, Berlin
Grand formalism for Systems Science. Fundamental behaviorism. Teleogical (functional) and material, causal (structural) descriptions as equivalent in system-description language. Defense of formalism as a kind of language. Systems as proper relations. Cybernetic systems as goal-seeking. Complexity as meta-systems (nesting). Introductions to category theory, topology, etc. Fuzzy systems as ** open** systems.
* Miller, James G: (1978) Living Systems, McGraw Hill, New York
General synthetic theory of biological systems. On functional self-similarity across levels of analysis.
Miser, HJ, and Quade, ES: eds. (1985) Handbook of Systems Analysis, North-Holland, New York
Monod, Jacques: (1971) Chance and Necessity, Vantage, New York
Famous essay on philosophical problems concerning theories of biological systems.
Morowitz, Harold J: (1968) Energy Flow in Biology, Academic Press, New York
On the thermodynamics and informational (entropic) dynamics of biological processes.
Morrison, P: (1982) Powers of Ten, in: Scientific American Books, WH Freeman, New York
"Guided tour" through the spatial scales of natural structure.
Negoita, CV, and Ralescu, DA: (1975) Applications of Fuzzy Sets to Systems Analysis, Birkhauser, Stuttgart
* Negotia, CV: (1981) Fuzzy Systems, Abacus Press, Tunbridge-Wells
Simple, coherent introduction to fuzzy systems theory.
Nicolis, G, and Prigogine, Ilya: (1977) Self-Organization in Non-Equilibrium Systems, Wiley, New York
Technical work on self-organization in flow systems, thermodynamic systems, and other describably in terms of partial differential equations.
* Odum, HT: (1983) Systems Ecology, Wiley, New York
Grand theory of global ecology. Thermodynamic basis of economy.
Pattee, Howard: ed. (1973) Hierarchy Theory, George Braziller, New York
Phillips, DC: (1976) Holistic Thought in Social Sciences
On synthesis on holism and reductionism.
Pines, David: ed. (1988) Emerging Syntheses in Science, Addison-Wesley, New York
Includes key articles by Charles Bennett and interesting looks at spin-glasses and solitons.
Powers, WT: (1973) Behavior, the Control of Perception, Aldine, Chicago
Radical constructivist cybernetic psychological theory.
* Prigogine, Ilya: (1980) From Being to Becoming, WH Freeman, San Francisco
On the whole Prigogine program for explanation of evolution in thermodynamic terms.
..... (1984) Order Out of Chaos, Bantam, New York
Famous, almost-popular treatment of the relation between far-from-equilibrium thermodynamic, general evolutionary theory, and natural philosophy.
Rapoport, Anatol: (1984) General Systems Theory: Essential Concepts and Applications, Abacus, Cambridge
Rescher, Nicholas: Scientific Explanation
Uses stochastic automata in a philosophy of theory.
..... (1979) Cognitive Systematization, Rowman and Littlefie, Totowa, NJ
Treatment of coherentist epistemolgoy and formal development of the necessary limits to knowledge.
Rosen, Robert: (1970) Dynamical Systems Theory in Biology, Wiley-Interscience, New York
..... (1985) Anticipatory Systems, Pergamon, Oxford
The only book on anticipatory systems at present.
Rosenkrantz, Roger D: ed. (1989) ET Jaynes Papers on Prob., Statistics and Statistical Physics, Kluwer
Collection of Jayne's best papers.
Sage, AP: (1977) Methodology for Large Scale Systems, McGraw-Hill, New York
Sandquist, GM: (1985) Introduction to Systems Science, Prentice Hall, Eng. Cliffs NJ
* Sayre, Kenneth: (1976) Cybernetics and the Philosophy of Mind, Humanities Press, Atl. High., NJ
Grand cybernetic evolutionary theory of mind.
Schrodinger, : (1967) What is Life?, Cambridge U., Cambridge,
Classic essay series on foundations of biological theory.
Shafer, Glen: (1976) A Mathematical Theory of Evidence, Princeton U., Princeton
On the foundations of extended information theory, in particular extended probabilities and Dempster-Shafer evidential inference.
Shannon, CE: ed. (1956) Automata Studies, Princeton U. Press, Princeton
First and historically very important book on automata; includes von Neumann on probabilistic automata.
Shannon, CE, and Weaver, W: (1964) Mathematical Theory of Communication, U. Illinois, Urbana
Classic work on the foundations of classical information theory.
Simon, Herbert: (1969) Sciences of the Artificial, MIT, Boston
..... (1977) Models of Discovery, Reidel, Boston
Skilling, John: ed. (1989) Maximum-Entropy and Bayesian Methods, Kluwer
Proceedings of the 8th MaxEnt workshop. Statistical thermodynamics and quantum mechanics. Measurement, crystalography, spectroscopy, time series, power spectra, astronomy, neural nets. Fundamentals, statistics.
Skoglund, V: (1967) Similitude: Theory and Applications, Int. Textbook Co., Scranton PA
Smuts, JC: (1926) Holism and Evolution, McMillan, London
Early work on holism.
Steinbruner, JD: (1974) Cybernetic Theory of Decision, Princeton U, Princeton
Susiluoto, I: (1982) Origins and Development of Systems Thinking in USSR, in: Annales Acad. Scie.,Diss.HumanLitt., v. 30, Finnish Acad. Sci., Helsinki
* Szucz, E: (1980) Similitude and Modeling, Elsevier, New York,
Probably the most modern book on the theory of similarity.
Theil, H: (1967) Economics and Information Theory, Rand McNally, Chicago
Classic work on the use of information theory in economic theory.
Thom, Rene: (1975) Structural Stability and Morphogenesis, Addison-Wesley, Reading MA
..... (1983) Mathematical Models of Morphogenesis, Ellis Hortwood Ltd., New York
Topological approach to systems philosophy, catastrophe theory, dynamical systems.
Thompson, D'Arcy: (1959) On Growth and Form, Cambridge U., Cambridge
Classic work in early cybernetic biological theory.
Trappl, Robert: ed. (1983) Cybernetics: Theory and Applications, Hemisphere, Washington
Anthology of foundations of systems and cybernetics; review of applications; complete bibliography. Beer, Atlan, Pichler, Klir, Pask, Nowakowska, Arbib, Laszlo.Trappl, Robert, and Horn, W, et. al.: eds. (1984) Basic and Applied General Systems Research: Bibliography, IFSR, Laxenburg,Aust., NOTE: From 1977-1984
Turchin, Valentin: (1977) Phenomenon of Science, Columbia U., New York
Cybernetic theory of universal evolution. Metascience as a cybernetic enterprise...... (1981) Inertia of Fear and Scientific Worldview, Columbia U. Press, New York
Interpretation of totalitarianism from the persepctive of cybernetic social theory.** von Bertalanffy, Ludwig: (1968) General Systems Theory, George Braziller, New York
Van Laarhove, PJ, and Aarts, EHL: (1987) Simulated Annealing: Theory and Applications, Kluwer
On phase transitions.Varela, FG: (1979) Principles of Biological Autonomy, North Holland, New York
von Foerster, Heinz: (1979) Cybernetics of Cybernetics, ed. K. Krippendorf, GordonandBreach, New York
ed. (1981) Observing Systems, Intersystems, Seaside CA
Many classic early cybernetics essays. On self-organization,memory without record (non-localized representation), computation of neural nets, necessities of biological function. Later essays on self-referential psychology much weaker.von Foerster, Heinz, and Zopf, G.: eds. (1962) Principles of Self-Organization, Pergamon, New York
von Neumann, John: (1958) Computer and the Brain, Yale U., New Haven
Classical essay on the theoretical foundations of cognitive science...... (1966) Theory of Self-Reproducing Automata, U. Illinois, Urbana Ill.
Waddington, CH: (1977) Tools for Thought, Cape, London
Warfield, JN: (1976) Societal Systems, Wiley-Interscience, New York
Wartofsky, MW: (1979) Models, Reidel, Boston
Weber, Bruce: ed. (1988) Entropy, Information, and Evolution, MIT Press, Cambridge
Primary reference. Wicken, Wiley, Brooks. Cities as dissipative structures.
* Weinberg, Gerard M.: (1975) An Introduction to General Systems Thinking, Wiley, New York
A readable and insightful book...... (1988) Rethinking Systems Analysis and Decision, Dorset House, New York
Weir, M: (1984) Goal-Directed Behavior, Gordon and Breach
Wicken, Jeffrey: (1987) Evolution, Information and Thermodynamics, Oxford U., New York
** Wiener, Norbert: (1948) Cybernetics. or Control and Communication in the Animal and Machine, MIT Press, Cambridge On the Human Use of Human Beings: Cybernetics and Society
Wilden, Anthony: (1972) System and Structure, Tavistock, New York
Series of fascinating, polemical essays on a vast variety of subjects critical to systems and cybernetics and their relations to depth psychology, politics, and world culture.Wilson, B: (1984) Systems: Concepts, Methodologies, and Applications, Wiley, Chichester UK
Windeknecht, TG: (1971) General Dynamical Processes, Academic Press, New York
Wolfram, Steven: ed. (1986) Theory and Applications of Cellular Automata, Scientific Press
Wymore, AW: (1969) Mathematical Theory of Systems Engineering, Wiley, New York
..... (1976) Systems Engineering Methodology for Interdisc. Theory, Wiley, New York
Wymore, Wayne: Systems Theory
Yates, Eugene: ed. (1987) Self-Organizing Systems: the Emergence of Order, Plenum, New York
Critical collection on self-organizing systems. Includes Iberall, Morowitz, Arbib, Pattee, Haken, Caianiello, Abraham and Shaw.Zadeh, Lofti A: (1954) System Theory, in: Columbia Eng. Quart., v. 8, pp. 16-19
Zadeh, Lofti A, and Desoer, CA: (1963) Linear Systems Theory, Mcraw-Hill, New York
Zeeman, EC: (1977) Catastrophe Theory, Addison Wesley, Reading, MA
Development of hysteresis and catastrophe theory as a modeling tool for systems science.Zeigler, BP: (1976) Theory of Modeling and Simulation, Wiley, New York
Zeigler, BP, and Elzas, MS et. al.: eds. (1979) Methodology in Systems Modeling and Simulation, North-Holland, New York
Zeleny, Milan: ed. (1981) Autopoiesis: A Theory of Living Organization, North-Holland, New York
Critical anthology on this theory of self-organization, including Maturana and Varela.
All of the classic, "required" papers have been reprinted in the book: Klir G.J. (1992) Facets of Systems Science, (Plenum, New York). You can order photocopies of many papers via the CARL UnCover service, which provides a search through a database containing millions of papers in thousands of academic journals covering all disciplines. Other, specific bibliographic references of books and a selected number of papers can be found in the library database of the Department of Medical Cybernetics and AI at the University of Vienna. A number of more recent books and papers can be found in our bibliography on complex, evolving systems, and in the bibliography of the Principia Cybernetica Project.
Key: * Required
R Recommended
Abraham, Ralph: (1987) "Dynamics and Self-Organization", in:
/Self-Organizing Systems/, ed. Eugene Yates, pp. 599-616, Plenum
Review of the scope and extent of modern dynamics theory,
especially as related to problems in self-organization. Useful
after an elementary understanding of dynamical systems.
Abraham, Ralph, and Shaw, Christophe: (1987) "Dynamics: a
Visual Introduction", in: /Self-Organizing Systems: Emergence/,
ed. Eugene Yates, pp. 543-598, Plenum
Ackoff, Russel: (1979) "Future of Operational Research is
Past", /General Systems Yearbook/, v. 24, pp. 241-252
R Arbib, Michael A: (1966) "Automata Theory and Control Theory: A
Rapproachement", /Automatica/, v. 3, pp. 161-189
A unification of automata theory and control theory in a broader
theory of dynamic systems.
Arbib, Michael A, and Rhodes, JL et. al.: (1968) "Complexity and
Graph Complexity of Finite State Machines and Finite Semi-Groups",
in: /Algorithmic Theory of Machines, Languages and Semi-Groups/,
ed. MA Arbib, pp. 127-145, Academic Press, New York
A rigorous formulation of descriptive complexity of systems in
terms of finite state machines.
* Ashby, Ross: (1958) "General Systems Theory as a New
Discipline", /General Systems Yearbook/, v. 3:1
* (1958) "Requisite Variety and Implications for Control of Complex
Systems", /Cybernetica/, v. 1, pp. 83-99
* (1964) "Introductory Remarks at Panel Discussion", in: /Views
in General Systems Theory/, ed. M. Mesarovic, pp. 165-169, Wiley,
New York
(1965) "Measuring the Internal Informational Exchange in a
System", /Cybernetica/, v. 1, pp. 5-22
A readable paper that explains how the Shannon entropy can be
used in analyzing systems.
(1968) "Some Consequences of Bremermann's Limit for Information
Processing Systems", in: /Cybernetic Problems in Bionics/, ed.
H Oestreicher et. al, pp. 69-76, Gordon and Breach, New York
(1970) "Information Flows Within Coordinated Systems", /Progress
in Cybernetics/, v. 1, ed. J. Rose, pp. 57-64, Gordon and Breach,
London
(1972) "Systems and Their Informational Measures", in: /Trends in
General Systems Theory/, ed. GJ Klir, pp. 78-97, Wiley, New York,
* (1973) "Some Peculiarities of Complex Systems", /Cybernetic
Medicine/, v. 9:2, pp. 1-6
Atlan, Henri: (1981) "Hierarchical Self-Organization in Living
Systems", in: /Autopoises/, ed. Milan Zeleny, North Holland, New
York
Auger, Peter: (1989) "Microcanonical Ensembles with
Non-equiprobable States", /Int. J. Gen. Sys./, v. 20:3, pp.
457-466
Aulin, AY: (1975) "Cybernetics as Foundational Science of
Action", /Cybernetic/, v. 3
* (1979) "Law of Requisite Hierarchy", /Kybernetes/, v. 8, pp.
259-266
Bahm, AJ: (1981) "Five Types of Systems Philosophies", /Int. J.
Gen. Sys./, v. 6
(1983) "Five Systems Concepts of Society", /Behavoral Science/,
v. 28
(1984) "Holons: Three Conceptions", /Systems Research/, v. 1:2,
pp. 145-150
Comparison of three system philosophies.
(1986) "Nature of Existing Systems", /Systems Research/, v. 3:3,
Pergamon, Oxford
Philosophical analysis of the necessary and sufficient conditions
for systemic processes.
(1988) "Comparing Civilizations as Systems", /Systems Research/,
v. 5:1
Macroscopic structural, semantic analysis of cultural systems.
Bailey, Kenneth D: (1984) "Equilibrium, Entropy and
Homeostasis", /Systems Research/, v. 1:1, pp. 25-43
Excellent survey of these concepts in multiple disciplines.
Balakrishnan, AV: "On the State Space Theory of Linear
Systems", /J. Mathematical Analysis and Appl./, v. 14:3, ed.
1966, pp. 371-391
* Barto, AG: (1978) "Discrete and Continuous Model", /Int. J.
Gen. Sys./, v. 4:3, pp. 163-177
Bennett, Charles H: (1986) "On the Nature and Origin of Complexity
in Discrete, Homogeneous, Locally-Interacting Systems",
/Foundations of Physics/, v. 16, pp. 585-592
On Bennett's measure of algorithmic depth.
Black, M: (1937) "Vagueness: An Exercise in Logical Analysis",
/Philosophy of Science/, v. 4, pp. 427-455
Probably the best discussion of the meaning of vagueness and its
importance in science and philosophy.
* Boulding, Ken: (1956) "General Systems Theory - The Skeleton of
Science", /General Systems Yearbook/, v. 1, pp. 11-17
(1968) "Specialist with a Universal Mind", /Management Science/,
v. 14:12, pp. B647-653
* (1974) "Economics and General Systems", /Int. J. Gen. Sys./, v.
1:1, pp. 67-73
Bovet, DP: (1988) "An Introduction to Theory of Computational
Complexity", in: /Measures of Complexity/, ed. L Peliti, A
Vulpiani, pp. 102-111, Springer-Verlag, New York
Braitenberg, Valentino: "Vehicles: Expirement in Synthetic
Psychology", /IEEE Trans. of Syst., Man, and Cyb./
On the complex, seemingly lifelike behavior of simply designed
cybernetic robots.
* Bremermann, HJ: (1962) "Optimization Through Evolution and
Recombination", in: /Self-Organizing Systems/, ed. MC Yovits et.
al., pp. 93-106, Spartan, Washington DC
(1967) "Quantifiable Aspects of Goal-Seeking Self-Org. Systems",
in: /Progress in Theoretical Biology/, v. M Snell, pp. 59-77,
Academic Press, New York
Brillouin, Leon: (1953) "Negentropy Principle of Information",
/J. of Applied Physics/, v. 24:9, pp. 1152-1163
First Brillouin essay, on the relation between thermodynamic and
informational entropies.
* Bunge, Mario: (1978) "General Sys. Theory Challenge to
Classical Philosophy of Science", /Int. J. Gen. Sys./, v. 4:1
(1981) "Systems all the Way", /Nature and Systems/, v. 3:1, pp.
37-47
Carnap, Rudolph, and Bar-Hillel, Y: (1952) "Semantic
Information", /British J. for Philosopy of Science/, v. 4, pp.
147-157
Cavallo, RE, and Pichler, F: (1979) "General Systems
Methodology: Design for Intuition Ampl.", in: /Improving the
Human Condition/, Springer-Verlag, New York
Caws, P: (1974) "Coherence, System, and Structure", /Idealistic
Studies/, v. 4, pp. 2-17
Chaitin, Gregory J: (1975) "Randomness and Mathematical Proof",
/Scientific American/, v. 232:5
(1977) "Algorithmic Information Theory", /IBM J. Res. Develop./,
v. 21:4, pp. 350-359
Introduction of Chaitin's version of Kolmogorov complexity.
(1982) "Godel's Theorem and Information", /Int. J. Theoretical
Physics/, v. 22
* Checkland, Peter: (1976) "Science and Systems Paradigm", /Int.
J. Gen. Sys./, v. 3:2, pp. 127-134
Chedzey, Clifford S, and Holmes, Donald S: (1976) "System
Entropies of Markov Chains", /General Systems Yearbook/, v. XXI,
pp. 73-85
(1977) "System Entropy and the Monotonic Approach to Equilibrium",
/General Systems Yearbook/, v. 22, pp. 139-142
(1977) "System Entropy of a Discrete Time Probability Function",
/General Systems Yearbook/, v. 22, pp. 143-146
(1977) "First Discussion of Markov Chain System Entropy Applied
to Physics", /General Systems Yearbook/, v. 22, pp. 147-167
Cherniak, Christophr: (1988) "Undebuggability and Cognitive
Science", /Communications of the ACM/, v. 31:4
Like Bremmerman's limit, some simple mathematics on the limits of
computational methods.
Christensen, Ronald: (1985) "Entropy Minimax Multvariate
Statistical Modeling: I", /Int. J. Gen. Sys./, v. 11
R Conant, Roger C: (1969) "Information Transfer Required in
Regulatory Processes", /IEEE Trans. on Sys. Sci. and Cyb./, v. 5:4,
pp. 334-338
A discussion of the use of the Shannon entropy in the study of
regulation.
R (1974) "Information Flows in Hierarchical Systems", /Int. J.
Gen. Sys./, v. 1, pp. 9-18
Using classical (Shannon) information theory, it is shown that
hierarchical structures are highly efficient in information
processing.
* (1976) "Laws of Information Which Govern Systems", /IEEE Trans.
Sys., Man & Cyb./, v. 6:4, pp. 240-255
* Conant, Roger C, and Ashby, Ross: (1970) "Every Good Regulator
of Sys. Must Be Model of that Sys.", /Int. J. Systems Science/,
v. 1:2, pp. 89-97
Cornacchio, Joseph V: (1977) "Systems Complexity: A
Bibliography", /Int. J. Gen. Sys./, v. 3, pp. 267-271
De Raadt, JDR: (1987) "Ashby's Law of Requisite Variety: An
Empirical Study", /Cybernetics and Systems/, v. 18:6, pp.
517-536
R Eigen, M, and Schuster, P: (1977) "Hypercycle: A Principle of
Natural Self-Org.", /Naturwissenschaften/, v. 64,65
Classical work on molecular feedback mechanisms.
Engell, S: (1984) "Variety, Information, and Feedback",
/Kybernetes/, v. 13:2, pp. 73-77
Erlandson, RF: (1980) "Participant-Oberver in Systems
Methodologies", /IEEE Trans. on Sys., Man, and Cyb./, v. SMC-10:1,
pp. 16-19
Ferdinand, AE: (1974) "Theory of Systems Complexity", /Int. J.
Gen. Sys./, v. 1:1, pp. 19-33
A paper that connects defect probability with systems complexity
through the maximum entropy principle. Also investigates the
relationship between modularity and complexity.
Ford, Joseph: (1986) "Chaos: Solving the Unsolvable, Predicting
the Unpredictable", in: /Chaotic Dynamics and Fractals/,
Academic Press
Fascinating account of the relation between chaotic dynamics, the
limits of observability, constructive mathematics, exsitence and
uniqueness, and the "ideology" of the scientific community.
Gaines, Brian R: "An Overview of Knowledge Acquisition and Transfer",
/IEEE Proc. on Man and Machine/, v. 26:4
GSPS type methods as the general form of all science. Relation
of Klir's GSPS methodology to other inductive methodologies.
R (1972) "Axioms for Adaptive Behavior", /Int. J. of Man-Machine
Studies/, v. 4, pp. 169-199
Perhaps the most comprehenseive foundational work on adaptive
systems.
* (1976) "On the Complexity of Causal Models", /IEEE Trans. on
Sys., Man, & Cyb./, v. 6, pp. 56-59
R (1977) "System Identification, Approximation and Complexity",
/Int. J. Gen. Sys./, v. 3:145, pp. 145-174
A thorough discussion on the relationship among complexity,
credibiilty, and uncertainty associated with systems models.
* (1978) "Progress in General Systems Research", in: /Applied
General Systems Research/, ed. GJ Klir, pp. 3-28, Plenum, New
York
* (1979) "General Systems Research: Quo Vadis?", /General Systems
Yearbook/, v. 24, pp. 1-9
* (1983) "Precise Past - Fuzzy Future", /Int. J. Man-Machine
Studies/, v. 19, pp. 117-134
* (1984) "Methodology in the Large: Modeling All There Is",
/Systems Research/, v. 1:2, pp. 91-103
R Gallopin, GC: "Abstract Concept of Environment", /Int. J. Gen.
Sys./, v. 7:2, pp. 139-149
A rare discussion of the concept of environment by a well known
ecologist.
Gardner, MR: (1968) "Critical Degenerotes in Large Linear
Systems", /BCL Report/, v. 5:8, EE Dept., U. Ill, Urbana
A report on an experimental investigation whose purpose is to
determine the relationship between stability and connectance of
linear systems.
* Gardner, MR, and Ashby, Ross: (1970) "Connectance of Large
Dynamic (Cybernetic) Systems", /Nature/, v. 228:5273, pp. 784
Gelfland, AE, and Walker, CC: (1977) "Distribution of Cycle
Lengths in Class of Abstract Sys.", /Int. J. Gen. Sys./, v. 4:1,
pp. 39-45
* Goguen, JA, and Varela, FJ: (1979) "Systems and Distinctions:
Duality and Complementarity", /Int. J. Gen. Sys./, v. 5:1, pp.
31-43
Gorelick, George: (1983) "Bogdanov's Tektology: Naure,
Development and Influences", /Studies in Soviet Thought/, v. 26,
pp. 37-57
Greenspan, D: (1980) "Discrete Modeling in Microcosm and
Macrocosm", /Int. J. Gen. Sys./, v. 6:1, pp. 25-45
* Hall, AS, and Fagan, RE: (1956) "Definition of System",
/General Systems Yearbook/, v. 1, pp. 18-28
Harel, David: (1988) "On Visual Formalisms", /Communications of
the ACM/, v. 31:5
Reasonable, critical extensions of "Venn Diagrams", general
consideration of the representation of multidimensional systems.
Henkind, Steven J, and Harrison, Malcolm C: (1988) "Analysis of
Four Uncertainty Calculi", /IEEE Trans. Man Sys. Cyb./, v. 18:5,
pp. 700-714
On Bayesian, Dempster-Shafer, Fuzzy Set, and MYCIN methods of
uncertainty management.
Herbenick, RM: (1970) "Peirce on Systems Theory", /Transaction
of the S. Peirce Soc./, v. 6:2, pp. 84-98
R Huber, GP: (1984) "Nature and Design of Post-Industrial
Organizations", /Management Science/, v. 30:8, pp. 928-951
Excellent paper discussing the changing nature of organizations
in the information society.
* Islam, S: (1974) "Toward Integrating Two Systems Theories By
Mesarovic and Wymore", /Int. J. Gen. Sys./, v. 1:1, pp. 35-40
Jaynes, ET: (1957) "Information Theory and Statistical
Mechanics", /Physical Review/, v. 106,108, pp. 620-630
A classic paper. Information theory as a sufficient and elegant
basis for thermodynamics. But does it follow that thermodynamics
is necessarily dependent on information theory, or that entropy
is "just" incomplete knowledge? Compares principle of maximum
entropy with assumptions of ergodicity, metric transitivity,
and/or uniform a priori distributions. Prediction as microscopic
to macroscopic explanation; interpretation as macro to micro.
Johnson, Horton A.: (1970) "Information Theory in Biology After
18 Years", /Science/, v. 6/26/70
Scathing critique of the role of "classical" information theory
in biological science. Most of these criticisms are still
unanswered, if being addressed in a roundabout way (e.g.
algorithmic complexity theory).
Joslyn, Cliff: (1988) "Review: Works of Valentin Turchin",
/Systems Research/, v. 5:1
Short introduction to Turchin's cybernetic theories of universal
evolution.
* Kampis, G: (1989) "Two Approaches for Defining 'Systems'",
/Int. J. Gen. Sys./, v. 15, pp. 75-80
Kaufmann, Stuart A: (1969) "Metabolic StabilityandEpigenesis in
Randomly Constructed Genetic Nets", /Journal of Theoretical Biology/,
v. 22, pp. 437-467
(1984) "Emergent Properties in Random Complex Automata",
/Physica/, v. 10D, pp. 145
Kellerman, E: (1968) "Framework for Logical Cont.", /IEEE
Transactions on Computers/, v. E-17:9, pp. 881-884
Klapp, OE: (1975) "Opening and Closing in Open Systems",
/Behav. Sci./, v. 20, pp. 251-257
Philosophy on the dynamics of social processes; entropic
metaphors.
R Klir, George: (1970) "On the Relation Between Cybernetics and
Gen. Sys. Theory", in: /Progress in Cybernetics/, v. 1, ed. J
Rose, pp. 155-165, Gordon and Breach, London
A formal discussion on the relation between the fields of
"cybernetics" and "systems science", concluding that the former
is a subfield of the latter.
(1972) "Study of Organizations of Self-Organizing Systems", in:
/Proc. 6th Int. Congress on Cyb./, pp. 162-186, Wammer, Belgium
(1976) "Ident. of Generative Structures in Empirical Data", /Int.
J. Gen. Sys./, v. 3:2, pp. 89-104
(1978) "General Systems Research Movement", in: /Sys. Models for
Decision Modeling/, ed. N Sharif et. al., pp. 25-70, Asian Inst.
Tech., Bangkok
* (1985) "Complexity: Some General Observations", /Systems
Research/, v. 2:2, pp. 131-140
* (1985) "Emergence of 2-D Science in the Information Society",
/Systems Resarch/, v. 2:1, pp. 33-41
* (1988) "Systems Profile: the Emergence of Systems Science",
/Systems Research/, v. 5:2, pp. 145-156
Klir, George, and Way, Eileen: (1985) "Reconstructability
Analysis: Aims, Results, Problems", /Systems Research/, v. 2:2,
pp. 141-163
Introduction to the methods of reconstruction as well as their
relevance to general philosophical problems.
Kolmogorov, AN: (1965) "Three Approaches to the Quantitative Definition
of Information", /Problems of Information Transmission/, v. 1:1,
pp. 1-7
First introduction of algorithmic meatrics of complexity and
information.
Krippendorf, Klaus: (1984) "Epistemological Foundation for
Communication", /J. of Communication/, v. 84:Su
On the necessary cybernetics of communication.
Krohn, KB, and Rhodes, JL: (1963) "Algebraic Theory of
Machines", in: /Mathematical Theory of Automata/, ed. J. Fox, pp.
341-384, Ploytechnic Press, Brooklyn NY
(1968) "Complexity of Finite Semigroups", /Annals of
Mathematics/, v. 88, pp. 128-160
Layzer, David: (1988) "Growth of Order in the Universe", in:
/Entropy, Information, and Evolution/, ed. Bruce Weber et. al.,
pp. 23-40, MIT Press, Cambridge
On the thermodynamics of cosmological evolution, and the
necessity of "self-organization" in an expanding universe.
* Lendaris, GG: (1964) "On the Definition of Self-Organizing
Systems", /IEEE Proceedings/, v. 52, pp. 324-325
R Lettvin, JY, and Maturana, HR: (1959) "What the Frog's Eye Tell
the Frog's Brain", /Proceedings of the IRE/, v. 47, pp.
1940-1951
Classic early paper in cybernetics, cited as the basis of
"constructive" psychological theory.
Levin, Steve: (1986) "Icosahedron as 3D Finite Element in
Biomechanical Supp.", in: /Proc. 30th SGSR/, v. G, pp. 14-23
R (1989) "Space Truss as Model for Cervical Spine Mechanics",
NOTE: Manuscript
Startling theory of the necessary foundations of biomechanics in
2-d triangular (heaogonal) plane packing and 3-d dodecahedral
space packing.
Lloyd, Seth, and Pagels, Heinz: (1988) "Complexity as
Thermodynamic Depth", /Annals of Physics/, v. 188, pp. 1
Perhaps a classic, on their new measure as the difference betwen
fine and coarse entropy. Comparison with other measures of
depth, complexity, and information.
* Lofgren, Lars: (1977) "Complexity of Descriptions of Sys: A
Foundational Study", /Int. J. Gen. Sys./, v. 3:4, pp. 197-214
Madden, RF, and Ashby, Ross: (1972) "On Identification of
Many-Dimensional Relations", /Int. J. of Systems Science/, v. 3,
pp. 343-356
An early paper contributing to the area that is known now as
reconstructibility analysis.
Makridakis, S, and Faucheux, C: (1973) "Stability Properties of
General Systems", /General Systems Yearbook/, v. 18, pp. 3-12
Makridakis, S, and Weinstraub, ER: (1971) "On the Synthesis of
General Systems", /General Systems Yearbook/, v. 16, pp. 43-54
Margalef, D Ramon: (1958) "Information Theory in Ecology",
/General Systems Yearbook/, v. 3, pp. 36-71
* Marschal, JH: (1975) "Concept of a System", /Philosophy of
Science/, v. 42:4, pp. 448-467
* May, RM: (1972) "Will a Large Complex System be Stable?",
/Nature/, v. 238, pp. 413-414
McCulloch, Warren, and Pitts, WH: "Logical Calculus of Ideas
Immanent in Nervous Activity", /Bull. Math. Biophysics/, v. 5
Classic early work on the neural nets as a logical modeling
tool.
McGill, WJ: (1954) "Multivariate Information Transmission",
/Psychometrica/, v. 19, pp. 97-116
Mesarovic, MD: (1968) "Auxiliary Functions and Constructive
Specification of Gen. Sys.", /Mathematical Systems Theory/,
v. 2:3
R Miller, James G: (1986) "Can Systems Theory Generate Testable
Hypotheses?", /Systems Research/, v. 3:2, pp. 73-84
On systems theoretic research programs attempting to unify
scientific theory through hypothesized isomorphies among levels
of analysis.
Negoita, CV: (1989) "Review: Fuzzy Sets, Uncertainty, and
Information", /Kybernetes/, v. 18:1, pp. 73-74
Good analysis of the significance of fuzzy set theory.
Pattee, Howard: "Evolution of Self-Simplifying Systems", in:
/Relevance of GST/, ed. Ervin Laszlo, George Braziller, New York,
"Instabilities and Information in Biological Self-Organization",
in: /Self Organizing Systems/, ed. F. Eugene Yates, Plenum, New York
(1973) "Physical Problems of Origin of NaturalControl", in:
/Biogenesis, Evolution, Homeostasis/, ed. A. Locker,
Springer-Verlag, New York
(1978) "Complementarity Principle in Biological and Social Structures",
/J. of Social and Biological Structures/, v. 1
(1985) "Universal Principle of Measurement and Language Function in
Evolving Systems", in: /Complexity, Language, and Life/, ed. John
Casti, pp. 268-281, Springer-Verlag, Berlin
(1988) "Simulations, Realizations, and Theories of Life", in:
/Artificial Life/, ed. C Langton, pp. 63-77, Addison-Wesley,
Redwood City CA
Patten, BC: (1978) "Systems Approach to the Concept of
Environment", /Ohio J. of Science/, v. 78:4, pp. 206-222
Pearl, J: (1978) "On Connection Between Complexity and Credibility of
Inferred Models", /Int. J. Gen. Sys./, v. 4:4, pp. 255-264
Theoretical study that shows that credibility of determinstic
models inferred from data tends to increase with data size and
decrease with the complexity of the model.
Pedrycz, W: (1981) "On Approach to the Analysis of Fuzzy
Systmes", /Int. J. of Control/, v. 34, pp. 403-421
Peterson, JL: (1977) "Petri Nets", /ACM Computing Surveys/, v.
9:3, pp. 223-252
R Pippenger, N: (1978) "Complexity Theory", /Scientific
American/, v. 238:6, pp. 114-124
Excellent discussion of one facet of complexity.
* Porter, B: (1976) "Requisite Variety in the Systems and Control
Sciences", /Int. J. Gen. Sys./, v. 2:4, pp. 225-229
Prigogine, Ilya, and Nicolis, Gregoire: (1972) "Thermodynamics
of Evolution", /Physics Today/, v. 25, pp. 23-28
Briefer introduction to far-from-equilibrium thermodynamics,
hypercycles, and evolutionary theory. Criticzed as confused.
Rapoport, Anatol: (1962) "Mathemantical Aspects of General
Systems Theory", /General Systems Yearbook/, v. 11, pp. 3-11
Rivier, N: (1986) "Structure of Random Cellular Networks and
Their Evolution", /Physica/, v. 23D, pp. 129-137
Brilliant introduction to the theory of the equilibrium
distribution of macroscopic entities (cells) in multiple kinds of
substances: metals, soap suds, and animal and vegetable tissues;
according to a non-thermodynamic maximum entropy law. Subsumes
other laws from these specific disciplines.
(1988) "Statistical Geometry of Tissues", in: /Thermodynamics and
Pattern Formation in Biology/, pp. 415-445, Walter de Gruyter,
New York
* Rosen, Robert: (1977) "Complexity as a Systems Property", /Int.
J. Gen. Sys./, v. 3:4, pp. 227-232
* (1978) "Biology and Systems Resarch", in: /Applied General
Systems Research/, ed. GJ Klir, pp. 489-510, Plenum, New York
* (1979) "Anticipatory Systems", /General Systems Yearbook/, v.
24, pp. 11-23
* (1979) "Old Trends and New Trends in General Systems Resarch",
/Int. J. Gen. Sys./, v. 5:3, pp. 173-184
* (1981) "Challenge of Systems Theory", /General Systems
Bulletin/
* (1985) "Physics of Complexity", /Systems Research/, v. 2:2, pp.
171-175
* (1986) "Some Comments on Systems and Systems Theory", /Int. J.
Gen. Sys./, v. 13:1, pp. 1-3
Rosenbluth, Arturo, and Wiener, Norbert: (1943) "Behavior,
Purpose, and Teleology", /Philosophy of Science/, v. 10, pp.
18-24
Original introduction of teleonomy, teleology, goal-seeking, and
intentionality in cybernetic terms.
Rothstein, J: (1979) "Generalized Entropy, Boundary Conditions,
and Biology", in: /Maximum Entropy Formalism/, ed. RD Levine, pp.
423-468, Cambridge U., Cambridge
On boundary conditions in biology, organisms as "well-informed
heat engines", definition of mutual information, order as an
entropy measure.
Sadovsky, V: (1979) "Methodology of Science and Systems
Approach", /Social Science/, v. 10, Moscow
Saperstein, Alvin M.: (1984) "Chaos: A Model for the Outrbreak
of War", /Nature/, v. 309
Schedrovitzk, GP: (1962) "Methdological Problems of Systems
Research", /General Systems Yearbook/, v. 11, pp. 27-53
Schneider, Eric D: (1988) "Thermodynamics, Ecological Succession and
Natural Selection: A Common Thread", in: /Entropy, Information, and
Evolution/, pp. 107-138, Bruce Weber et. al., Cambridge
On the thermodynamics of maturing ecosystems, relation to
Principle of Maximum Entropy Production.
Shaw, Robert: (1981) "Strange Attractors, Chaotic Behavior and
Information Flow", /Zeitschrift fur Naturforschung/, v. 36a
(1984) /Dripping Faucet as a Model Chaotic System/, Aeriel Press,
Santa Cruz
Best explanation of the nature of chaotic processes, especially
with respect to information theory.
Simon, Herbert: (1965) "Architecture of Complexity", /General
Systems Yearbook/, v. 10, pp. 63-76
* (1988) "Predication and Prescription in Systems Modeling",
NOTE: IIASA manuscript
Skarda, CA, and Freeman, WJ: (1987) "How Brains Make Chaos Into
Order", /Behavioral and Brain Sciences/, v. 10
Interpretation of neurological experiments revealing the
cybernetic basis of perception, the reliance on chaotic dynamics,
and the non-locality of mental representations. Resting as
chaos, perception as stable attractors, seizures as cyclic
attractos.
Skilling, John: (1989) "Classic Maximum Entropy", in: /Maximum
Entropy and Bayesian Methods/, ed. J. Skilling, pp. 45-52, Kluwer,
New York
Mathematical introduction to the traditonal MaxEnt method as
applied to data analysis.
Smith, C Ray: (1990) "From Rationality and Consistency to
Bayesian Probability", in: /Maximum Entropy and Bayesian Methods/,
ed. P. Fougere, Kluwer, New York
Mathematical introduction to the relation between inductive and
deductive reasoning, Cox's axioms, Bayes' theorem, and Jaynes'
MaxEnt program.
Smith, RL: (1989) "Systemic, not just Systematic", /Systems
Research/, v. 6:1, pp. 27-37
* Svoboda, A: "Model of the Instinct of Self-Preservation", in:
/MISP: A Simulation of a Model.../, ed. KA Wilson, NOTE: From
French,Inf.Proc.Mach. 7
Swenson, Rod: (1989) "Emergent Attractors and Law of Maximum Entropy
Production", /Systems Research/, v. 6:3, pp. 187-198
Good references for general evolution. Discussion of minimax
entropy production and emergence, biological thermodynamics.
Szilard, L: (1964) "On Decrease of Enteopy in Thermodynamic Systems by
Intervention of Intelligent Beings", /Behavioral Science/, v. 9
Classic first paper on the necessary relation between
informational and thermodynamic entropies.
Takahara, Y, and Nakao, B: (1981) "Characterization of
Interactions", /Int. J. Gen. Sys./, v. 7:2, pp. 109-122
Takahara, Y, and Takai, T: (1985) "Category Theoretical
Framework of General Systems", /Int. J. Gen. Sys./, v. 11:1, pp.
1-33
Thom, Rene: (1970) "Topological Models in Biology", in:
/Towards a Theoretical Biology/, v. 3, ed. CH Waddington, Aldine,
Chicago
On self-simplifying systems.
Tribus, Myron: (1961) "Information Theory as the Basis for
Thermostatistics and Thermodynamics", /J. Applied Mechanics/, v. 28,
pp. 108
Full description of the derivation of basic thermodynamics from
Jayne's maximum entropy formalism.
R Turchin, Valentin: (1982) "Institutionalization of Values",
/Worldview/, v. 11/82
Review of Turchin's social theory and defense of reviews of
_Phenomenon of Science_ and _Inertia of Fear_.
(1987) "Constructive Interpretation of Full Set Theory", /J. of
Symbolic Logic/, v. 52:1
Almost complete reconstruction of ZF set theory from a
constructivist philosophy, including implementation in the REFAL
language.
Turney, P: (1989) "Architecture of Complexity: A New
Blueprint", /Synthese/, v. 79:3, pp. 515-542
Ulanowicz, R, and Hennon, B: (1987) "Life and Production of
Entropy", /Proc. R. Soc. London/, v. B 232, pp. 181-192
Excellent: principle of maximum entropy production; positive
feedback=autocatalysis; lasers as high dissipative, low entropy
producing systems; nuclear autocatalysis as greatest source of
entropy production; measurement techniques for biotic entropy
production; all chemical organization as either extinct or in
organisms; high efficiency as high entropy production; on metrics
of evolution.
v Bertalanfy, Ludwig: (1950) "An Outline of General Systems
Theory", /British J. of Philosophy of Science/, v. 1, pp.
134-164
(1962) "General Systems Theory - A Criticial Review", /General
Systems Yearbook/, v. 7, pp. 1-20
* Varela, FG, and Maturana, HR et. al.: (1974) "Autopoiesis: the
Organization of Living Systems, its Characterization, and a Model",
/Biosystems/, v. 5, pp. 187-196
First definition of autopoeisis.
von Foerster, Heinz: (1960) "On Self-Organizing Systems and
their Environments", in: /Self-Organizing Systems/, ed. Yovitz and
Cameron, Pergamon
Well written, many interesting observations. Proof of
meaningless of the term "SOS", first (?) discussion of "growth of
phase space" route to organization, on relative information,
order from noise principle.
von Neumann, John: (1963) "General and Logical Theory of
Automata", in: /Collected Works/, v. 5, ed. AH Taub, pp. 288-328,
Pergamon
Classic. On thermodynamics and fundamental cybernetics,
digital/analog distinctions and relations in complex systems.
(1963) "Probability, Logic, and Synthesis of Reliable Organization
from Unreliable Parts", in: /Collected Works/, v. 5, ed. AH Taub,
pp. 329-378, Pergamon
On logics, automata, and information theory.
* Waelchli, F: (1989) "Eleven Theses of General Systems Theory",
/Systems Research/, NOTE: To appear
R Walker, CC: (1971) "Behavior of a Class of Complex Systems",
/J. Cybernetics/, v. 1:4, pp. 55-67
A good example of the use of the computer in discovering systems
science laws.
Walker, CC, and Ashby, Ross: (1966) "On Temporal Characteristics of
Behavior in Certain Complex Systems", /Kybernetik/, v. 3:2, pp.
100-108
Warfield, JN, and Christakis, AN: (1986) "Dimensionality",
/Systems Research/, v. 3:3, Pergamon, Oxford
R Weaire, D, and Rivier, N: (1984) "Soaps, Cells and Statistics:
Random Patterns in 2-D", /Contemporary Physics/, v. 25:1, pp.
59-99
Continution of Rivier 1986.
* Weaver, Warren: (1968) "Science and Complexity", /American
Scientist/, v. 36, pp. 536-544
From Klir, on organized simplicity, unorganized complexity, and
organized complexity.
White, I: (1988) "Limits and Capabilities of Machines: A
Review", /IEEE Trans. on Sys., Man, and Cyb./, v. 18:6, pp.
917-938
Wicken, Jeffrey: (1987) "Entropy and Information: Suggestions
for a Common Language", /Philosphy of Science/, v. 54:2, pp.
176-193
Solid paper on more modern view of the relation between
thermodynamics and information theory.
Wilson, David S: (1989) "Reviving the Superorganism", /J.
Theor. Bio./, v. 136, pp. 337-356
On levels of selection, criteria for being an organism, systems
vs. aggregates. Wilson is a current SUNY faculty.
Wolfram, Stephen: (1988) "Complex Systems Theory", in:
/Emerging Syntheses in Science/, ed. David Pines, pp. 183-190,
Addison-Wesley, New York
Example of a more simplistic appeal to entropy as a metric of
order.
Zadeh, Lofti A: (1958) "On the Identification Problem", /IRE
Trans. on Circuit Theory/, v. CT-3, pp. 277-281
* (1962) "From Circuit Theory to Systems Theory", /IRE
Proceedings/, v. 50, pp. 856-865
* (1963) "On the Definition of Adaptibility", /IEEE Proceedings/,
v. 51, pp. 469-470
(1963) "General Identification Problem", in: /Proceedings of the
Princeton Conference on the Identification Problem in Communications
and Control/, pp. 1-17
(1965) "Fuzzy Sets and Systems", in: /Systems Theory/, ed. J.
Fox, pp. 29-37, Polytechnic Press, Brooklyn NY
R (1973) "Outline of a New Approach to Analysis of Complex Sys.",
/IEEE Trans. on Sys., Man and Cyb./, v. 1:1, pp. 28-44
A motivation for using fuzziness in dealing with very complex
systems is discussed in detail.
(1982) "Fuzzy Systems Theory: Framework for Analysis of Buerocratic
Systems", in: /Sys. Meth. in Social Science Res./, ed. RE Cavallo,
pp. 25-41, Kluwer-Nijhoff, Boston
R Zeigler, BP: (1974) "Conceptual Basis for Modeling and
Simulation", /Int. J. Gen. Sys./, v. 1:4, pp. 213-228
A solid systems science conceptual framework for modeling and
simulation is introduced.
R (1976) "Hierarchy of Systems Specifications and Problems of
Structural Inference", in: /PSA 1976/, v. 1, ed. F.Suppe,
PD Asquith, pp. 227-239, Phil. Sci. Assoc., E. Lansing
Introduces a hierarchy of systems types (a formal treatment).
Zeleny, Milan: (1979) "Special Book Review", /Int. J. Gen.
Sys./, v. 5, pp. 63-71
(1988) "Tectology", /Int. J. Gen. Sys./, v. 14, pp. 331-343
On Bogdonav, an important historical figure in systems science.
Zwick, Martin: (1978) "Fuzziness and Catastrophe", in: /Proc.
of the Int. Conf. of Cyb.andSoc/, pp. 1237-1241, Tokyo/Kyoto
(1978) "Dialectics and Catastrophe", in: /Sociocybernetics/, ed.
F.Geyer et. al., pp. 129-155, Martinus Nijhoff, The Hauge,Neth.
R (1978) "Requisite Variety and the Second Law", in: /Proc. Int.
Conf. of Cyb. and Soc./, pp. 1065-1068, IEEE Sys. Man Cyb.,
Tokyo/Kyoto
Establishes the equivalence of Ashby's Requisite Variety Law and
the second law of thermodynamics.
(1978) "Quantum Measurement and Godel's Proof", /Speculations in
Science and Tech./, v. 1, pp. 135-145
R (1979) "Cusp Catastrophe and Laws of Dialectics", /System and
Nature/, v. 1, pp. 177-187
Expression of dialectical concepts (quantity to quality,
negation, interpenetration of opposites) in terms of catastrophe
theory.
(1982) "Dialectic Thermodynamics", /General Systems Yearbook/, v.
27, pp. 197-204
R (1984) "Information, Constraint, and Meaning", in: /Proceedings
SGSR/, ed. AW Smith, pp. 93-99, Intersystems
Wonderful treatment of the relation between syntax and semantics
in information theory.
Each of these books and papers is selected to be both very important to the domain, and of high quality. They are therefore highly recommended for everybody working in the domain. The number of stars (*) denotes the relative importance in terms of the number of citations. For a discussion of the main contributions of the following authors and publications, see my paper "Classic Publications on Complex, Evolving Systems: a citation-based survey" .
The books with links below can be securely ordered and paid for over the web via Amazon.com, the largest bookstore on the Net. Note: although out-of-print books too can be ordered in this way, it may be quicker to try and locate them in a public library.
Anderson P. W., K. J. Arrow, and D. Pines (Eds.). The Economy as an Evolving Complex System, Addison-Wesley, Redwood City CA, 1988. **
Arthur, W. B.: Competing Technologies, Increasing Returns, and Lock-in by Historical Events, The Economic Journal 99: 1989, pp. 106-131. *
Arthur, W. B.: Positive Feedbacks in the Economy, Scientific American, February 1990, pp. 92-99. *
Arthur W. B. Increasing Returns and Path Dependence in the Economy, University of Michigan Press, Ann Arbor, 1994.
Arthur W. B.: Bounded Rationality and Inductive Behavior (the El Farol Problem), American Economic Review 84, pp. 406-411, 1994.
Ashby W. R. An Introduction to Cybernetics, Methuen, London, 1964. **
Ashby W. R. Mechanisms of Intelligence: Writings of Ross Ashby, Intersystems, Salinas CA, 1981.
Ashby, W. R. Design for a Brain - The Origin of Adaptive Behaviour. Chapman and Hall, London, 1960.
Aulin A. The Cybernetic Laws of Social Progress, Pergamon, Oxford, 1982 *
Axelrod R. M. The Evolution of Cooperation, Basic Books, New York, 1984. *
Bak P. and Chen K.: Self-Organized Criticality, Scientific American: January 1991, pp. 46-53.
Bak P., Tang C., & Weisenfeld K.: Self-Organized Criticality. Physical Review A 38: 1988, pp. 364-374. *
Bak P., How Nature Works: The Science of Self-Organized Criticality, Springer, Berlin, 1996.
Bennett C. H. Dissipation, Information, Computational Complexity and the Definition of Organization. Emerging Syntheses in Science, Pines D. (ed.), Addison-Wesley, Redwood City CA, 1985, pp. 215-233. *
Boulding K. E. Ecodynamics: a new theory of societal evolution. Sage, London, 1978.
Campbell, D. T. Evolutionary epistemology. Evolutionary epistemology, rationality, and the sociology of knowledge, G. Radnitzky and W. W. Bartley (eds.), Open Court, La Salle IL, 1987, pp. 47-89.
Campbell, D. T. "Downward Causation" in Hierarchically Organized Biological Systems. Studies in the Philosophy of Biology, F.J. Ayala and T. Dobzhansky (eds), Macmillan, New York, 1974 .
Casti J.L. Complexification: explaining a paradoxical world through the science of surprise, HarperCollins, 1994.
Crutchfield, J., Farmer, J.D., Packard, N., and Shaw, R.: Chaos, Scientific American, 255 (6): December 1986, pp. 46-57.
Darwin C. The origin of species by means of natural selection or the preservation of favoured races in the struggle for life. (Edited with and introduction by J W Burrow). Penguin classics, 1985. (First published by John Murray, 1859) *
Dawkins R. The selfish gene (2nd edition), Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1989. **
Dawkins R. The Extended Phenotype: The Gene as a Unit of Selection, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1983. *
Dawkins R. The Blind Watchmaker, Longman, London, 1986. *
Eigen M. and P. Schuster. The Hypercycle: A principle of natural self-organization, Springer, Berlin, 1979 **
Eigen M., and R. Winkler-Oswatitsch. Steps Toward Life: a perspective on evolution. Oxford University Press, New York, 1992. *
Fisher R. A. The Genetical Theory of Natural Selection, 2nd edition, Dover Publications, New York, 1958.
Forrester, J. Industrial Dynamics, MIT Press, Cambridge, MA, 1961.
Forrester, J. W. World Dynamics (2nd ed.), Wright-Allen Press, Cambridge, MA, 1973.
Gell-Mann, M., The Quark and the Jaguar: Adventures in the Simple and the Complex, W.H. Freeman, San Francisco, 1994. *
Gleick, J. 1987. Chaos: Making of a New Science, Penguin Books, New York. *
Gould S.J., and N. Eldredge. 1977: Punctuated equilibria: the tempo and mode of evolution reconsidered. Paleobiology 3, pp. 115-151.
Haken H. Synergetics, Springer, Berlin, 1978.
Holland J. H. 1992. Adaptation in Natural and Artificial Systems: An Introductory Analysis with Applications to Biology, Control and Artificial Intelligence, MIT Press, Cambridge MA. ***
Holland J.H. Hidden Order : How Adaptation Builds Complexity , Addison-Wesley 1996.
Holland J. H., Holyoak K. J., Nisbett R. E. & Thagard P. R. 1986 Induction: Processes of Inference, Learning and Discovery, MIT Press, Cambridge MA. *
Jantsch, E., The Self-Organizing Universe: Scientific and Human Implications of the Emerging Paradigm of Evolution, Oxford, Pergamon Press, 1979.*
Kauffman S. A.: Antichaos and Adaptation, Scientific American: August 1991, pp. 78-84 **
Kauffman S. A. The Origins of Order: Self-Organization and Selection in Evolution, Oxford University Press, New York, 1993 ****
Kauffman S. A. At Home in the Universe: The Search for Laws of Self-Organization and Complexity, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1995.
Langton C. G.: Computation at the Edge of Chaos: phase transitions and emergent computation, Physica D, 42, 1-3, pp. 12-37, 1990. *
Langton, C. G. (Ed.). Artificial Life: The Proceedings of an Interdisciplinary Workshop on the Synthesis and Simulation of Living Systems, Addison-Wesley, Redwood City CA, 1989. **
Langton, C. G., Taylor, C., Farmer, J.D., and Rasmussen, S. (Eds.). Artificial Life II: Proceedings of the Second Artificial Life Workshop, Addison-Wesley, Redwood City CA, 1992. *
Langton, C. G. (ed.), Artificial Life: An Overview, MIT Press, Cambridge, MA, 1995.
Mandelbrot B. B. The Fractal Geometry of Nature, Freeman, New York, 1983.
Maruyama M.: The Second Cybernetics: Deviation-Amplifying Mutual Causal Processes, American Scientist 51, No. 2: 1963, pp. 164-179.
Maturana H. R., & Varela F. J. The Tree of Knowledge: The Biological Roots of Understanding, (rev. ed.), Shambhala, Boston, 1992. ***
Monod, J. Chance and Necessity, Collins, London, 1972.
Nicolis, G, and Prigogine, I. Self-Organization in Non-Equilibrium Systems, Wiley, New York, 1977. **
Nicolis, G. and I. Prigogine. Exploring Complexity, Freeman, New York, 1989.
Prigogine, I. and Stengers, I. Order Out of Chaos, Bantam Books, New York, 1984 ***
Prigogine, I. From Being to Becoming: Time and complexity in the physical sciences, Freeman, San Francisco, 1980.
Ray, T. S. An Approach to the Synthesis of Life. Artificial Life II, C. G. Langton et al. (Eds.), Addison-Wesley, Redwood City CA, 1992, pp. 371-408.
Shannon, C. E., and W. Weaver. The Mathematical Theory of Communication (5th ed.). University of Illinois Press, Chicago, 1963.
Simon, H. A. The Sciences of the Artificial (3rd. edition) MIT Press, Cambridge MA, 1996. **
Thom, R. Structural Stability and Morphogenesis, Benjamin, Reading MA, 1975.
Thompson, D. On Growth and Form, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1917.
Varela, F., Principles of Biological Autonomy, North Holland, New York, 1979.*
von Bertalanffy L. General Systems Theory (Revised Edition), George Braziller, New York, 1973. *
von Foerster H. On self-organising systems and their environments. Self-Organising Systems, M.C. Yovits and S. Cameron (Eds.), Pergamon Press, London, 1960, pp. 30-50. *
von Foerster H. and Zopf, G. (Eds.) Principles of Self-Organization, Pergamon, New York, 1962. *
von Foerster H. Observing Systems: Selected papers of Heinz von Foerster. Intersystems, Seaside, CA, 1981.
von Foerster H. Cybernetics of Cybernetics (2nd edition). Future Systems, Minneapolis, 1996. **
von Neumann J. Theory of Self-Reproducing Automata. (Ed. by A. W. Burks), Univ. of Illinois Press, Champaign, 1966. *
Waldrop M. M. Complexity: The Emerging Science at the Edge of Order and Chaos, Simon & Schuster, New York, 1992. **
Wiener N. Cybernetics: or Control and Communication in the Animal and Machine M.I.T. Press, New York, 1961. **
Wolfram S. Cellular Automata and Complexity: Collected Papers, Addison-Wesley, Reading MA, 1994.
Zeleny M. (Ed.) 1981, Autopoiesis: A Theory of Living Organization, North Holland, New York.
In Cybernetics and Systems Science proper, many people have approached the general task of compiling large amounts of useful information. There have been efforts on the part of scholarly organizations, like the International Society for the Systems Sciences (ISSS, formerly the Society for General Systems Research (SGSR)), to develop lists of terms and concepts held in common with Cybernetics and Systems Science. There are bibliographies of systems literature [TRRHOW84], at least four dictionaries of cybernetic terms [AM84,FRC91,KRK84,MUA68], and one encyclopedia of Systems Science [SIM87]. An important contribution is the large pamphlet Education in the Systems Sciences [SNB90], detailing a great deal of information about the whole nature of Cybernetics and Systems Science and how it is carried out around the world. [CLB84] includes a substantive glossary of systems terms. We should note the GENSYS project, directed by Len Troncale, which has an ambition similar to Principia Cybernetica.
{A classic; still the finest introductory book on cybernetics and systems theory. Includes problem sets, examples, and diagrams.}
{Translation of historical foundation of systems science.}
{Philosophy of and notational system for propositional logic. Basis for a whole school of graphical approaches to classical logic.}
{Primer on Systems Science.}
{Guide to the theory and practice of management cybernetics, based on Beer. Includes extensive glossary.}
{Early systemic evolutionary theology.}
{Computer database encyclopedia of iconic symbols.}
{Excellent book on cybernetics, translated from Russian.}
{An early book that describes the nucleus of what is known now as the General Systems Problem Solver: a general framework, or language, for systems science.}
{Textbook and essay collection for a first Systems Science course.}
{Translated from German by G. Gilbertson.}
{Survey of cybernetics.}
{Eight volumes, from the perspective of technical systems and control theory; also many excellent articles of a more general methodological and philosophical nature.}
{1st edition, Winter 1990, PO Box 5805, Berkeley CA 94705 USA. "Annotated Guide to Education and Research Opportunities in the Sciences of Complexity": degree-granting programs of study; societies, associations and organizations; directory of researchers; publications: periodicals and books; bibliography; keyword and cluster index; name index.}
{Anthology of foundations of systems and cybernetics; review of applications; complete bibliography. Beer, Atlan, Pichler, Klir, Pask, Nowakowska, Arbib, Laszlo.}
{Bibliography from 1977-1984, Continuation of earlier bibliography compiled by Klir.}
{Excellent popular introduction to systems theories and principles.}
{First book on cybernetics from this master of the field.}
annotate this page if you would like to make an addition or correction. See also the list of cybernetics journals from the ASC, and ASSA's list of Systems Journals.Adaptive BehaviorComments: devoted to experimental and theoretical research on adaptive behavior in animals and in autonomous artificial systems, with emphasis on mechanisms, organizational principles, and architectures that can be expressed in computational, physical, or mathematical models.; emphasizes an approach complementary to traditional AI, in which basic abilities that allow animals to survive, or robots to perform their mission in unpredictable environments, will be studied in preference to more elaborated and human-specific abilities; explicitly takes into account the environmental feedback.
Artificial LifeBehavioral and Brain SciencesComments: Interdisciplinary journal on theoretical and experimental psychology, with emphasis on cognitive and evolutionary models. Dialog format, not afraid to deal with philosophical and theoretical issues. To be considered as a commentator , to suggest other appropriate commentators, or for information about how to become a BBS Associate, please send email to:, harnad@clarity.princeton.edu
ISSS Comments: Old journal of the Society for General Systems Research (presently ISSS). Mostly social and psychological systems theory, often withe reference to Miller's living systems theory. Emphasis on interdisciplinarity, and generalizability of results across levels. Used to be included in many citation and reference indexes as an important journal, but has gone downhill and seems to have difficulty surviving. Co-sponsored by the Inst. of Management Sciences
BioSystemsrather small journal, locally published, with systems inspired work on cognitive science and neural networks
ComplexitySanta Fe Institute. Edited by John Casti and Harold Morowitz. Contains mostly introductory and survey articles.Complexity InternationalComments: Physics journal on dynamic systems theory, complex systems theory, cellular automata and networks, etc.
Comments: rather small, locally published, but long standing journal on cybernetics
Cybernetics & Human KnowingComments: emphasis on second-order cybernetics and semiotics (board: von Glasersfeldt, Von Foerster, Luhmann, Maturana, Braten, etc.)
Cybernetics and Systems Analysis*Cybernetics and SystemsDep. of Medical Cybernetics and Artificial Intelligence, University of Vienna, Freyung 6, A-1010 Wien, Austria.Comments: Excellent technical journal on all aspects of systems theory and cybernetics.
Evolution and Cognition
Konrad Lorenz Institute for Evolution and Cognition Research, Adolf-Lorenz-Gasse 2, A-3422 Altenberg Donau, AustriaComments: interdisciplinary research on evolutionary epistemology and evolutionary systems
Evolution of CommunicationComments: origins of human language, but also the evolutionary continuum of communication in general
ISSSComments: For years the annual publication of the Int. Soc. for Gen. Sys. Res. (ISGSR, now ISSS), featuring selected publications by foundational authors. Address probably out-of-date.
Comments: Official Journal of TAKIS
Comments: new developments in all areas of control systems technology, including, but not limited to, new sensor and actuator technologies, software and hardware for real-time computing and signal processing in, control systems, tools for computer-aided design of control systems, new approaches to control system design and implementation, experimental results, distributed architectures, intelligent control, and novel applications of control engineering methods.
IEEE Transactions on Systems, Man and CyberneticsComments: Long-standing cybernetics journal from a "reputable" publisher. More towards technical systems science, still broad-minded
IFSR Newsletter*International Journal of General SystemsGordon and BreachComments: Another premiere systems science journa. Frequently technical, otherwise broad. Complexity theory, mathematical systems theory, philosophy, history.
Comments: major focus of work developing and using Soft Systems Methodology
Journal of ComplexityComments: emphasis on mathematical and computational complexity.
Journal of Complex SystemsComments: new interdisciplinary journal in the complex adaptive systems tradition, with PCP editor Cliff Joslyn in its editorial board.
Journal of Memetics - Evolutionary Models of Information TransmissionComments:the first peer-reviewed journal on memes, freely available on the Web, sponsored by the Principia Cybernetica Project.
Journal of Social and Evolutionary Systems*KybernetesComments: Excellent British journal of systems science. Sometimes technical, otherwise broad.
Open Systems & Information DynamicsComments:interdisciplinary research in mathematics, physics, engineering and life sciences; system and information-theoretic approaches dealing with control, filtering, communication, pattern recognition, chaotic dynamics, memory and cooperative behaviour in open complex systems
Comments: journal of the French systems community; articles in French and English.
Comments: In English and Spanish, Latin American Journal of systems theory .
Social SystemsComments: In German, English and French; systems theoretical work in sociology, applications of general systems concepts (inc. cognition and difference) to society, interaction and organization .
Comments: Applications of dynamical theory to social systems modeling.
Systemic Practice and Action Research PlenumComments: application of "critical systems thinking" to improving work and organization
*Systems Research international federation for systems researchComments: another central journal for the systems theory community; emphasis on social science, management and systems thinking, less on mathematics and technology
Systems Research and Information ScienceGordon and BreachThe Information SocietyTIS Web)Comments: address probably out of date
World Futures: the Journal of General EvolutionGordon and BreachComments: Edited by Ervin Laszlo, board includes Ralph Abraham, Bob Artigiani, Bela Banathy, Peter Allen, George Kampis, Vilmos Csanyi, Varela. Contents: general patterns of change and development in nature as well as society; articles, short communications, and book reviews relating to evolutionary processes in all fields of science, with special attention to multidisciplinary approaches.
American Society for Cybernetics,
Address: Am Huelsenbusch 54,
D-44803 Bochum,
New England Complex Systems Institute
The Cybernetics Society (UK)Aims of the Association:
The Association has developed and is still developing the following activities:
President: Prof. Jean Ramaekers (Belgium),
Secretariat: International Association for Cybernetics
Palais des Expositions,
Place Andre Rijkmans,
5000 Namur (Belgium)
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Directory of Scholarly E-Conferences
Listservs at the CSOLWWW-server, FTP- archiveThe basic concept accepted by members of the Control Systems Group is that all organized behavior continuously controls the portion of perceptual experience which can be influenced by the actions of organisms. This is not an article of faith. It follows from a detailed quantitative analysis of behavior, showing that action affects the very perceptions on which action is based. The action might be as simple the tightening of a muscle, and the perception as elementary as the signal generated by a sensory nerve attached to a tendon Or the action might be as complex as formulating sentences, inflections, and expressions used in a conversation, and the perception as rich as judging the effects of one's communication on the attitudes of the listener, even as the words are being spoken.
As important function of the Control Systems Group is to provide a support system for people who have become dissatisfied with the quality of explanations in their own fields, and who have come to see control theory as a source of inspiration and a tool for productive and creative work.
Discussion might include, but is not limited to:
Whole SystemsThis is an unmoderated public list. No flaming will be allowed, but frank discussions are welcome. It is pre-supposed that the participants support the general idea of creating a better future and are able to tolerate diverse viewpoints.
Wholesys-l is a very busy list with many members and a lot of traffic. If you prefer to get only a few selected postings and no discussions, you should rather subscribe to the wholeinfo-l list. On the average one or two messages a day, which are each complete in themselves, will be forwarded from wholesys-l to wholeinfo-l. You can not post to the list directly.
Systems, Values & Organizations
ThinknetInternational Society for the Systems SciencesThe Observer WebAn electronic mailing list dedicated to Systems Science and Cybernetics on the SUNY-Binghamton computer system. The list is commited to discussing a general understanding of the evolution of complex, multi-level systems like organisms, minds, and societies as informational entities containing possibly circular processes. Specific subjects include Complex Systems Theory, Self-Organizing Systems Theory, Dynamic Systems Theory, Artificial Intelligence, Network Theory, Semiotics, fractal geometry, Fuzzy Set Theory, Recursive Theory, computer simulation, Information Theory, and more.
The purposes of the list include: 1) facilitating discussion among those working in or just interested in the general fields of Systems and Cybernetics; 2) providing a means of communicating to the general research community about the work that Systems Scientists and Cyberneticians do; 3) housing a repository of electronic files for general distribution concerning Systems and Cybernetics; and 4) providing a central, public directory of working Systems Scientists and Cyberneticians.
The list is coordinated by members of the Systems Science department of the Watson School at SUNY-Binghamton, and is affiliated with the International Society for the Systems Sciences (ISSS) and the American Society for Cybernetics (ASC). Different levels and kinds of knowledge and experience are represented.
It is a common observation that our present culture lacks integration: there is an enormous diversity of "systems of thought" (disciplines, theories, ideologies, religions, ...), but they are mostly incoherent, if not inconsistent, and when confronted with a situation where more than one system might apply, there is no guidance for choosing the most adequate one. Philosophy can be defined as the search for an integrating conceptual framework, that would tie together the scattered fragments of knowledge which determine our interaction with the world. Since the 19th century, philosophy has predominantly relied on science (rather than on religion) as the main source of the knowledge that is to be unified.
After the failure of logical positivism and the mechanistic view of science, only one approach has made a serious claim that it would be able to bring back integration: the General Systems Theory (von Bertalanffy; Boulding). Systems theorists have argued that however complex or diverse the world that we experience, we will always find different types of organization in it, and such organization can be described by principles which are independent from the specific domain at which we are looking. Hence, if we would uncover those general laws, we would be able to analyse and solve problems in any domain, pertaining to any type of system.
Many of the concepts used by system theorists came from the closely related approach of cybernetics: information, control, feedback, communication... In fact cybernetics and systems theory study essentially the same problem, that of organization independent of the substrate in which it is embodied. Insofar as it is meaningful to make a distinction between the two approaches, we might say that systems theory has focused more on the structure of systems and their models, whereas cybernetics has focused more on how systems function, that is to say how they control their actions, how they communicate with other systems or with their own components, ... Since structure and function of a system cannot be understood in separation, it is clear that cybernetics and systems theory should be viewed as two facets of a single approach. In order to simplify expressions, we will from now on use the term "cybernetics" to denote the global domain of "cybernetics and general systems theory". If you prefer, you may substitute "systemic" or "systems scientist" each time you will read "cybernetic" or "cybernetician".
What is the reason that cybernetics does not seem to get the popularity it deserves? What distinguishes cyberneticians from researchers in the previously mentioned areas is that the former stubbornly stick to their objective of building general, domain-independent theories, whereas the latter focus on very specific applications: expert systems, psychotherapy, thermodynamics, pattern recognition, ... These applications attract attention insofar that they are useful, concrete or spectacular. On the other hand, the aim of general integration remains too abstract, and is not sufficiently successful to be really appreciated.
But why then is cybernetics less successful than these more trendy approaches? Clearly the problem of building a global theory is much more complex than any of the more down-to-earth goals of the fashionable approaches. But we may also say that the generality of the approach is dangerous in itself if it leads to remaining stuck in abstractions, which are so far removed from the everyday world that it is difficult to use them, interact with them, test them on concrete problems, in other words, get a feel on how they behave and what are their strengths and weaknesses.
Our contention here is that the goal of global integration is still, if not more, of an essential importance, but that cybernetics has a number of lessons to learn from its more specialised applications. Whereas cybernetics aims to unify science, it is in itself not unified. Instead of looking down on practical applications, it should try to understand how those applications can help cyberneticians in their task of unifying science, and first of all unifying cybernetics. It should look upon them as tools, that can be used for tasks that may extend much further than the ones they were originally designed for.
Where the theory of cybernetics can be enriched by its applications, we may similarly expect that the applications will be enriched by a closer contact with the general theory from which they originated. There is now already a trend in many of those fashionable approaches such as expert systems design, robotics, man-machine communication, etc., to acknowledge the limitations of their specific paradigm, and to look back to a broader, "cybernetical" framework for inspiration on how to overcome them. In conclusion, what we are arguing for is a cross-fertilization between cybernetics and its various recently fashionable applications.
The reason we believe that the time is ripe for such an approach is that both cybernetics and its applications have reached a sufficient level of maturity that it seems realistic to integrate them in practice. The present situation in cybernetics may be compared with the situation in Mathematics at the end of the previous century. What cybernetics needs is support for coping with the practical complexity of its problem domain, and a concrete filling in of some of the main "slots" in its empty framework. What the applications need is a framework in which they can be fitted, brought into contact, and situated the one with respect to the other. This should bring cybernetics back into contact with reality, and help it to succeed in its overall goal of integrating the different systems of thought.
One had to wait further for the classical work of Russell and Whitehead, the Principia Mathematica, in which they ground the "principles of mathematical thinking" in a clear, apparently consistent and complete way. (the theorem of Gö;del later shattered the hope that such a formal treatment could ever be considered complete, but that is another story). What was novel in the work of Russell and Whitehead was that they applied mathematical methods to the foundation of mathematics itself, formulating the laws of thought governing mathematical reasoning by means of mathematical axioms, theorems and proofs. This proved highly successful, and the Principia Mathematica stills forms the basis of the "modern" mathematics as it is taught in schools and universities.
Let us further indicate the similarities and differences between a Principia Mathematica and a Principia Cybernetica. Both mathematics and cybernetics are in the first place metadisciplines: they do not describe concrete objects or specific parts of the world; they describe abstract structures and processes that can be used to understand and model the world. In other words they consist of models about how to build and use models: metamodels (Van Gigh, 1986). This meta-theoretical point of view is emphasized in particular in the so-called "second order cybernetics" (von Foerster, 1979; 1981), which studies how observers construct models.
It is because of this metatheoretic character that mathematics and cybernetics can be applied to themselves: a metamodel is still a model, and hence it can be modelled by other metamodels, including itself (Heylighen, 1988). In mathematics, the most well-known example of such a self-representation is the technique of "Gödelization", where a proposition about natural numbers is represented by a natural number. Of course, it is well-known that any self-representation must be incomplete (LÖfgren, 1990), as illustrated by the Gödel theorem, but we do not consider completeness in the formal sense to be a necessary condition for a practically functioning modelling framework.
Let us proceed with the differences between cybernetics and mathematics. Mathematics is characterized by the following assumptions: simplicity, regularity and invariance; the separability of systems into independent elements; and the objective, context-independent, value-free character of knowledge. Cybernetics, on the other hand, emphasizes complexity, variety and process; the fact that elements always interact; and the subjective, context- and value-dependent nature of knowledge. Cybernetics does not deny the value of mathematics; it assumes it but goes beyond it, by trying to encompass phenomena which cannot be represented in a static, unambiguous, formal framework. It is clear then that the self-application of cybernetics, in the form of a Principia Cybernetica, must be different from the Principia Mathematica model. A Principia Cybernetica must put the emphasis on evolution and open-endedness, on different levels of precision or vagueness, on dynamic interactions between a variety of systems or viewpoints.
Part of the reason why the General Systems movement in the fifties and sixties did not succeed in its objectives was because its models and methods were still too dependent on the static, atomistic paradigm that gave birth to mathematics and classical mechanics. The reason why the present situation is much more promising is that now we dispose of better concepts, tools (e.g. computers), and methods for modelling complex and dynamic phenomena (Heylighen, 1989).
Yet the idea of developing general principles (Principia) still assumes a striving towards clarity, "objectivity", and invariance. We do not want to get trapped in endless discussions and confusions over subjective meanings and viewpoints. The invariant principles that are to be derived, however, will be situated at such a high level of abstraction that they do not impose any absolute restrictions on concrete questions. They will form an empty skeleton or framework on which a multiplicity of more concrete theories can be hung (cf. Boulding, 1956). This framework will function primarily as a heuristic tool for building models, which will not preclude any model, but which will provide guidelines for avoiding difficulties and for making models more adequate. In order to succeed in that, the framework will need to incorporate methods for concretizing its own recommendations, depending on the context of the problem. This means that, unlike mathematics, the framework should provide many intermediate levels between the abstract, precise and invariant principles and their concrete, context-dependent implementations.
The potential for computer technology to revolutionize knowledge systems is of course not only well known, but also well underway. There are many \cite{BUV45,END63,NET65} who have championed the above ideas into the idea of constructing a "universal knowledge system" which would not only dynamically represent the current state of knowledge, but also make it accessible at multiple levels of resolution and in multiple orderings. Such a system is envisioned to have: universal access to all individuals and groups; universal content of all representable knowledge; unlimited "collaborative granularity" to group people and groups of people into other groups of people; a completely connected architecture, to ensure accessibility of the whole system; complete flexibility of representational form and modality; and a maximal interface through human sense organs and effectors, perhaps to the point of neural interfacing.
Of course, such a goal is still quite remote, for those researchers or any others in any field. Yet where else but in Cybernetics and Systems Science should this be seriously attempted? Where else are the fundamental principles of information systems so well understood and developed? Where else is this intimate relation between people and machines more highly championed? And, what other field could most benefit from the possibility of an easing of the construction of a unified conceptual territory from a vast, heterogeneous expanse?
| Synopsys: |
This is the quick answer to this fundamental question. In order to start giving the long answer, we should first examine each of the key terms in this sentence:
Fitness is the most important and tricky term of the answer to define. It can only be defined in terms which are not obvious themselves, and so need further definitions, and so on. One can hope that after a few rounds of definitions, the meaning will become sufficiently intuitive to be satisfactory for most readers. The whole of Principia Cybernetica Web can be viewed as an attempt to provide a sufficiently extensive semantic networks of concepts clarifying concepts (such as "fitness").
"Self-actualization", Maslow's term for maximally developing all our protentialities, and thus reaching the highest level of psychological health and awareness, is merely the implementation of fitness increase in the mental domain (see my paper on Maslow). Similarly, it can be argued that happiness is a direct sign that we have managed to improve our fitness. Thus, if people say that the meaning of life is to "learn and develop", "actualize our potentialities", "improve the balance of pleasure and pain", "enjoy ourselves" or "simply be happy", they are expressing a more limited version of the answer above (limited in the sense that it is more difficult to apply to non-human life, and does not take into account other aspects of life).
On the other hand, people who express the belief that the meaning of life is to "love and be loved", or "promote cooperation and togetherness" are expressing the importance of our social needs, which are another component of fitness. Indeed, fitness for individuals requires fitness for the group to which these individuals belong, and this implies cooperation and "love" rather than selfishness and hostility.
Even those people who state that "life has no meaning" do not contradict the present definition. Indeed, if "meaning" is seen in the restricted sense of a fixed, external purpose, then life has no meaning. "Increasing fitness" is not a goal explicitly imposed by some God, but rather the "implicit goal" governing all of evolution. There are an infinite number of ways in which fitness can be increased, so we cannot say that life necessarily has to move to one end state rather than another. Most changes are initially blind. It is just that some directions (those that decrease fitness) are likely to be eliminated sooner or later by selection.
We remain free in choosing which of the directions we will take: goals or values are not imposed on us. The fitness criterion is merely a guideline to help us choose those most likely to prolong and develop life. But the final decision will depend on our our personal circumstances, and therefore requires reflection. In that sense, the present answer also encompasses the answers of those people who state that the meaning of life is "a personal choice", "to be found within oneself", or even "to ask the question 'What is the meaning of life?'".
The Net's Meaning of Life
Meaning of Life submissions
the meaning of life in the Yahoo subject index
Meaning of life: a large collection of definitions
The Principia Cybernetica project was conceived by Valentin Turchin, a physicist, computer scientist, and cybernetician, whose political activity and antitotalitarian views led to his forced emigration from the Soviet Union to the United States in 1977. He had developed a cybernetic philosophy based on the concept of the "metasystem transition" with implications for human evolution, political systems, and the foundations of mathematics. He further wanted to develop an integrated philosophical system with a hierarchical organization, and involving multiple authors.
In 1987, Turchin came into contact with Cliff Joslyn, a systems theorist, software engineer, and proponent of Turchin's philosophy. After discussing Turchin's ideas for a collaboratively developed philosophical system, Joslyn suggested a semantic network structure using hypertext, electronic mail, and electronic publishing technologies as a viable strategy for implementation, maintenance, and production of such an ambitious project. Together they founded the Principia Cybernetica Project and formed its first Editorial Board. They wrote a first general proposal, and a document they called "The Cybernetic Manifesto" in which the fundamental philosophical positions were outlined. Joslyn began publicizing Principia Cybernetica by posting the relevant documents on the CYBSYS-L electronic mailing list in the autumn of 1989.
This generated a fair amount of response, including that of Francis Heylighen, a physicist, cognitive scientist, and systems theorist. He reacted with detailed comments on the content of the Project (the evolutionary philosophy), its form (the hypermedia organization of knowledge), and the link between the two. Heylighen had been developing a very similar philosophy to Turchin's and had been thinking along the same lines of creating a network of people interested in the domain of complex, evolving systems who would communicate with the help of various electronic media. He started an active correspondence with Turchin and Joslyn, and finally joined them as the third member of the editorial board in spring 1990.
Other reactions to Principia Cybernetica were more contentious. The strong tone of the "Manifesto", which was intended to provoke reaction, engendered a sometimes heated debate on the CYBSYS-L list, where several fundamental criticisms were made, leading the PCP-editors to carefully evaluate the wording of the project. The Manifesto became the first of many publications devoted to PCP, written by the editors and other contributors.
The first official activity of PCP was the sponsorship of a forum on Cybernetics and Human Values at the 8th Congress of the World Organization of Systems and Cybernetics at Hunter College in New York in July of 1990. The Editorial Board were joined by B. Lichtenstein and D. White in a forum which introduced PCP and discussed many of the relevant issues.
Following this forum the editors not only forged coherent working relationships, but were able to come to considerable consensus not only about issues of philosophical content, but also of management and organization.
The publication of the Principia Cybernetica Newsletter # 0 followed, which was widely distributed to members of the cybernetics and systems community by postal mail and computer networks. The Newsletter garnered many favorable and some critical responses from our colleagues, and the Editors proceeded to organize the 1st Principia Cybernetica Workshop, held at the Free University of Brussels during 5 days in July, 1991. This gathering was very successful and well attended, resulting in the publication of the Workbook containing extended abstracts of the papers presented at that meeting; and the Newsletter # 1.
1991 also saw the establishment of the PRNCYB-L electronic mailing list. PRNCYB-L is now used as a discussion medium for over 100 project participants.
National Fund for Scientific Research": one in 1992 for a collective project on Knowledge Development, one in 1993 for the individual project of F. Heylighen devoted to the network support for PCP, and another one in 1994, extending the previous project on Knowledge Development. The latter grant included a contract for a full-time research assistant to support the project. That position was given to Johan Bollen, who started to work for PCP in January 1994. F. Heylighen also received a grant specifically for his PCP-research in 1993 from the "Cultural Support Fund" of the Free University of Brussels. A paper by Heylighen on PCP, entitled "Principles of Systems and Cybernetics", received a "Best Paper Award" for the Symposium on "General Systems Methodology" at the 11th European Meeting on Cybernetics and Systems Research in Vienna, 1992. Following the success of the 1991 Workshop, PCP organized several other conferences, starting with a one-day symposium at the 13th International Congress on Cybernetics in Namur, Belgium in August 1992. A symposium on "Cybernetic Principles of Knowledge Development" was held at the 12th European Meeting on Cybernetics and Systems Research in Vienna, in April 1994 (at the same congress, the Principia Cybernetica Web was publically demonstrated). A very well-attended 3 day Symposium on "The Evolution of Complexity" was organized in Brussels at the "Einstein meets Magritte" conference, in June 1995, and a symposium on "Theories and Metaphors of Cyberspace" was organized in Vienna in April 1996.
1994 was the year in which PCP had been active for five years, leading us to produce a Progress Report. It concluded that, in spite of the great initial ambitions and rather limited means of the project, quite a lot had been achieved. In 1995, a special issue of "World Futures" was published on "The Quantum of Evolution". This collection of invited papers, edited by the PCP board, provided the first extensive overview of the theoretical framework developed by PCP.
In the autumn of 1995, a second electronic mailing list, PCP-news, was installed for the distribution of announcements.
The digest of messages sent to that list provides a detailed account of the developments since then, such as the different "spin-off" groups that PCP helped start up, which include the Global Brain Group, the Journal of Memetics and the study group on Progress.
http://gwis2.circ.gwu.edu/~joslyn/96summer.html for a program of the events). The most important result of the meeting was a new consensual definition of the central concept of "control" together with a number of related concepts. A draft node has already been put on the Web (see below), but it will be elaborated with many more details and related nodes in the coming two months.
It may be of interest to note that a new mailing list, j-memetics, has been created, which is to some degree a "spin-off" of PRNCYB-L. Its aim is to discuss the creation of a peer-reviewed, electronic journal devoted to memetics or "evolutionary models of information transmission". For more info, contact hanss@sepa.tudelft.nl (Hans-Cees Speel) or b.edmonds@mmu.ac.uk (Bruce Edmonds).
Last August, a new study group, associated with PCP, has been started, to discuss the emergence of a "global brain" out of the computer network, which would function as a nervous system for the human "superorganism". Participation is limited to people who have been doing active research and published books or papers on this subject. Present members are: Peter Russell, Gottfried Mayer-Kress, Gregory Stock, Lee Chen, Johan Bollen, Ben Goertzel, Joel de Rosnay, Valentin Turchin and Francis Heylighen. For more info, see http://cleamc11.vub.ac.be/suporgli.html or contact Francis Heylighen.
A first part of the new results, reached during the PCP board meeting in June, on the definition of control have now been incorporated into PCP Web (http://cleamc11.vub.ac.be/control.html). Moreover, our programs for self-organizing hypertext and retrieval of words through spreading activation can now be permanently consulted on the web, via a new node devoted to our research on learning, "brain-like" webs (http://cleamc11.vub.ac.be/learnweb.html).
The PCP editor Cliff Joslyn has moved from Goddard Space Center, NASA, to the Los Alamos National Laboratory. His new address is:
The groups associated with PCP have also been quite active. The people involved with the electronic "Journal of Memetics" have reached consensus on an introductory text describing the aims of the journal, a general editorial policy, a managing editor (Hans-Cees Speel, hanss@sepa.tudelft.nl), and the constitution of an advisory board (presently Daniel Dennett, Aaron Lynch, David Hull and Gary Cziko). At the moment, they are looking for authors wishing to contribute to the first issue, which is scheduled for 1997. If you are interested to write a paper or take part in the reviewing process, please contact Hans-Cees Speel.
The "Global Brain" group (see http://cleamc11.vub.ac.be/gbrain-l.html) has started its discussions on superorganisms and networks playing the role of nervous systems. Thanks again to Bruce Edmonds (who already created the PRNCYB-L archive, and the Journal of Memetics list and web site), an archive of the discussions can now be consulted at http://www.fmb.mmu.ac.uk:80/~majordom/gbrain/
We are happy to announce that Joel de Rosnay is joining PCP as a new "associate" (see http://cleamc1.vub.ac.be/masthead.html). Joel is a systems theorist, futurologist, molecular biologist and prolific writer of popular science books on topics related to the cybernetic world view. He is presently Director of Strategy of the Cite des Sciences et de l'Industrie at La Villette (Paris, France). His book "The Macroscope", a systemic view of the world as whole, will soon be made available on the Web with the support of PCP. Joel is in particular interested in the "cybernetic organism" formed by global society and its "planetary brain" emerging out of the computer networks. His home page, with interviews and excerpts from his work can be found at http://www.cite-sciences.fr/derosnay/e-index.html
The people involved with the electronic "Journal of Memetics", associated with PCP, have set up their (still experimental) web site for the publication of memetics related articles. The first papers should be published in the next few months.
The most important development was the publication on PCP Web of a complete book on the system's approach, "The Macroscope", by PCP associate Joel de Rosnay.
After the very successful Web publication of Joel de Rosnay's book "The Macroscope" (which has drawn many positive responses), we are preparing a Web version of another difficult-to-find classic book on cybernetics and systems thinking: "The Phenomenon of Science. A cybernetic approach to human evolution" by PCP editor Valentin Turchin. The book should be available on PCP Web in the coming weeks.
We are preparing the annual meeting of the Principia Cybernetica Editorial Board (F. Heylighen, C. Joslyn, V. Turchin and J. Bollen) in Brussels. It is likely to take place during the last week of June, and to include a visit to Paris for discussions with PCP associate Joel de Rosnay. It might also be accompanied by a seminar on Metasystem Transition Theory at the Free University of Brussels.
The "Journal of Memetics - Evolutionary Models of Information Transmission", associated with PCP, is ready to go on-line with its first issue. After peer review, four papers and a book review have been accepted for publication. Once the website has been thoroughly tested, its URL will be announced through this and other mailing lists. Richard Dawkins has agreed to join the Journal's advisory board.
As could be expected, there was not much activity during the summer months. As announced earlier, the PCP office has moved to a different building within the Free University of Brussels, and is now housed together with the associated Center Leo Apostel. New phone, fax, mail etc. addresses are listed on PCP's masthead (http://cleamc11.vub.ac.be/MASTHEAD.html). The move of the project's web server to the new physical location, which is connected to the network by a microwave antenna, went surprisingly smoothly. An increase in the number of system crashes after the move seems now to have been solved by updating the network software.
ASSOCIATED GROUPS
The opening up of the mailing list of the Global Brain Group to selected non-members has produced a lot of additional discussions. About a dozen new subscribers with diverse backgrounds have joined the list. The archive of messages can be consulted at http://www.cpm.mmu.ac.uk/~majordom/gbrain/
During a stay in Jan's summer house in the (French) Provence, Jan Bernheim and Francis Heylighen have further developed their ideas for a study group that would focus on an evolutionary analysis of social progress. It starts from the observation that practically all indicators for average quality of life (wealth, life expectancy, level of education, equality, democracy, literacy, IQ, life satisfaction, ...) have undergone a spectacular increase during the last half century. ( see http://cleamc11.vub.ac.be/CLEA/Groups/Progress.html). This undeniable progress for humanity as a whole stands in sharp contrast with the prevailing pessimism of many commentators or the relativism of the postmodernists. The main aim of the group is to analyse these trends critically, and to explain them on the basis of evolutionary principles. This may lead to practical and ethical guidelines for future developments.
This group would be associated with PCP, in a way similar to the "Global Brain Group". This means that the group works on a more specific subject within the larger evolutionary-systemic world view which PCP is developing, thus providing a more specialised focus, while including both PCP members and others. People interested in participating in this study group may contact Francis Heylighen
BOARD MEETING
In the period June 20-30, the annual meeting of the Principia Cybernetica Editorial Board (F. Heylighen, C. Joslyn, V. Turchin and J. Bollen) took place in Brussels. It included a visit to Paris for discussions with PCP associate Joel de Rosnay, and a meeting at the Center Leo Apostel of the Free University of Brussels. The discussions centered on a whole range of issues concerning the organization of the project and its philosophical content. The general state of the project, its web server and associated groups were reviewed.
Some of the practical issues discussed were the editing of nodes by editors at a distance (e.g. using Netscape Gold), and the conversion of LaTeX formatted texts (including a number of PCP papers by Turchin and Joslyn) to HTML. It was decided to try to program a simple converter in Perl, rather than install one of the cumbersome conversion packages that already exist. It was also decided to develop an animated version of the PCP logo, which would illustrate the process of metasystem transition as an infinite recurrence. More advanced interface issues for the organization of Principia Cybernetica Web were discussed, such as the use of frames or Java applets, but no concrete decisions were as yet taken.
At the content level, we focused on the central node about Metasystem Transition Theory, rewriting its text and reorganizing its child nodes. In particular, we decided to add a new "methodology" node. We further discussed different topics, including ethics, the global brain and the idea of progress. Cliff Joslyn proposed a new representation for the central concept of "control", thus extending the one developed at last year's board meeting in Washington DC.
We further discussed a number of recent developments in intelligent computer networking, such as the use of ontologies, semantic webs, link types in hypertext, groupware, multidimensional clustering to develop higher level concepts, graphical representations of complex web structures, agents, and spreading activation. All these technologies are potentially useful to make PCP web more intelligent and user-friendly. Moreover, they are likely to be included in one of the different research proposals being prepared by PCP members and others at the Los Alamos National Research Laboratory, the "Global Brain" study group, and the Free University of Brussels. It was concluded that we need to get a good grasp of the present "state of the art" for these technologies. This will help us to clarify, integrate and strenghten the different proposals.
The meeting with a number of researchers of the Center Leo Apostel (CLEA, see http://cleamc11.vub.ac.be/CLEA/) replaced a planned seminar on Metasystem Transition Theory (MSTT), which was cancelled for practical reasons. The discussion confronted PCP's MSTT with CLEA's research project on transitions between layers of reality. The parallels between both approaches were clear, and it was decided to try and integrate the "control levels" of MSTT and CLEA's "reality layers". This would entail an extension of the known sequence of metasystem transitions down to the level of quantum mechanics, according to the formula: classical mechanics = control (constrained variation) of quantum non-locality. Thus, the hypothesized MST would reduce the infinite dimensional Hilbert space of quantum phenomena to the three dimensional Euclidean space of classical mechanics.
The meeting with Joel de Rosnay at the "Cite des Sciences" in Paris focused mainly on the development of the "Global Brain" theme. de Rosnay suggested to organize a conference on the subject, and to arrange funding for research through various institutions with which he has good contacts. He told us that Microsoft chairman Bill Gates, with whom he is acquainted, expressed particular interest in PCP. We agreed that if de Rosnay does not find a publisher for the English translation of his 1995 book "L'homme symbiotique" (Symbiotic Man), we would publish it on PCP web, like we did with his 1975 book "The Macroscope". de Rosnay said he would send us a representation of his own "spiral" model of transitions to higher level of complexity, for inclusion in PCP web.
ASSOCIATED GROUPS
In the last week of May, the "Journal of Memetics - Evolutionary Models of Information Transmission", associated with PCP, went on-line with its first issue (
The "Global Brain" study group has decided to open up its mailing list to selected subscribers ( see http://cleamc11.vub.ac.be/gbrain-l.html ). The reason is that the founding members were too busy and their number was too small to sustain active discussions. However, since the global brain topic is bound to attract many mudheads and crackpots, while we wish to keep the intellectual level and signal-to-noise ratio of the discussion high, we agreed about a selection procedure on the basis of the submissions of prospective new members.
Alex Riegler, an Austrian cognitive scientist, has applied for a postdoctoral visiting fellowship at the Brussels office of PCP. If the application is accepted by the funding agency, he will start to work here on Feb. 1 for a period of one year (and possibly longer). Alex has been doing research on cognitive constructivism and the systems theory of evolution, applied to the design of autonomous agents. For further details and publications about this quite interesting work, see his home page: http://www.ifi.unizh.ch/~riegler/
Valentin Turchin's book "The Phenomenon of Science" has finally been completely scanned in. (the work was delayed because An Vranckx, who was working on the scanning, has been abroad for several months). Once the text has been converted to HTML and integrated with all the figures, the book will be made available on PCP web. We hope to make the official announcement within the next few days.
The study group on "Progress" associated with PCP has had its first informal meeting in Brussels, just before a seminar on "Understanding Happiness" by Ruut Veenhoven, a Dutch sociologist who has done extensive research on the social, economic and psychological factors involved in life-satisfaction. (see his World Database of Happiness:
VARIOUS ACTIVITIES
In spite of the intervening holidays, November and December were quite busy months for the PCP team. PCP editor Val Turchin's book "The Phenomenon of Science" was finally published on the web, and attracted quite some interest.
Two meetings were announced, a "Symposium on Memetics" (http://cleamc11.vub.ac.be/MEMETSY.html) chaired by PCP editor F. Heylighen and PRNCYB member Mario Vaneechoutte, and a Special Session on "Semiotics of Autonomous Information Systems" (
Although not officially associated with PCP, it is worth mentioning the creation of the new "Journal of Complex Systems" (
It has now been confirmed that Alex Riegler, an Austrian cognitive scientist, will come to work at the Brussels PCP office in February. Although his application to the Belgian Fund for Scientific Research was not accepted, he managed to get money for a year's stay from the Austrian National Bank.
The study group on "Progress", associated with PCP has submitted a research project entitled "Progress in global quality of life and its indicators: an interdisciplinary approach" for funding. The aim is to analyse a host of statistical data in order to study in how far the on-going development and modernization of society is associated with increase in happiness, and thus to test the evolutionary theory underlying PCP in the domain most relevant to our present situation. If the project is accepted, this will add another researcher to the PCP team in Brussels, and provide us with some more money. The promoters of the project are Francis Heylighen, Jan Bernheim, Ruut Veenhoven and Robert Scott Gassler.
THE PRINCIPIA CYBERNETICA WEB
The last part of 1997 was quite unlucky for PCP's technical infrastructure. First, the PRNCYB-L mailing list in Binghamton, NY, broke down for several weeks. Then, the PRNCYB-L archive in Manchester, UK, suffered a disk crash, so that several messages got lost. Finally, on Dec. 5, the main PCP web server in Brussels, Belgium, had a hard disk crash, caused by an electricity cut-off. Because of poor backing-up procedures (which will be remedied soon), the most recent copy of the material we had was 6 months old, so that lots of files were missing.
Happily, a call for help to this mailing list produced a deluge of reactions from people who had kept copies of PCP files. Two of them even had used a web robot to gather a complete copy of PCP web, which was not more than two weeks old. This allowed us to restore all lost files, though the robot produced a number of small formatting changes, which had to be undone. Because of that, you may still find a few errors in URL's in different PCP nodes. Please let us know if you find one, so that we can correct everything.
Thanks again to all those who offered their help. Because of you, PCP web could be restored with a minimum of delay. Your massive response showed how PCP has gathered a wide audience of people actively interested in our project. This group continues to grow, as shown by the 3 to 4 new subscribers this mailing list gains every week (while very few people ever unsubscribe), and by the many email reactions we receive.
It seems that the number of people actively interested grows more quickly than the number of hits on our server (at present inching towards 8000/day). This is probably caused by the massive increase in servers and web pages on the net, which compete for the attention of a more slowly increasing number of web surfers. The result is that the new users PCP web attracts will be lower in number, but higher in their interest for the specific PCP themes. When PCP web was created, there were only some 200 servers in existence, and practically every server was interesting for those exploring the new medium. Nowadays there is such an overkill in available information, that only those really motivated to study cybernetic philosophy are likely to discover, and do the effort to explore, PCP web.
After the busy activities at the end of 1997, the beginning of 1998 was relatively quiet. Alex Riegler has started to work at the Brussels PCP office at the end of January. He has joined the project as an editorial assistant. The new address of his home page is http://cleamc11.vub.ac.be/riegler/ He has also submitted a research project on "Evolutionary Complexification of Knowledge Systems". If this application is accepted, he will get a 3 year postdoc research contract to work with us.
Contributions for two PCP co-organized sessions are being collected. (see http://cleamc11.vub.ac.be/act.html) If you consider submitting an abstract to the symposium on memetics (http://cleamc11.vub.ac.be/MEMETSY.html), let me remind you that the deadline for submission is March 10, that is, next week. (the deadline for the session on Semiotics of Autonomous Information Systems has already passed).
Some of you may remember the symposium on "The Evolution of Complexity", organized by PCP in 1995 in Brussels (see http://cleamc11.vub.ac.be/EINMAGSY.html). The most important papers presented at this symposium, plus a few other selected papers, have been bundled into a book. This volume (the "violet book" in the 8 volume series Proceedings of the interdisciplinary conference "Einstein meets Magritte", see http://cleamc11.vub.ac.be/CLEA/publications.html) has finally been typeset, and proofs have been sent for correction to the authors. This means that in a few months, it should be available from the publisher, Kluwer Academic.
Since we regularly get questions about the existence of study programs in the domain of cybernetics and systems, it seems worth noting the organization of the 5th European School of Systems Science, in Neuchatel, Switzerland, Sept. 7-11, 1998 (see
The editorial board of the Principia Cybernetica Project has been preparing its annual board meeting, which will take place this year in Santa Fe, New Mexico, around August 10-20. This meeting will take place together with an informal, invited workshop involving, in addition to the PCP board, some people from the Santa Fe Institute, Los Alamos National Laboratory and the New Mexico State University. The topic is "Emergent Semantic and Computational Processes in Distributed Information Systems" (see
The Brussels PCP group has received an extensive visit by Mark Bickhard, a cognitive scientist/philosopher/psychologist from Lehigh University, where he has been working with the recently deceased Donald T. Campbell, a PCP associate. Bickhard has developed a philosophy very close to the one we call "Metasystem Transition Theory". Starting from a process ontology, Bickhard develops the theme of variation and selection and emergent organization at the different levels of reality, from quantum fields, via crystals, to living organisms and knowledge, with a specific emphasis on persons. His "interactivist" theory of representation is very close to our view of knowledge based on models, where correspondence is replaced by construction, constrained by selection on the basis of predictions. Bickhard is likely to join the project as an "associate". More info about his work is available at his home page:
The full program of the symposium on memetics, organized by PCP and the Journal of Memetics, including the abstracts of all accepted contributions is now available on the web: http://cleamc11.vub.ac.be/MEMETSY.html. Some 23 contributions have been selected for presentation.
The Brussels PCP group has received another extensive visit, this time by Liane Gabora, an artificial life/memetics researcher from UCLA, and member of the editorial board of the Journal of Memetics. There is a good chance that she will join us to do research at the Center "Leo Apostel" (CLEA) on the emergence of culture during evolution. Liane has developed an "autocatalytic" model for the emergence of culture or thought, inspired by Stuart Kauffman's work on the origin of life and sparse distributed memory models of cognition. This fits in both with PCP's theory of metasystem transitions, and CLEA's project on "transitions between hard and soft layers of reality". More info on her work can be found at http://cleamc11.vub.ac.be/CLEA/seminars/Gabora.txt . A recent paper is available at
Most papers to be presented at the symposium on memetics, organized by PCP and the Journal of Memetics, are now available on the web: http://cleamc11.vub.ac.be/MEMETSY.html. The symposium will take place for two and a half days, from August 26 (afternoon) to August 28. The latest issue (June) of the Journal of Memetics has been published at http://www.cpm.mmu.ac.uk/jom-emit/1998/vol2/index.html
The project on progress in global quality of life which we submitted was unfortunately not accepted by the funding agency. Neither was Alex Riegler's application for a 3 year Postdoc research contract at CLEA. We'll have to try again next year, or find alternative sources of funding. Johan Bollen has carried out extensive psychological experiments, in collaboration with people from the Catholic University of Leuven, to test the basic assumptions that underly our "learning web" methodology (http://cleamc11.vub.ac.be/LEARNWEB.html). At first sights, the results seem positive, but the data need much further processing.
After a year of relatively low level activity, the discussions on our PRNCYB-L mailing list have become very intensive again. Especially the topics of "non-physical experience", "mind and body", "reductionism, holism and complexity" and "will and free will" have produced dozens of messages each. John J. Kineman is presently exploring the possibility to create a two-way gateway between the PRNCYB-L emailing list, and a HyperNews discussion system on the web, that could be used also by non-PRNCYB subscribers. HyperNews was originally developed by another PRNCYB member, Daniel LaLiberte. You can try out a first prototype at
PCP has had had a successfull annual meeting of the editorial board in
Santa Fe, New Mexico, in which outstanding issues were discussed, and
contacts were made with different researchers working in New Mexico.
The meeting was organized together with a workshop on
"Emergent Semantic and Computational Processes in Distributed Information
Systems" at the Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL), in which all PCP
visitors and local residents participated, together with a number of
researchers from LANL, the Santa Fe Institute (SFI), and New Mexico State
University (NMSU). The workshop was well attended and aroused quite some
interest and discussion about the newly emerging domain of
self-organization and complexity models applied to information networks,
such as the web.
Texts of the contributions are being collected, and will be gradually made
available on the workshop's website
(
In addition, the PCP group had several interesting discussions with
researchers working in the New Mexico area, including Norman Johnson, the
driving force behing the LANL "Symbiotic Intelligence Project"
(
Liane confirmed that she has accepted our invitation to come to work in
Brussels on a two year research contract, starting on Oct. 1. This will
allow her to finish her PhD and continue her research on the emergence of
culture, while collaborating with the Brussels PCP group at the Center "Leo
Apostel". Inversely, a possibility was discussed for Johan Bollen from the
Brussels group to come and work at LANL for a one year period, in order to
collaborate more closely with Luis Rocha and Cliff Joslyn, the
representatives of PCP in New Mexico. Other possibilities for collaboration
were discussed with Bonabeau and Johnson, although no concrete decisions
have been made as yet.
Because of these different side-activities, together with the not-to-be
missed opportunities for sight-seeing and hiking in the spectacular New
Mexico surroundings, we had perhaps not as much time for the board meeting
itself as we had hoped. In particular, we did not manage to have in-depth
discussions on fundamental theoretical issues, although we did discuss some
interesting implications of the emergence of collective intelligence in
animal and human societies for developing a more detailed model of large
scale metasystem transitions. On the other hand, the meeting concluded with
a long list of concrete plans for the further development of the project
organization in general, and PCP web in particular. These objectives are
summarized below.
On the organizational level, it was decided to create an American office
for the project ("PCP West"), to complement the present European office in
Brussels. This permanent PCP presence at LANL has been made possible by the
recent promotion of PCP editor Cliff Joslyn to a tenured "staff" position
at the Los Alamos lab. The PCP editorial assistants, Johan Bollen and Alex
Riegler, were formally 'promoted' to "assistant editors". We also
reiterated our aim to more closely involve the different "associates" of
the project in the writing of nodes, and suggested some names of new people
to invite as associates or authors of nodes. Finally, we decided to renew
contacts with the International Society for Systems Science, which through
Bela A. Banathy expressed their interest to collaborate with PCP.
PLANS FOR PCP-WEB
During the meeting we received a final confirmation from Mick Ashby,
grandson of the famous cybernetician W. Ross Ashby, that he had received
permission from the publishers of his grandfather's classic book,
"Introduction to Cybernetics", to publish the book in an electronic version
on PCP Web. Since this will be the third "out of print" book which we
republish on the Web, we decided to create a special "library" section on
PCP web, with electronic versions of important books. The Ashby book will
be scanned in during the coming weeks and converted to PDF and HTML for
easy printing and browsing.
Moreover, we decided to produce an easy-to-print "book" version of all PCP
nodes, so that people don't need to browse between the hundreds of nodes,
but can read a more or less complete version of PCP web on paper. A more
ambitious aim, which may not be realized soon, is to provide PCP web users
with a "shopping basket", in which they can gather a list of only those
nodes ("pages") they are interested in, and then receive all these nodes at
once in an easy-to-print file format, without the navigational formatting
(menu bar, child nodes, etc.) that is only useful for web browsing.
PCP web itself is scheduled for a major overhaul, to improve both its
organization and its appearance, so that it would become more easy to
browse and to edit. Structurally, the idea is to clearly distinguish all
database fields (author, date, title, content, etc.) within the HTML code,
by introducing new tags such as
We have been experimenting with a number of new layouts, which should be
both esthetically pleasing and help the user to navigate more efficiently.
We would be curious to hear your reactions and suggestions with respect to
these different options. Some trial layouts can be seen at the subsequent
URLs http://cleamc11.vub.ac.be/layout/Default1.html, ..., Default12.html.
Apart from purely esthetical issues such as color schemes, icons and logos,
the main issue is whether we should put the navigational structure of
parent ("up") and child ("down") nodes in a vertical side bar (e.g
http://cleamc11.vub.ac.be/layout/Default7.html), or in a horizontal box at
the bottom of the page (e.g.
http://cleamc11.vub.ac.be/layout/Default12.html). Please let us know which
features or layouts you prefer.
For PCP web as a whole, it was decided to create, together with the New
Mexico office, a New Mexico mirror of the main Brussels server, so as to
facilitate access from America and provide a permanently available backup
in case of server problems. Moreover, if a NSF proposal submitted by the
LANL group and a group at NMSU would be accepted, money would become
available to create a "collaborative knowledge space", at NMSU. This would
contain an experimental version of PCP Web, the SFI web and perhaps others,
so as to allow experiments with different algorithms for web
self-organization or information retrieval, as they were developed by Luis
Rocha, Johan Bollen and other PCP contributors. It was also decided to try
and reserve some alternative domain names for the PCP server(s), in
particular: pcp.vub.ac.be, pcp.lanl.gov and cybernetica.org (pcp.org,
pcp.com and pcp.net are already taken by organizations that have nothing to
do with Principia Cybernetica).
MEMETICS SYMPOSIUM IN NAMUR
The Brussels PCP people had hardly recovered from the jetlag of the journey
back to Europe, or we had to go to the 3-yearly Cybernetics congress in
Namur, Belgium, for the first ever symposium on Memetics. The symposium was
organized and chaired by Mario Vaneechoutte and myself. It was quite
successful, with attendance ranging between 15 and 40 people during the two
and a half days. The discussions after each talk were particularly
animated, showing that memetics has developed into a topic that receives a
lot of interest, especially among young researchers. The average age of the
contributors was quite low (most of them did not have a PhD yet), and about
a generation younger than the age of the attendant to other symposia. The
congress president, Jean Ramaekers, told me that he was very happy with
this "rejuvenation" of a congress that has taken place without interruption
since 1956.
By the way, Jean Ramaekers and me also discussed the possibility to create
a Belgian association for cybernetics and systems science. This informal
association, for which WOSC president Robert Vallee suggested the name
"Systemica Belgica", would be used as a communication channel between
researchers in Belgium, to inform each other about cybernetics related
activities, such as seminars, conferences, projects, etc. If you work in or
around Belgium and would be interested to participate, please send me a
message with your address, domain of interest and suggestions about the
organization.
From the scheduled symposium program
(http://cleamc11.vub.ac.be/MEMETSY.html), only 3 contributors did not make
it: Liane Gabora, who had apologized because she was too busy preparing her
long term visit to Belgium, Thomas Quinn and Koen Bruynseels. On the other
hand, a guy whose name I don't remember (?Rosdeitcher?) presented an
improvised, but entertaining talk in which he sketched his own "conversion"
from being a follower of Ayn Rand's "objectivist" philosophy to becoming an
advocate of the memetic/cybernetic paradigm.
From the other, scheduled talks, I particularly appreciated my co-chair
Mario Vaneechoutte's speculations on the origin of life as a model for
memetics, Michael Best's simulation of cultural vs. genetic evolution,
Szabolcs Szamado's analysis of fundamental memetic replication processes,
John Evers' application of memetics to explain altruism and Paul Marsden's
review of research on "social contagion" as an existing body of empirical
data that cries out for a memetic reinterpretation. The talk by my PCP
collaborator Johan Bollen about our learning web algorithms also generated
a very positive response, although I am of course not in an objective
position to judge about its quality (;-). Practically all papers should by
now be available on the web via the above symposium URL. They will be
published by the end of this year as part of the congress proceedings.
The symposium was concluded with a lively panel discussion, chaired by Gary
Boyd, in which the absent panel member Gabora was replaced by Paul Marsden,
and a short brain storming session with all remaining participants to
generate a list of suggestions for us to advance the field of memetics. One
of the concrete decisions was to steer the Journal of Memetics more in the
direction of the system of commentary used by "Behavioral and Brain
Sciences". This requires us setting up a list of commentators.
We have a lot of it to thank to the World-Wide Web system becoming available in the meantime, solving most of our technical problems. We certainly must give credit to Cliff Joslyn for so well anticipating a system which at that moment did not exist, except in the mind of its inceptor, Tim Berners-Lee, who wrote his first, privately circulated, proposal for WWW at about the same time.
We will now review each goal separately, by quoting each of the 12 points from the original document, noting "YES" it it has been achieved, "NO" if we aren't there yet, and "MAYBE" if it has been achieved partially.
1. For a group of researchers, perhaps not all geographically close, to collaboratively develop a system of philosophy, where philosophy is taken in the general sense of clear and consistent language about ideas and concepts
The overall score seems pretty impressive: if we give 1 for a YES, 0 for a NO and 0.5 for a MAYBE, we get 9 out of 13, that is: 69 %, after less than 5 years of development.
Note, however, that these are objectives mostly about the "form" or organization of the Project. The goals for the "content" or philosophy were never stated as explicitly, apart from building a "complete and consistent philosophical system", including metaphysics, epistemology and ethics. Our system is definitely not complete, though its reach is quite broad, and few fundamental issues are left untouched. Its consistency is debatable but there are no obvious contradictions.
Taking into account that the original proposal described PCP as a "very long term" project, we may conclude that there is reason to be proud of what we have achieved in a rather short term existence.
Philosophy is the putting of our thought and language in order.
Philosophy is important. Philosophy is a part of our knowledge.
Cybernetic epistemology defines knowledge as
the existence in a cybernetic system of a model of some part of reality
as it is perceived by the system. A model is a
recursive generator of predictions about the world
which allow the cybernetic system to make decisions about its actions.
The notions of meaning and truth must be defined
from this perspective.
Knowledge is both objective and subjective because it
results from the interaction of the subject (the cybernetic system)
and the object (its environment). Knowledge about an object is
always relative: it exists only as a part of a certain subject.
We can study the relation between knowledge and reality (is the
knowledge true or false, first of all); then the subject of
knowledge becomes, in its turn, an object for another subject
of knowledge. But knowledge in any form (a proposition,
a prediction, a law), irrespective of any subject is a logical absurdity.
A detailed development of cybernetic epistemology on the basis
of these definitions is critical for the
formalization of the natural science and natural philosophy, and the
interpretation of mathematical systems.
Cybernetic metaphysics asserts that freedom is a fundamental
property of things. Natural laws act as constraints on that freedom;
they do not necessarily determine a course of events.
This notion of freedom implies the existence of an agency,
or agencies, that resolve the indeterminacy implicit in freedom
by choosing one of the possible actions.
Such an agency is defined as a will. A will exercises control over a system
when the freedom of that system is constrained by actions
chosen by the will.
We understand God in the spirit of pantheism.
God is the highest level of control in the Universe.
God is for the Universe what human will is for human body.
Natural laws are one of the manifestations of God's will.
Another manifestation is the evolution of the Universe: the Evolution.
When a number of systems become integrated so that a new level of
control emerges, we say that a metasystem has formed. We refer to
this process as a metasystem transition.
A metasystem transition is, by definition, a creative act.
It cannot be solely directed by the internal structure or logic of a system,
but must always comes from outside causes, from "above".
The metasystem transition is the quantum of evolution.
Highly organized systems, including living creatures,
are multilevel hierarchies of control resulting from
metasystem transitions of various scales.
Major evolutionary events are large-scale metasystem transitions
which take place in the framework of the trial-and-error processes
of natural selection.
Examples include: the formation of self-duplicating macromolecules;
formation of multicellular organisms;
emergence of intelligent organisms; formation of human society.
Human intelligence, as distinct from the intelligence of non-human
animals, emerges from a metasystem transition, which is
the organism's ability to control the formation of
associations of mental representations. All of specifically human
intelligence, including imagination, language, self-consciousness,
goal-setting, humor, arts and sciences, can be understood
from this perspective.
The emergence of human intelligence
precipitated a further, currently ongoing, metasystem
transition, which is the integration of people into human societies.
Human societies are qualitatively different from societies of animals
because of the ability of the human being to create (not just use)
language. Language serves two functions: communication between
individuals and modeling of reality. These two functions are,
on the level of social integration, analogous to those of the nervous
system on the level of integration of cells into a multicellular
organism.
Using the material of language, people make new --- symbolic -
models of reality (scientific theories, in particular) such as
never existed as neural models given us by nature.
Language is, as it were, an extension
of the human brain. Moreover, it is a unitary common extension
of the brains of all members of society. It is a collective
model of reality that all members of society labor to improve,
and one that preserves the experience of preceding generations.
We make a strong analogy between societies and neural,
multicellular organisms. The body of a society
is the bodies of all people plus the things made by them.
Its "physiology" is the culture of society. The emergence
of human society marks the appearance
of a new mechanism of Universal Evolution: previously
it was natural selection, now it becomes conscious human
effort. The variation and selection necessary for the increase
of complexity of the organization of matter
now takes place in the human brain; it becomes
inseparable from the willed act of the human being.
This is a turning point in the history of the world:
the era of Reason begins.
The human individual becomes a point of concentration of Cosmic
Creativity. With the new mechanism of evolution, its
rate increases manifold.
Turning to the future we predict that
social integration will continue in two dimensions, which
we can call width and depth. On the one hand (width), the growth of
existing cultures will lead to the formation of a world society and
government, and the ecological unification of the biosphere under human
control. The ethics of cybernetical world-view demands that each of us
act so as
to preserve the species and the ecosystem, and to maximize the potential
for continued integration and evolution.
On the other hand (depth), we foresee the physical integration of
individual people into "human super-beings", which
communicate through the direct connection of their nervous systems.
This is a cybernetic way for an individual human person
to achieve immortality.
The problem of immortality is the problem of
ultimate human values, and vice versa.
Living creatures display a behavior
resulting from having goals. Goals are organized hierarchically,
so that in order to achieve a higher-level goal the system has to
set and achieve a number of lower-level goals (subgoals).
This hierarchy has a top: the
supreme, ultimate goals of a creature's life. In an animal this
top is inborn: the basic instincts of survival and reproduction.
In a human being the top goals can go beyond animal instincts.
The supreme goals, or values, of human life are, in the last analysis,
set by an individual in an act of free choice. This produces the
historic plurality of ethical and religious teachings.
There is, however a common denominator to these teachings:
the will to immortality. The animal is not aware of its
imminent death; the human person is. The human will to immortality
is a natural extension of the animal will for life.
One concept of immortality we find in the traditional
great religions. We designate it as metaphysical.
It is known as immortality of soul, life after death, etc.
The protest against death is used here as a stimulus to accept
the teaching; after all, from the very beginning it promises
immortality. Under the influence of the critical scientific method,
the metaphysical notions of immortality,
once very concrete and appealing, are becoming
increasingly abstract and pale; old religious systems are slowly
but surely losing their influence.
Another concept of immortality can be called creative, or
evolutionary. The idea is that
mortal humans contribute, through their creative acts,
to the ongoing universal and eternal process -- call it Evolution,
or History, or God -- thus surviving their physical destruction.
This uniquely human motive underlies, probably, all
major creative feats of human history.
The successes of science make it possible to raise the banner
of cybernetic immortality. The idea is that the human being
is, in the last analysis, a certain form of organization of
matter. This is a very sophisticated
organization, which includes a high multilevel hierarchy of control.
What we call our soul, or our consciousness, is associated with
the highest level of this control hierarchy. This organization can
survive a partial --- perhaps, even a complete --- change
of the material from which it is built. It is a shame to
die before realizing one hundredth of what you have conceived
and being unable to pass on your experience and intuition.
It is a shame to forget things even though we know how to store
huge amount of information in computers and access them in
split seconds.
Cybernetic integration of humans must preserve
the creative core of human individual, because it is the engine
of evolution. And it must make it immortal, because
for the purpose of evolution there is no sense in killing humans.
In natural selection, the source of change is the mutation
of the gene; nature creates by experimenting on genes and seeing
what kind of a body they produce. Therefore, nature has to
destroy older creations in order to make room for the newer ones.
The mortality of multicellular organisms is
an evolutionary necessity. At the present new stage of evolution,
the evolution of human-made culture, the human brain is
the source of creativity, not an object of experimentation. Its
loss in death is unjustifiable; it is an evolutionary absurdity.
The immortality of human beings is on the agenda of Cosmic Evolution.
The future immortality of the human person does not
imply its frozen constancy. We can understand the situation
by analogy with the preceding level of organization.
Genes are controllers of biological evolution and they are immortal,
as they should be. They do not stay unchanged, however,
but undergo mutations, so that human chromosomes are a far cry
from the chromosomes of primitive viruses.
Cybernetically immortal human persons may mutate and evolve
in interaction with other members of the super-being,
while possibly reproducing themselves
in different materials. Those human persons who will
evolve from us may be as different from us as we are different
from viruses. But the defining principle of the human person
will probably stay fixed, as did the defining principle of the gene.
Should we expect that the whole of humanity will
unite into a single super-human being?
This does not seem likely, if we judge from the history
of evolution. Life grows like a pyramid; its top goes up
while the basis is widening rather than narrowing.
Even though we have seized control
of the biosphere, our bodies make up only a small part of the whole biomass.
The major part of it is still constituted by
unicellular and primitive multicellular organisms, such as plankton.
Realization of cybernetic immortality will certainly require
some sacrifices --- a vehement drive to develop science, to begin with.
It is far from obvious that all people and all communities
will wish to integrate into immortal super-beings.
The will to immortality, as every human feature,
varies widely in human populations. Since the integration we speak about
can only be free, only a part of mankind -- probably a small part -
should be expected to integrate. The rest will continue to exist
in the form of "human plankton".
But it is the integrated part of humanity that will ultimately control
the Universe. Unintegrated humanity will not be able to compete
with the integrated part. This becomes especially clear when
we realize that the whole Cosmos, not the planet Earth,
will be the battlefield. No cosmic role for the human race is possible
without integration. The units that take decisions must be
rewarded for those decisions, otherwise they will never take them.
Can we imagine "human plankton" crowded
in rockets in order to reach a distant star in ten, twenty
or fifty generations? Only integrated immortal creatures
can conquer the outer space.
At present our ideas about the cybernetic integration of humans
are very abstract and vague. This is inevitable; long range
notions and goals may be only abstract. But this does not mean
that they are not relevant to our present concerns and problems.
The concept of cybernetic immortality can give shape to
the supreme goals and values we espouse, even though
present-day people can think realistically only in terms
of creative immortality (although -- who knows?).
The problem of ultimate values is the central problem of our
present society. What should we live for after our basic needs
are so easily satisfied by the modern production system?
What should we see as Good and what as Evil? Where are the ultimate
criteria for judging social organization?
Historically, great civilizations are inseparable
from great religions which gave answers to these questions.
The decline of traditional religions appealing to metaphysical
immortality threatens to degrade modern society.
Cybernetic immortality can take the place
of metaphysical immortality to provide the ultimate goals and values
for the emerging global civilization.
We are living at a time when we can see
the basic contradiction of the constructive evolution of
mankind very clearly: it is the contradiction between human
integration and human
freedom. Integration is an evolutionary necessity. If humanity sets itself
goals which are incompatible with integration the result will be
an evolutionary dead end: further creative development
will become impossible. Then we shall not survive. In the
evolving Universe there is no standstill: all that does not
develop perishes. On the other hand,
freedom is precious for the human being;
it is the essence of life. The creative freedom of individuals is
the fundamental engine of evolution in the era of Reason. If it
is suppressed by integration, as in totalitarianism,
we shall find ourselves again in an
evolutionary dead end. This contradiction is real,
but not insoluble. After all,
the same contradiction has been successfully solved on other
levels of organization in the process of evolution. When cells
integrate into multicellular organisms, they continue to perform
their biological functions--metabolism and fission. The new quality,
the life of the organism, does not appear despite the
biological functions of the individual cells but because of them
and through them. The creative act of free will is
the "biological function" of the human being.
In the integrated super-being it
must be preserved as an inviolable foundation,
and the new qualities must appear through it and because of it.
Thus the fundamental challenge that the humanity faces now
is to achieve an organic synthesis of integration and freedom.
Goguen also opposed the striving towards consensus, which is a fundamental goal of the Principia Cybernetica, on the grounds that all opinions are valuable, and that no one viewpoint should be privileged. This criticism is more difficult to answer in a few words.** It was repeated in different forms by different people, mostly those with a "post-modernist" or "social constructivist" philosophy. These critics stress the relativity of knowledge, and the creativity which arises from a variety of different opinions.
But we hold that this creativity can only appear through a confrontation and conversation between the different opinions, and that is just what Principia Cybernetica proposes. Without at least an attempt to reach consensus, people will stick to their own opinions, and no novelty is created. But it is not our intention to impose a consensus, and we start from the principle that Principia Cybernetica must be open-ended: every new idea or opinion can be incorporated somewhere along the way, even if only as a "discussion node". We do not expect to reach a complete consensus in any foreseeable future. Yet we do hold that there is a deep unity in the ideas characterizing Systems Theory and Cybernetics. In our experience, those with a background in Cybernetics or Systems share these fundamental concepts and values, although they may express them with different words. Further, we hold that a fundamental, broad consensus at the conceptual level is necessary for the advancement of a discipline, or a society.
Other criticisms (albeit in a generally sympathetic spirit) about the philosophy behind Principia Cybernetica, and its practical realizability, were made by Gerard de Zeeuw and Rod Swenson to Heylighen when he presented the ideas of Principia Cybernetica to a number of people at the European Meeting on Cybernetics and Systems in Vienna (April 1990). Swenson mentioned in particular the difficulty of maintaining copyright in a network which is authored collectively by many different people. On the other hand, Principia Cybernetica was enthusiastically welcomed by Gordon Pask, who is one of the main theorists in the "social constructivist" paradigm, and the creator of conversation theory.
Dr. Francis Heylighen et al, Free U. of Brussels
Now this is hypertext! Over 600 documents of profuse hypertext. Several methods of navigating the library, including menus, indexes, and a graphical browser. The subject matter of cybernetics is very closely related to the Web itself.
After the free voting procedure, PCP Web ended up with a "Honorable Mention" for the "
The websmiths are hard at work on this one, using a full bag of HTML
(Hypertext Markup Language) tricks to bring you representational maps of
the Webspace that you can click on, searchable indices, and other goodies.
Choice tidbits include the realtime Web visualizer tools, John December's
comprehensive treatise on computer-mediated communication, the full text of
Darwin's On The Origin Of Species, and fresh news from the Project Xanadu
folks, complete with an impressive bibliography. Start your education on
the tech behind the hype at http://cleamc11.vub.ac.be/.
The following quotations give a good idea of how Principia Cybernetica Web is perceived by others. I have separated "personal" comments (made in various places linking to PCP Web because they find the subject interesting) from "professional reviews" by various web surveying service, which are not a priori interested in the subject, but try to evaluate PCP web for the "general reader" who is unlikely to know anything about cybernetics.
You can
"an excellent resource for cybernetics, systems
theory, and other disciplines often mentioned in Neuro-Linguistic Programming circles" (Neuro-Linguistic Programming and Design Human Engineering
)
"The most impressive Cybernetics resource I've ever seen." (Intelligent Systems
)
"An extraordinarily interesting site about evolution, cybernetics and philosophy." (
"... for easy to understand definitions of cybernetics and virtual reality" (
"an excellent
resource for systems science. " (Jon Wallis' Home
Page)
"The stated goal of the Principia Cybernetica Project is to link all of Mankind's knowledge... have to give them credit for ambition." (
"An intriguing place" (
"Everything you ever wanted to know about systems and cybernetics".(
"congratulations on a job well-done, both in initiating Principia Cybernetica in the first place, and also in implementing the Principia Cybernetica Web, which is a rare and rich site on the Net." (Arkuat's comments on PCP )
"...and finally, the ultimate...
"An extremely sensible philosophy. The next step in human
evolution!" (
" For some theoretical background try [...] the Principia Cybernetica Web which will stretch your mind a little" (
" This is a remarkable site: Systems Science,
Feedback Loops, etc. It's a very busy site, so be patient and keep trying." (
" More than you can ever learn on cybernetics and related issues - the Website is overwhelming! (
"The Principia Cybernetica site is the largest Web 'nexus' on
cybernetics and general systems theory."(
"a fascinating collection of indexes and links on a diverse range of topics collateral to Gestalt and Systems conceptualization" (
"An extraordinary experience of collective creation on
the Web : an international group of research scientists
is writing an hypertext on the global brain created by
the interconnection of men, computers and network.
A quantum leap into the third millenium." (
"Un extraordinario proyecto que
prentende lograr las respuestas a las preguntas fundamentales
del ser humano a traves de la inteligencia artificial."(
"By now the alarm was permanently set at 4:30 am but Timothy Alan Hall never heard it. He had rewired
the little clock radio to activate an ancient reel-to-reel recorder on the other side of the trailer, hooked up
an equally old set of theatre speakers and had it rigged to play his tape recording of a vintage 8086
computer booting up off dual floppies, grinding into first gear with a seriously irritating reminder of days
long gone.[...]
Tim was perfectly aware of the existence of memetic evolution, an obvious competition going on between
genes and memes and his favorite web site was Principia Cybernetica which he studied when time
permitted. The various philosophical subjects and New Agey topics failed to hold his interest for long but
the truth was that memes did exist, were powerfully motivated and his own life had been changing
positively because of them. The truth was inescapable."(
"What can artificial systems tell us about the meaning of life? What are we doing
here anyway? These are some of the questions tackled on the PCP's Web server at
the Free University of Brussels." (
"The cool, the innovative, the excellent - they're all here in our
gallery of Internet resources that exemplify the pioneering spirit of
the Internet. These are the pages we like this week:
December 30, 1994 to January 5, 1995.
Academia:
Cybernetics and Systems Theory" (
"A 3 star site. Rating Summary:
"Content: 41/50,
Presentation: 34/50,
Experience: 35/50
In mathematics, we can mention
Powers
Campbell
Beyond 2nd Order cyb.
Our methodology to build this complete philosophical system is based on a "bootstrapping" principle: the expression of the theory affects its content and meaning, and vice versa. In this way we aim to apply the principles of cybernetics to their own development.
Our philosophy too is based on cybernetic principles. Our epistemology understands knowledge as a model, which is constructed by the subject or group, but undergoes selection by the environment. Our metaphysics asserts actions as ontological primitives. On the basis of this ontology, we define the most important concepts and organize them in a semantic network. At a higher level, we also lay out the fundamental principles of cybernetics in terms of these underlying concepts.
One of the central concepts is that of evolution in the most general sense, which is produced by the mechanism of variation and selection. Another is control, which we define in a special cybernetic sense, and assert as the basic mode of organization in complex systems. This brings us to the central concept for MSTT, that of the metasystem transition, or the process by which control emerges in evolutionary systems.
On this basis we then reconstruct the
complete history of evolution, from the Big
Bang to the present, as a sequence of MST's. An extrapolation of this sequence
provides us with a first glimpse of what the future
might bring. Finally, the possible dangers and opportunities of our evolutionary
future direct our attention to the need for formulating an ethics,
based on evolutionary and systemic principles, that could guide our actions.
Yet, we wish to avoid an
over-formalization of the semantic structures we create. The meaning of a
term will be partially formal, determined by the network of semantic
relations to which it belongs; and partially informal, determined by the
personal interpretation of the user who reads the exposition, and who
tries to understand the concept by making associations with the context.
Such a format allows the adequate representation of precise, mathematical
concepts, of vague, ambiguous, "literary" development, and of the whole
continuum in between. The degree of "formality" can be used to measure the position of a text on that continuum.
Vague or ambiguous concepts can be incrementally refined and clarified through the process of progressive formalization. Formalization may go in rounds, or levels, becoming more intensive and extensive. In keeping with this strategy, nodes we are writing will be initially
organized according to the usual notion of their conceptual dependency
understood informally or semi-formally. As the collection of nodes grows,
we give more time to the work on formal semantics and the structuring of
this accumulated material.
Both semantic networks and progressive formalization avoid starting from a fixed set of primitives or foundational concepts. Instead, we use part of the concepts to clarify other concepts, and vice versa. Thus, by allowing multiple beginnings to exist in parallel we avoid the shortcomings of foundationalism. The resulting system can be read or understood in different orders, for example starting from "meaning" as a primitive concept to develop the concept of evolution, or starting from evolution to analyse the evolution of meaning.
We are well aware of these dangers, but on the other hand we are also aware
of the risk of the converse, of a failure to generate any firm
foundations on which theory can be constructed. We believe that it is this
latter condition that Cybernetics and Systems Science has indeed found itself in today. Even a
cursory examination of current systems literature will reveal a veritable
zoo of advanced, highly sophisticated theories which have only a loose and
metaphorical relation to each other. A clear and elegant underlying theory
on which they could be reconciled is simply lacking.
Rather the approach that we adopt aims to steer a middle ground between
both extremes. It does so through the reliance on the general method we
adopt throughout: a balance between the freedom of variation and the
constraint of selection in a hierarchically organized system of control. In
this case the multiple components of the hierarchy are foundations,
axiomatic sets which reciprocally and irreducibly support each other. While
each component is itself a stable foundation, the overall metasystem is
a-foundational: the choice of an axiom set is ultimately either arbitrary
or non-theoretical (pragmatic).
In this sense, the philosophy we propose is
anti-foundational. Yet a constructive philosophy can be considered
foundational in the sense that it takes the principle of constructive
evolution itself as a foundation. This principle is different from other
foundations, however, because it is empty (anything can be constructed,
natural selection is a tautology), but also because it is situated at a
higher, "meta" level of description. Indeed, constructivism allows us to
interrelate and inter-transform different foundational organizations or
systems, by showing how two different foundational schemes can be
reconstructed from the same, more primitive organization.
Similarly, a metafoundational theory would consist of a set of propositions which can be derived from multiple sets of foundational propositions. Propositions which are primary (axioms) in one system would be derived in another system. No set of fundamental propositions would be absolutely primary. The whole theory should rather be viewed as a bootstrapping (cf. Heylighen's paper on "Knowledge structuring") network, where A derives from B and B derives from A.
A mathematical structure which might possibly express this arrangement is a multiply rooted DAG (Directed Acyclic Graph).
Psychological constructivism asserts that knowledge is constructed by the
subject, and not a simple "reflection" of or correspondence to reality.
Following especially Kant, the neural mechanisms of the sense organs, the
cortex, and the entire brain are seen as active mediators which provide the
inherent "categories of perception". It follows that perception and
knowledge are in fact a model of reality, and not merely a reflection
or impression of it.
We can also describe an extreme version of radical constructivism, which is
currently fashionable with some cyberneticians, but which we reject.
Some radical constructivists approach strong skepticism by denying the existence
of any external reality, and simply define reality as our
knowledge. This "brain in a vat" view is unnecessarily strong. Instead we
take a kind of agnostic view, which is a-realist, not anti-realist.
While it is true that knowledge provides no direct and incorrigible access
to the world, and it is not justified to make strong inferences about
reality on the basis of knowledge, at the same time it is not allowed to
make inferences about reality on the basis of a lack of knowledge:
ignorance of something does not entail its non-existence.
We accept mathematical and psychological constructivism, but we go further.
We call our evolutionary philosophy physically constructive in the
sense that systems can only be understood in terms of the (physical)
processes which manifest them and by which they have been assembled. This is
certainly true for physical and biological systems, but also holds for
formal, symbolic, and semantic systems. In particular, we hold that
semantics, language, and mathematics must always be understood in the
context of the physical basis of their operation---on the physical systems
(e.g. sense organs, brains, machines, computers) which transmit, receive,
and especially interpret physical tokens.
In a traditional systems philosophy "organization" might be seen as the fundamental principle of being, rather than God, matter, or the laws of nature. However it still begs the question where this organization comes from. In our evolutionary-systemic philosophy, on the other hand, the essence is the process through which this organization is created.
Therefore, our ontology starts from elementary actions, rather than from static objects, particles, energy or ideas. These actions are the primitive elements, the building blocks of our vision of reality, and therefore remain undefined. Actions are in not general not deterministic but involve an element of freedom. A sequence of actions constitutes a process. Our ontology is thus related to the process metaphysics of Whitehead and Teilhard de Chardin. Its historical origin can be traced back even further to the development from Kant to Schopenhauer.
Relatively stable "systems" are
constructed by such processes through the mechanism of variation and selection. This leads to the spontaneous emergence of more complex
organizations during evolution: from space-time and elementary
particles, to atoms, molecules, crystals, DNA, cells, plants, animals,
humans, and human society and culture (see the history of evolution). This developmental sequence provides us with a basis for our cosmology. Because of this self-organization of the universe, there is no need to posit a personal God, distinct from the universe, as an explanation for the observed complexity.
Events of emergence are the
"quanta" of evolution. They lead to the creation of new systems with
new identities, obeying different laws and possessing different
properties. In such systems, the behaviour of the whole depends on the behaviour of the parts (a "reductionistic" view), but the behaviour of
the parts is at the same time constrained or directed by the behaviour
of the whole (a "holistic" view). (see downward causation)
A fundamental type of emergence is the "meta-system transition" , which results in a higher level of control while increasing the overall freedom and adaptivity of the system. Examples of
metasystem transitions are the emergence of multicellular organisms, the emergence of the capacity of organisms to learn, and the emergence of human intelligence.
See further: Turchin's paper on Cybernetic Metaphysics.
In a traditional systems philosophy "organization" might be seen as the fundamental principle of being, rather than God, matter, or the laws of nature. However it still begs the question where this organization comes from. In our evolutionary-systemic philosophy, on the other hand, the essence is the process through which this organization is created.
Therefore, our ontology starts from elementary actions, rather than from static objects, particles, energy or ideas. These actions are the primitive elements, the building blocks of our vision of reality, and therefore remain undefined. Actions are in not general not deterministic but involve an element of freedom. A sequence of actions constitutes a process. Our ontology is thus related to the process metaphysics of Whitehead and Teilhard de Chardin. Its historical origin can be traced back even further to the development from Kant to Schopenhauer.
Relatively stable "systems" are
constructed by such processes through the mechanism of variation and selection. This leads to the spontaneous emergence of more complex
organizations during evolution: from space-time and elementary
particles, to atoms, molecules, crystals, DNA, cells, plants, animals,
humans, and human society and culture (see the history of evolution). This developmental sequence provides us with a basis for our cosmology. Because of this self-organization of the universe, there is no need to posit a personal God, distinct from the universe, as an explanation for the observed complexity.
Events of emergence are the
"quanta" of evolution. They lead to the creation of new systems with
new identities, obeying different laws and possessing different
properties. In such systems, the behaviour of the whole depends on the behaviour of the parts (a "reductionistic" view), but the behaviour of
the parts is at the same time constrained or directed by the behaviour
of the whole (a "holistic" view). (see downward causation)
A fundamental type of emergence is the "meta-system transition" , which results in a higher level of control while increasing the overall freedom and adaptivity of the system. Examples of
metasystem transitions are the emergence of multicellular organisms, the emergence of the capacity of organisms to learn, and the emergence of human intelligence.
See further: Turchin's paper on Cybernetic Metaphysics.
`Meta' in Greek means over, and -- since when you jump over
something you find yourself behind it in space and after in time
-- it is also understood as behind and after. The word `metaphysics'
is said to originate from the mere fact that the
corresponding part of Aristotle's work was positioned right after the part
called `physics'. But it is not unlikely that the term won a
ready acceptance as denoting the whole field of knowledge because
it conveyed the purpose of metaphysics, which is to reach beyond
the nature (`physics') as we perceive it, and to discover the
`true nature' of things, their ultimate essence and the reason
for being. This is somewhat, but not much, different from the way
we understand `meta' in the 20-th century. A metatheory is a
theory about another theory, which considered as an object of
knowledge: how true it is, how it comes into being, how it is
used, how it can be improved, etc. A metaphysician, in contrast,
would understand his knowledge as a knowledge about the world,
like that of a physicist (scientist, generally), and not as a
knowledge about the scientific theories (which is the realm of
epistemology).
If so, metaphysics should take as honorable a place in
physics as metamathematics in mathematics. But this is very far
from being the case. It would be more accurate to describe the
situation as exactly opposite. Popularly (and primarily by the
`working masses' of physicists), metaphysics is considered as
something opposite to physics, and utterly useless for it (if not
for any reasonable purpose). I will argue below that this
attitude is a hangover from the long outdated forms of empiricism and positivism. I will argue that metaphysics is physics.
A detractor of metaphysics would say that its propositions
are mostly unverifiable, if intelligible at all, so it is hardly
possible to assign any meaning to them. Thales taught that
everything is water. The Pythagoreans taught that everything is
number. Hegel taught that everything is a manifestation of the
Absolute Spirit. And for Schopenhauer the world is will and
representation. All this has nothing to do with science.
But Democritus, and then Epicurus and Lucretius taught that
the world is an empty space with atoms moving around in it. In
due time this concept gave birth to classical mechanics and
physics, which is, unquestionably, science. At the time of its
origin, however, it was as pure a metaphysics as it could be. The
existence of atoms was no more verifiable than that of the
Absolute Spirit. Physics started as metaphysics. This is far
from an isolated case.
The question of verifiability is a part of our understanding
of the nature of language and truth. What is the meaning of words
and other objects of a language? The naive answer is: those
things which the words denote. This is known as the reflection
theory of language. Language, like a mirror, creates certain
images, reflections of the things around us. With the reflection
theory of language we come to what is known as the correspondence
theory of truth: a proposition is true if the relations between
the images of things correspond to the relations between the
things themselves. Falsity is a wrong, distorted reflection. In
particular, to create images which correspond to no real thing in
the world is to be in error.
With this concept of meaning and truth, any expression of
our language which cannot be immediately interpreted in terms of
observable facts, is meaningless and misleading. This viewpoint
in its extreme form, according to which all unobservables must be
banned from science, was developed by the early nineteenth-century
positivism (August Comte). Such a view, however, is
unacceptable for science. Even force in Newton's mechanics
becomes suspect in this philosophy, because we can neither see nor
touch it; we only conclude that it exists by observing the
movements of material bodies. Electromagnetic field has still less of
reality. And the situation with the wave function in quantum
mechanics is simply disastrous.
The history of the Western philosophy is, to a considerable
extent, the history of a struggle against the
reflection-correspondence theory.
We now consider language as a material to create
models of reality. Language is a system which works as a whole,
and should be evaluated as a whole. The job the language does is
organization of our experience, which includes, in particular,
some verifiable predictions about future events an the results of
our actions. For a language to be good at this job, it is not
necessary that every specific part of it should be put in a direct
and simple correspondence with the observable reality.
A proposition is true if, in the framework of the language
to which it belongs, it does not lead to false predictions, but
enhances our ability to produce true predictions. We usually
distinguish between factual statements and theories. If the
path from a proposition to verifiable predictions is short and
uncontroversial, we call it a factual statement. A theory is
but only through some intermediate steps, such as reasoning,
computation, the use of other statements. Thus the path from a
theory to predictions may not be unique and often becomes
debatable. Between the extreme cases of statements that are
clearly facts and those which are clearly theories there is a
whole spectrum of intermediate cases.
The statement of the truth of a theory has essentially the
same meaning as that of a simple factual statement: we assert
that the predictions it produces will be true. There is no
difference of principle: both factual statements and theories are
varieties of models of reality which we use to produce
predictions. A fact may turn out to be an illusion, or
hallucination, or a fraud, or a misconception. On the other
hand, a well-established theory can be taken for a fact. And we
should accept critically both facts and theories, and re-examine
them whenever necessary. The differences between facts and
theories are only quantitative: the length of the path from the
statement to verifiable predictions.
This approach has a double effect on the concept of existence.
On the one hand, theoretical concepts, such as mechanical
forces, electromagnetic and other fields, and wave functions,
acquire the same existential status as the material things we see
around us. On the other hand, quite simple and trustworthy
concepts like a heavy mass moving along a trajectory, and even the
material things themselves, the egg we eat at breakfast, become
as unstable and hazy as theoretical concepts. For to-day's good
theory is to-morrow's bad theory. We make and re-make our
theories all the time. Should we do the same with the concept of an
egg?
Certainly not at a breakfast. But in theoretical physics an
egg is something different from what we can eat: a system of
elementary particles. This makes no contradiction. Our language
is a multilevel system. On the lower levels, which are close to
our sensual perception, our notions are almost in one-to-one
correspondence with some conspicuous elements of perception. In
our theories we construct higher levels of language. The concepts
of the higher levels do not replace those of the lower levels, as
they should if the elements of the language reflected things "as
they really are", but constitute a new linguistic reality, a
superstructure over the lower levels. We cannot throw away the
concepts of the lower levels even if we wished to, because then
we would have no means to link theories to observable facts.
Predictions produced by the higher levels are formulated in terms
of the lower levels. It is a hierarchical system, where the top
cannot exist without the bottom.
Recall the table describing four types of langage-dependent
activities in our discussion of formalization. Philosophy is characterized by abstract
informal thinking.
The combination of high-level abstract constructs used in
philosophy with a low degree of formalization requires great
effort by the intuition and makes philosophical language the most
difficult type of the four. Philosophy borders with art when it
uses artistic images to stimulate the intuition. It borders with
theoretical science when it develops conceptual frameworks to be
used in construction of formal scientific theories.
Top-level theories of science are not deduced from
observable facts; they are constructed by a creative act, and their
usefulness can be demonstrated only afterwards. Einstein wrote:
"Physics is a developing logical system of thinking whose
foundations cannot be obtained by extraction from past experience
according to some inductive methods, but come only by free fantasy".
This "free fantasy" is the metaphysician's. When Thales said
that all is water, he did not mean that quite literally; he surely was
not that stupid. His `water' should rather be translated as `fluid',
some abstract substance which can change its form and is infinitely
divisible. The exact meaning of his teaching is then: it is
possible to create a reasonable model of the world where such a
fluid is the building material. Is not the theory of
electromagnetism a refinement of this idea? As for the Pythagoreans,
the translation of the statement 'everything is number' is that
it is possible to have a numerical model of the Universe and everything
in it. Is not the modern physics such a model?
When we understand language as a hierarchical model of
reality, i.e. a device which produces predictions, and not as a
true picture of the world, the claim made by metaphysics is read
differently. To say that the real nature of the world is such and
such means to propose the construction of a model of the world
along such and such lines. Metaphysics creates a linguistic
structure -- call it a logical structure, or a conceptual
framework -- to serve as a basis for further refinements. Metaphysics
is the beginning of physics; it provides fetuses for future
theories. Even though a mature physical theory fastidiously
distinguishes itself from metaphysics by formalizing its basic
notions and introducing verifiable criteria, metaphysics in a very
important sense is physics.
The meaning of metaphysics is in its potential. I can say
that Hegel's Absolute Spirit is meaningless for me, because at
the moment I do not see any way how an exact theory can be
constructed on this basis. But I cannot say that it is
meaningless, period. To say that, I would have to prove that
nobody will ever be able to translate this concept into a valid
scientific theory, and I, obviously, cannot do that.
It takes usually quite a time to translate metaphysics into
an exact theory with verifiable predictions. Before this is done,
metaphysics is, like any fetus, highly vulnerable. The task of
the metaphysician is hard indeed: he creates his theory in
advance of its confirmation. He works in the dark. He has to
guess, to select, without having a criterion for selection.
Successes on this path are veritable feats of human creativity.
Kant synthesized empiricism and rationalism by seeing
knowledge as organization of sensations by our mind. Space, time, and
other categories are not given us in sensations. They are our
forms of perception, the way we organize sensations. This is how
the synthetic judgments a priory become possible. They speak
about the methods of our mind which are inborn and do not depend
on sensations.
From the cybernetic point of view, sensations are at the
input of our cognitive apparatus, the nervous system. This input
is then processed by a huge hierarchical system. As the signals
move up in the hierarchy, sensations become perceptions, and then
conceptions (there are no sharp boundaries, of course). How much
is coming from the reality, the sensations, and how much from the
way we process them?
Kant considered the categories as a sort of final, ultimate,
because they are rooted in the way our brains are made. The
only possible geometry for him was Euclidean geometry.
And here comes the non-euclidean geometry of Lobachevsky.
This could be a disaster if we did not interpret Kant's ideas from
a modern point of view.
We see no contradiction
between the use of inborn ways of analysis of sensation and
the refusal to take these ways as the only possible and
universally applicable. We cannot change
our brain (for the time being, at least),
but we can construct world models which are counter-intuitive to
us.
We have two cybernetic systems which make world models: our
brain, with its neuronal models, and our language, in which we
create symbolic models of the world. The latter are certainly
based on the former. But the question remains open: at what level
of the neuronal hierarchy do the symbolic models take up?
Compare mathematics and classical mechanics. Mathematics
deals with objects called symbolic expressions (like numbers, for
example). They are simple linear structures. We use our nervous
system to identify some symbols as "the same". For example, this
symbol: A is the same as this: A. Another thing we want is to
know that if you add a symbol B to A, and to another A you add
another B, then the results, i.e. AB, will be identical again.
The totality of such elementary facts could hardly be codified,
exactly because of their basic nature. They are not eliminable.
Even if we pick up a number of axioms about symbolic expressions,
as we do, e.g., in the theory of semi-groups, we shall still use
rules of inference to prove new facts about them, and since the
rules and the formal proofs are again symbolic expressions, we
shall rely again on the basic facts about symbolic expressions in
the original informal way.
In classical mechanics we use much more of our neuronal
world models. There is a three-dimensional space; there is time;
there are the concepts of continuity, a material body, of cause
and effect, and more.
Mach and Einstein would be, probably, impossible without
Kant. They used the Kantian principle of separating elementary
facts of sensations and organizing these facts into a conceptual
scheme. But the physicists went further. Einstein moved from
the intuitive space-time picture given by the classical mechanics
down to the level of separate measurements, and reorganized
the measurements into a different space, the four-dimensional space-time
of the relativity theory. This space-time is now as
counterintuitive as it was in 1905, even though we have accustomed to it.
Hence what we call the paradoxes of the relativity theory. But
they do not bother us. We use a bit less of neuronal
models, and a bit more of symbolic models, that is all.
In quantum mechanics, the physicists went even further. They
rejected the idea of a material body located in the space-time
continuum. The space-time continuum is left as a mathematical
construct, and this construct serves the purposes of relating
micro and macro-phenomena, where it has the familiar classical
interpretation. But material bodies lost their tangible character.
The elementary objective facts are even lower in
the hierarchy than measurements; they are observations
which all occur in the world of macro-objects.
In the relativity theory observations
(measurements) at least belonged to the same universe as the
basic conceptual scheme: the space-time continuum. In quantum
mechanics, on the contrary, there is a gap between what we believe
to really exist, i.e. quantum particles and fields, and
what we take as the basic observable phenomena, which are all
expressed in macroscopical concepts: space, time and causality.
Of course, one can say that in the last analysis every theory
will explain and organize observable facts, and they always will
be macroscopic facts, because we are macroscopic creatures. Thus
a physical theory does not need the concept of ``real existence'';
even if it is a micro-world theory it operates on macro-world
observables. This is formally true. But the question is that of the
structure of a physical theory. We still want our theory to give
an answer to the question: what is REALLY existing? What is the
ultimate reality of physics? This question is not meaningless.
Its meaning is in the quest for a theory which would start with
concepts believed to correspond to that ultimate reality, and
then step by step construct observables from these
``really existing'' things. Somehow, it seems that such a theory
has better chances for success. If we have such a theory, and the real
existence is attributed to some things --- call them ex-why-zeds ---
and the theory is born out by experiment, then we can say that
the ex-why-zeds do really exist and that the world really consists
of ex-why-zeds. Ontologically, this will be as certain as
when we say that the apple is in a bowl on the basis of seeing it
and touching it.
The contemporary quantum mechanics does not meet this requirement.
It starts with space-time continuum, which in no sense
exists. Since Kant we know that it is only a form of our perception.
Suppose we are determined to construct a theory which is
built as required above. How should we go about the construction
of such a theory? We must go further down in the hierarchy of
neuronal concepts, and take them for a basis. Space and time must
not be put in the basis of the theory. They must be constructed
and explained in terms of really existing things.
This is where metaphysics should help us.
The goal of metaphysics is to
create world models which go down and down into the depth of our
experience. The concepts of the higher level of the neuronal
hierarchy are discounted as superficial; attempt is made to
identify the most essential, pervasive, primordial elements of
experience. But this is exactly the program we have just set for
ourselves. Kant's metaphysics had served as the philosophical
basis for the modern theories of physics. We see now that a
further movement down is required. Thus let turn to
the development of metaphysics after Kant.
Two lines of development became most visible: the German
idealism and Hegel in particular; and Schopenhauer.
The Hegelian line contributed to the development of
the theory of evolution, but in terms of ontology and epistemology
did not give
much. It is not analytical. It is a romantic picture of
a striving and struggling world. The basic entities and concepts are
obviously made up, as if created by an artist.
Schopenhauer, on the contrary is analytical. He does not
create a sophisticated picture of the world. He only gives an
answer to the question `what is the world': it is will
and representation.
Kant introduced the concept of the thing-in-itself for that
which will be left of a thing if we take away everything that we
can learn about it through our sensations. Thus the thing-in-
itself has only one property: to exist independently of the
cognizant subject. This concept is essentially negative; Kant did
not relate it to any kind or any part of human experience. This
was done by Schopenhauer. To the question `what is the thing-in-
itself?' he gave a clear and precise answer: it is will. The
more you think about this answer, the more it looks
like a revelation. My will is something I know from within.
It is part of my
experience. Yet it is absolutely inaccessible to anybody except
myself. Any external observer will know about myself whatever he
can know through his sense organs. Even if he can read my
thoughts and intentions -- literally, by deciphering brain signals --
he will
not perceive my will. He can conclude about the existence of my will
by analogy with his own. He can bend and crush my will through
my body, he can kill it by killing me, but he cannot in any way
perceive my will. And still my will exists. It is a thing-in-
itself.
What then is the world as we know it? Schopenhauer answers:
a 'Vorstellung'. This word was first translated into English as
an `idea', and then a `representation'. Both translations are not
very precise. In Russian there is a word for it which is a literal
translation of the German `Vorstellung': `predstavleniye'.
`Vorstellung' is something that is put in front of you.
It is a world picture we create ourselves -- and put in front of us,
so that to some extent it screens the real world. This aspect of
Vorstellung is not properly reflected either in 'idea'
or in 'representation'.
Let us examine the way in which we come to know anything
about the world. It starts with sensations. Sensations are not
things. They do not have reality as things. Their reality is that
of an event, an action. Sensation is an interaction between the
subject and the object, a physical phenomenon. Then the signals
resulting from that interaction start their long path through the
nervous system and the brain. The brain is tremendously complex
system, created for a very narrow goal: to survive, to sustain
the life of the individual creature, and to reproduce the species.
It is for this purpose and from this angle that the brain
processes information from sense organs and forms
its representation of the world.
Experiments with high energy elementary particles
were certainly not included into the goals for which the
brain was created by evolution. Thus it should be no surprise
that our space-time intuition is found to be a very poor
conceptual frame for elementary particles.
We must take from our experience only the most fundamental
aspects, in an expectation that all further organization of
sensations may be radically changed. These most elementary
aspects are: the will, the representation, and the action, which
links the two: action is a manifestation of the will
that changes representation.
Indeed, is it not the physical quantity of action that is
quantized and cannot be less than Plank's constant h, if it is
not zero? Why not see this as an indication that action should
have a higher existential status than space, time, matter? Of
course, it is not immediately clear whether the concept of action
as we understand it intuitively and the physical quantity that
has the dimension of energy by time and called 'action' are one and
the same, or related at all. That the physicists use the word `action' to
denote this quantity could be a misleading coincidence. Yet the
intuitive notion of an action as proportional to the energy spent
(understood intuitively) and the time passed does not seem
unreasonable. Furthermore, it is operators, i.e., actions
in the space of states, that represent observable (real!)
physical quantities in quantum mechanics, and not
the space-time states themselves!
Even if we reject these parallels and intuition as unsafe, it
still remains true that neither space, nor time, nor matter are
characterized by constant indestructible quanta, but
a combination of these: action. Is it not natural to take action
as a basis for the picture of the world --- if not for a
unifying physical theory?
But set aside physics. There is a branch of knowledge, cybernetics,
where action ontology comes naturaly because of its approach
to the description of the world. In cybernetics we abstract from
matter, energy, space, even time. What remains is interdependence
between actions of various kinds.
Communication, control, information -- all these are actions.
Taking action as an ontological
primitive we come to an intuitively acceptable and logically
consistent definition of its basic concepts.
Cybernetic ontology is ontology of action
In cybernetics we abstract from matter, energy, space, even time.
What remains is interdependence between actions of various kinds.
Communication, control, information -- all these are actions.
An action is a result of a free choice.
The state of the world defines (or rather is defined as) the
set of feasible actions for each will.
The act of will is to choose one of these.
We learn about action through our representations, i.e. our
knowledge about the external world.
When we ignore the agent, we speak of actions as events.
When we speak of actions
of human beings we know very well what the agent is: just the person
whose action it is. We reconstruct this notion, of course, starting
from our own "I". When we speak of animals, e.g. such as dogs,
we again have no doubt in the validity of the concept agent.
This reasoning can be continued to frogs, amoebas, and inanimate
objects. We say: "the bomb exploded and ship sank".
But what about a collision of two
elementary particles, of an act (sic!) of radioactive decay?
It is definitely an action, but whose action is it?
We do not know -- meaning that we have, at present, no picture,
model, or theory of the world which would make use of the agent of
this collision or emission. Thus we call this action an event.
Not that it has no agent:
by the nature of our concept, each action is performed by an agent.
We simply can say nothing about it, so we ignore it. It may well be that
in some future physical theory we shall speak about the agents of
subatomic events. It seems reasonable to speak of an agent which
comes into being for the express purpose of causing an act of
radioactive decay. At each moment in time this agent makes a choice
bewteen decay and not decay. This immediately explains the exponential
law of radioactivity.
When we speak of an action, we speak also of an agent that performs
the action. An agent is the carrier of will, the entity that chooses
between possible actions. We do not see agents, we see only what they
are doing. But we use the concept of agent to create models of the world.
We break what is going on in the world into parts and call these parts
actions. Then we notice that actions have certain structure. Some actions
are taking place in parallel, others consecutively. A number of actions
can be considered as one complex action (cf. process). We start the description
of this structure by introducing the notion of agents that perform actions.
The same agent may perform, consecutively, some number of actions.
Different agents may execute actions in parallel. The agent of a complex
action can, somehow, call a "subcontractor" agent.
Introduction of agents is, speaking informally, our first theory
of the world. Further development of the theory can go in various
directions. Since the thinking being understands agent seeing himself
as the primary model, it is natural that in primitive societies the concept
of agent is understood anthropomorphically: as something which is very
similar, if not identical, to ourselves. Hence the animism of primitive
thinking: understanding of all actions as initiated by various kinds
of spirits or other imaginary creatures.
The development of modern science banned spirits from the picture of the
world. But agents, cleared from anthropomorphism, still remain,
even though the physicists do not call them so. What is Newtonian force
if not an agent that changes, every moment, the momentum of a body?
Physics concentrates on the description of the world in space and
time; it leaves -- at least at the present day -- the concept of angent
implicit. We need it explicitly because of our metaphysics based
on the concept of action, not to mention the simple fact that cybernetics
describes, among other things, the behavior of human agents.
(This last field of application of cybernetics is, of course, one of the
reasons for our metaphysics).
Event is an action abstracted from the agent.
Agents come into, and go out of, existence. For centuries philosophers
grappled with a problem: how to distinguish simple ("quantitative") changes
from the cases where something really "new" emerges. What does it mean
to be "new", to emerge? In our theory this intuitive notion is formalized
as the coming of a new agent into existence. An action can lead to
an emergence of new agents.
Take, once again, radioactive decay. A neutron
suddenly chooses to break down into a proton, electron and neutrino.
We saw one agent: the neutron. Now it disappeared, but we see three new
agents which will meet their fate independently. This is an emergence.
In the case of complex actions, such as the birth of a baby, we can
argue about the exact time of the event, because we have more than one
reference system in which to describe actions. As a member of society,
the baby emerges at birth. As an object of embryology it emerges
at the moment of egg fertilization.
A set of actions is referred to as a domain. Theories (models
of the world) we construct are never universal. They are always applicable
to some part of the reality only. This part is the domain of the theory.
When we apply a theory, we assume that only those actions take place
which are within the domain. Make an action which is not included
in the domain, and the whole theory may become out of place.
The states of the world are defined as subsets of the domain of the theory.
Other actions are ignored; they may be either irrelevant, when they
have no impact on the legitimacy of the theory, or prohibited, when
they make the theory unapplicable.
A distinction can be seen as an element of cognitive structuration. Indeed, any process of perception implies a classification between phenomena. This classification operation has two aspects :
Spencer-Brown (1969) has proposed general axioms for distinctions. With these axioms, he has shown that a set of distinctions has a Boolean algebra structure, isomorphic to the algebra of classes in set theory or to the algebra of propositions in logic (Spencer-Brown, 1969). Spencer Brown showed that distinction algebra implies propositional calculus. B. Banaschewski (1977) showed the opposite entailment in
See further:
In many minds, science is still associated with the deterministic
picture of the world, as it was in the nineteenth century.
The modern science, however, draws a picture which is quite different.
The world of the nineteenth century was, broadly, as follows.
Very small particles of matter
move about in virtually empty three-dimensional space. These
particles act on one another with forces which are uniquely
determined by their positioning and velocities.The forces of
interaction, in their turn, uniquely determine, in accordance
with Newton's laws, the subsequent movement of particles. Thus
each subsequent state of the world is determined, in a unique
way, by its preceding state.Determinism was an intrinsic feature
of the scientific worldview of that time. In such a world there
was no room for freedom: it was illusory. Humans, themselves
merely aggregates of particles, had as much freedom as wound-up
watch mechanisms.
In the twentieth century the scientific worldview has undergone a radical change.
It has turned out that subatomic physics cannot be understood
within the framework of the Naive Realism of the nineteenth
century scientists. The theory of Relativity and, especially,
Quantum Mechanics require that our worldview be based on Criti
cal Philosophy, according to which all our theories and mental
pictures of the world are only devices to organize and foresee
our experience, and not the images of the world as it "really"
is. Thus along with the twentieth-century's specific discove
ries in the physics of the microworld, we must regard the inevi
tability of critical philosophy as a scientific discovery -- one
of the greatest of the twentieth century.
We now know that the notion that the world is "really" space
in which small particles move along definite trajectories, is
illusory: it is contradicted by experimental facts. We also know
that determinism, i.e. the notion that in the last analysis all
the events in the world must have specific causes, is illusory
too. On the contrary, freedom, which was banned from the science
of the nineteenth century as an illusion, became a part, if not
the essence, of reality. The mechanistic worldview saw the laws
of nature as something that uniquely prescribes how events should
develop, with indeterminacy resulting only from our lack of
knowledge; contemporary science regards the laws of nature as
only restrictions imposed on a basically non-deterministic world.
It is not an accident that the most general laws of nature are
conservation laws, which do not prescribe how things must br,
but only put certain restrictions on them.
There is genuine freedom in the world. When we observe it
from the outside, it takes the form of quantum-mechanical
unpredictability; when we observe it from within, we call it our
free will. We know that the reason why our behaviour is unpredictable
from the outside is that we have ultimate freedom of
choice. This freedom is the very essence of our personalities,
the treasure of our lives. It is given us as the first element of
the world we come into.
Logically, the concept of free will is
primary, impossible to derive or to explain from anything else.
The concept of necessity, including the concept of a natural law,
is a derivative: we call necessary, or predetermined, those
things which cannot be changed at will.
The attributes of a god or God vary from one religion to another.
In polytheistic religion (poly = many, theos = god) several of
these beings are posited. They are usually presumed to be immortal,
and to control aspects of nature or human destiny. Although
invisible, they are imagined to be human-like or animal-like in
appearance.
In monotheistic religions (monos = one) God is usually viewed as
an all- powerful and omnipresent being who created and still sustains
the universe. He is thought to be incorporeal, but possessed of a
human-like mind capable of planning actions, and of powers capable of
carrying out those actions in the real world.
In Judaism, Christianity and Islam, God also has a human-like
personal aspect, as the perfectly good, perfectly just, all-knowing
judge of human actions and thoughts. He allegedly cares for and loves
each one of us personally, and is merciful and forgiving if we accept
him.
In the metaphysics of Principia Cybernetica, there is no need to posit the existence of a personal God, as an all-powerful, intelligent agent which governs the universe but which is external to it. Indeed, the role of God as creator and director of the universe is taken over by self-organizing evolution. On the other hand, if such an agent with the traditional attributes of omnipotence, omniscience and perfect goodness would be posited, this would lead to logical inconsistencies. There are many arguments supporting this conclusion.
However, this still leaves open a few philosophical positions. Which position you prefer is more a matter of taste than a matter of logic, since they seem equivalent in most practical respects. The simplest one is atheism, which assumes that there is no God, and thus no need to think about the concept. A more subtle approach is pantheism, where the word God is redefined and is equated with the
universe and nature.
In this spirit of pantheism, God might be seen as the highest level of control
in the Universe. God is for the Universe what human will is for the human body.
Natural laws are one of the manifestations of God's will. Another manifestation is the evolution of the Universe: the Evolution. Finally, there is the "intermediate" position of agnosticism, which simply assumes that we don't know whether God exists, since none of the existing arguments can prove that God either exists or does not exist.
The major philosophical criticisms of God as viewed by Judaism,
Christianity and Islam are as follows:
None of these criticisms apply to the God of pantheism, which is
identical with the universe and nature.
Pantheism is distinguished
from panentheism, which holds that God is in everything, but also transcends
the Universe.
Strict pantheism is not a theism. It does not believe in a transcendent
or personal God who is the creator of the universe and the judge of humans.
Many pantheists feel the word "God" is too loaded with these connotations and
never use the word in their own practice - though they may use it to simplify,
or to explain things to theists.
Pantheism has often been accused of atheism, and not just because it
rejects the idea of a personal creator God. Strict
Because it shares these naturalistic beliefs with atheism, the arguments
for pantheism are the same as the arguments for atheism. Pantheism puts
forward exactly the same critiques of transcendental religions and
supernatural beliefs as does atheism. It is a secular religion, firmly rooted
in the real world of the senses and of science.
This form of pantheism is identical with movements variously called
religious atheism, affirmative atheism, Monism, or Cosmism. It is also very
close to Taoism, some forms of Chinese and Japanese Buddhism, and neo-
Confucianism.
Strict pantheism differs from conventional atheism only in its emotional
and ethical response to the material universe. It focusses not simply on
criticizing transcendental beliefs and religions, but stresses the positive
aspects of life and nature - the profound aesthetic and emotional responses
that most people feel towards nature and the night sky.
Naturalistic pantheism draws ethical conclusions from these feelings.
Humans should seek a closer harmony with nature. We should preserve
biodiversity and the delicate ecological balances of the planet, not just as a
matter of survival, but as a matter of personal fulfilment.
Pantheism offers ways of expressing these feelings in ceremonies,
celebrating significant times and places which underline our links with
nature, the solar system and the universe. All this is possible without
retreating one millimeter from the rigorously empirical attitude to reality
found in modern science.
There are other forms of pantheism.
An alternative, quite common among New Agers, is pan-psychic pantheism -
the belief that the universe/God has a collective soul, mind or will. This
version was most clearly expressed by
For further background, see:
The simplest argument for atheism follows from Occam's Razor: from different equivalent explanations, choose the simplest one. If we cannot explain more things by postulating the existence of God than we can without, then we should prefer the theory without. The fact that this principle is not sufficient to prove that God does not exist, is not very relevant. After all, nobody can prove that unicorns, flying toasters or 23-legged purple elephants do not exist, but that does not make their existence any more likely. (see also:
This assumes that the existence of God does not explain anything. However, the most typical argument for the existence of God is that creation by God is needed to explain the complexity of the universe around us. Apart from the fact that that same complexity can already be explained by straightforward principles of evolution and self-organization, the introduction of God does not in any way contribute to explanation, since it just pushes the phenomenon to be explained one step away. If God explains the existence of the universe, then what explains the existence of God? Since the concept of God is neither simpler nor more intuitive than the concept of the Universe, explaining God's origin is not in any way easier than explaining the origin of the Universe. On the contrary, since God is in principle unknowable, we cannot even hope to explain His coming into being. On the other hand, although the Universe may never be grasped in its totality, there are definitely many aspects of it that are observable and understandable, and lend themselves to ever more complete explanations. In conclusion, postulating God as an explanation does not only make the theory unnecessarily complicated, it even obscures those phenomena that might have been explained otherwise.
One must note that atheism is not in contradiction with religion. In its original, Latin sense, religion means "that which holds together", implying a kind of overarching philosophy and system of ethics that guides society as a whole, without necessary reference to God. Also in the more practical sense, several "religions", including Zen Buddhism, Taoism and Confucianism, lack any idea of God, and thus may be properly called "atheist religions". Also the different emotions that typically accompany religous experiences, such as the feeling of being part of a larger whole, can very well be experienced by a atheists, leading to what may be called "atheist religiosity".
See also: the
Cybernetics starts where metaphysics ends. It takes for granted the
notions of system, process, state and control as the primary elements
of models to construct. This is its difference from physics, which
takes space, time and matter as the primary concepts. It does not follow
that cybernetics may do completely without physical notions and
vice cersa: the question is that of the main focus. Boundaries between
various provinces of knowledge are blurred by constant lebding and borrowing.
When we look at the modeling scheme, we see four nodes representing
'states of affairs', or 'states of the world'. What are those states?
To answer this question let us ask ourselves: if action is the primary
reality, how do we distinguish between various states of the world?
The answer can be: by being able to do various different actions.
For example, if the state of affairs is such that there is an apple
on the table in front of me, a can reach it and pick it up. If there is
no apple this is impossible. If the moon is on the night sky, I can
execute the action of observing it. For this purpose I rotate my head in a
certain way and keep my eyes open. Observation is a kind of action.
Thus we could define a state of the world as a set of actions that I
(the subject of knowledge) can take.
But there are states of another type,
which do not fit this definition. If I feel pain, or am frustrated, or
elated, angry, or complacent, this has no effect on the actions I can
take. It affects only the choices I am going to make selecting from the
same set of possible actions. Indeed, if my hand is over a gas heater
and hurts (say, gently, for plausibility), I still have the choice between
keeping the hand where it is, or withdrawing. But, obviously, the more it hurts, the more likley I am to withraw it.
Thus we come to distinguish between:
(a) a physical state, which is a set of possible actions for the
subject 'physical' actions; and
(b) a mental state, which influences the choices to be made by the subject,
but does not alter the set of possible choices.
When speaking of "states" without any of the two adjectives, we shall
mean physical states.
The distinction between (a) and (b) reflects the fundamental distinction
between "I" and "not-I".
Why should we consider action as more basic and primary than state?
After all, we register an action when the states of the world changes.
The reason is this: a state can be understood and characterized
in terms of actions -- we have just defined it as a set of possible actions.
An action, however cannot be defined through states. When we define
an action as a change of the state, we introduce something new, which is
not present in the idea of a state; change is, essentially, an action
abstracted from the actor that executes it.
The following observation confirms the primacy of action
over state. When we start thinking about constructing a model of the world
on the basis of these concepts, we tend to believe that we will need
a relatively few types of actions, while the set of possible states of the
world is expected to be much greater and much more complex.
In our mathematical model of semantics we shall denote the set of all
possible action by A. We do not yet know what this set is, or rather
what it should be for our further models to be successful. It is possible
that various models of the world will start with various different sets A.
But with any A, the set of possible states of the world, which we shall
denote as W, is the powerset of A, W = P(A), i.e. the set of all subsets
of A. Thus an individual state w is an element of W. w \el W, and
a subset of A, w \subs A.
Among the most elementary actions known to us are small displacements
"in space". We have put the quotes, because people have accustomed to imagine
that some entity, called "space" exists as a primary reality, which
creates the possibility of moving from one point of this space to another.
Our analysis turns this notion topsy-turvy. Only actions constitute
observable reality; space is nothing but a product of our imagination
which we construct from small displacements, or shifts, of even smaller
objects called points. If x is such a shift,
then xx -- the action x repeated twice -- is a double shift, which we
would call in our conventional wisdom a shift at the double distance
in the same direction. On the other hand, we may want to represent a
shift x as the result of another shift x' repeated twice: x = x'x'.
It so happens that we can make three different
kinds of shifts, call them x, y, z, none of which can be reduced to
a combination of the other two. At the same time any shift w
can be reduced to a properly chosen combination of shifts x, y, z.
So we say that our space has three dimensions.
When we do nothing for a while we say that some "time" has passed.
In terms of actions, doing nothing is a special type of action.
If we denote it by t, then
tt is an action of waiting for two times longer than with t.
When we measure time, we take some repetative process, like one swing of
a pendulum, for a model of other processes. We may say, for instance, that
John needes 80 'pendulums' of time to smoke a cigarette. In terms of
the homomorphism picture, the state when John is lighting his cigarette
is w_1; the state when he extinguishes it is w_2; the language L is
the pendulum, with some kind of counter of swings; the mapping M is
registration of the current value of the counter. The process
M must be a real physical process, not just a mental association
of some states of the counter with some states of cigaret smoking -
the truth which has been dramatically demonstrated
by Einstein's relativity theory.
We often say that all real processes take place in space and time.
The meaning of such statements is that in addition to what really goes on,
we imagine some reference actions of consecutive shifts ("in space")
and waits ("in time") and esatblish relationships between these actions
and actual objects and processes. Thus, in accordance with Kant's view,
space and time are not observable realities, but our ways to organize
experience.
Henri Bergson was first to notice and emphasize the difference between
real time, in which we live and act,
and the objectified time of history and physics.
Imagine a pendulum which at each swing puts a mark on a
moving tape. We have a historical record of "the time moving". This
historic record is an object at every moment we look at it. We use it
as a part of our model of reality. We shall refer to the marks on the tape
as representing a model time. It is very much different from
the real time.
Real time is such that two moments of it never coexist. In model time
the moments coexists as different objects in some space. Thus Bergson
calls model time a projection of real time on space. Bergson's real time
is irrreversible. Model time, the time of Newton's mechanics, is reversable:
we read historical records equally well from left to right and from right
to left. The seemingly inconceivable feature of Feynman's diagrams, the
movement in the direction opposite to time, is explained simply by the fact
that the time of physical theories is model time, i.e. a spacial
phenomenon. Real time shows up in probability theory and statistical
physics. We are dealing there with real acts of choosing from a number
of possibilities. Hence this time is irreversible. In mechanics, to every
action there is an inverse action which brings back the original state.
So, when we project time on space the projection has an additional property
of reversibility. But the act of choosing has no inverse. If you drew
ticket No.13, you drew it. You can return it to the pool, but the fact
will still remain that it was No.13, and nothing else, that was drawn first
and then returned. You can choose, but you cannot "unchoose".
A model can be represented by an object in such a manner that the
potential user of the model would be able to create the original
model if he has the representation. In particular, any piece of knowledge
can be represented in this way. This is a case of objectification.
A a metasystem transition takes place:
a model, which is a process, "becomes" (not really -- it is only
represented by) an object; now we can manipulate these objectified
models, modify them and study them, thus creating models of
(objectified) models.
Some of these objectified models are not intended for a direct use,
that is to say, they must not be used for obtaining predictions.
They are used only as inputs to other models, so that those other models
could do ingenious predictions and serve as a basis for decision making.
We call such objectified models historic records. The manner in which
they are used can be usually described as updating. That is, the user
takes a historic record, modifies it according to some principles -
may be with the use of other models, and derives the model to be
actually used for the generation of predictions.
Semant.10. Objectification
We often want to think and speak about a process as something definit,
constant -- in other words, as an object. Then we objectify it, i.e.
replace the process, in reality or in our imagination, by an object.
Objectification is a kind of metasystem transition. Normally in a
metNews- May/June 1997
http://www.cpm.mmu.ac.uk/jom-emit/). The website is getting more and more popular, and the associated mailing list for memetics discussions has become very active, with 500 messages in its first 5 weeks (see the archive at http://www.cpm.mmu.ac.uk/~majordom/memetics/). However, there are not as yet many new proposals for papers, and authors are still solicited to submit manuscripts.News- Sept/Oct 1997
http://www.eur.nl/fsw/soc/happiness.html) Veenhoven himself was enthusiastic to join the group and to collaborate on a joint research proposal. It was agreed to start preparing an edited book, in which different contributors would discuss the different aspects and mechanisms of global progress, such as economic growth, increase in life expectancy, raise in education level and IQ, and improvement in the overall the quality of life. The book is planned to be ready by the year the 2000. Veenhoven suggested the title "The Optimistic Manifesto", but this is of course still open for discussion.News- Nov/Dec 1997
http://www.c3.lanl.gov/~joslyn/ISAS98/) chaired by PCP editor Cliff Joslyn and PCP associate Luis Rocha. Though the meetings concern different topics, they fall in about the same period, respectively August and September 1998. The first is organized by the "Journal of Memetics" associated with PCP and is part of the 15th Int. Congress on Cybernetics, the second is part of the 1998 Conference on Intelligent Systems and Semiotics.http://www.santafe.edu/~bonabeau/), edited by our friend Eric Bonabeau from the Santa Fe Institute. The general subject is close to PCP themes, and PCP editor Cliff Joslyn is member of its editorial board.News- Jan/Feb 1998
http://www.unine.ch/CIESYS/ECOLE.html), although this is independent of PCP.News- March/April 1998
http://www.c3.lanl.gov/~joslyn/pcp/workshop98.html). This ties in with our work on self-organizing networks and the global brain.http://www.lehigh.edu/~mhb0/mhb0.htmlNews - May/June 1998
Our plans for the annual board meeting of PCP in Santa Fe, New Mexico, have become more concrete. Johan Bollen, Alex Riegler, Cliff Joslyn and Francis Heylighen will meet during the period August 1 to 20, and will be joined by Valentin Turchin from August 9. The accompanying workshop on "Emergent Semantic and Computational Processes in Distributed Information Systems" (see http://www.c3.lanl.gov/~joslyn/pcp/workshop98.html) on August 10-11 is now taking concrete shape, with most abstracts available on the web. This workshop wil hopefully be the start for a fruitful collaboration between PCP and the "Symbiotic Intelligence Project" (http://ishi.lanl.gov/symintel.html), which groups researchers from Los Alamos National Laboratory and Santa Fe Institute. The subject would be the application of self-organizing systems to support collective intelligence on the web.http://www.cpm.mmu.ac.uk/jom-emit/1997/vol1/gabora_l.htmlhttp://HyperNews.ngdc.noaa.gov/HyperNews/get/ecosci/1.html News - July/August 1998
BOARD MEETING IN NEW MEXICOhttp://www.c3.lanl.gov/~joslyn/pcp/workshop98.html). Afterwards, workshop
proceedings will be published, most likely as a LANL internal report at
first, and as a book or special issue of a journal in a second stage. This
second stage is likely to propose a selection of the most relevant papers,
rewritten to take into account the other contributions, together with some
newly invited papers from people who did not attend the workshop but who
are experts in the domain.http://ishi.lanl.gov/symintel.html), John Casti from SFI, who was
interested to publish a report of the workshop in the journal "Complexity"
which he edits, Eric Bonabeau, another SFI resident and editor of "Complex
Systems", who is a world authority on the collective intelligence exhibited
by insect societies, and Liane Gabora, a memetics researcher affiliated to
UCLA.First public introduction of the Principia Cybernetica Project
Author: Cliff Joslyn, and Valentin Turchin,
Updated: 23 Dec 89
Filename: FPUBINT.html
Date: Sat, 23 Dec 89 12:41:22 EDT
Sender: Cybernetics and Systems
Progress Report: 5 years of PCP
Author: F. Heylighen, C. Joslyn,
Updated: Oct 11, 1994
Filename: PROGREP.html
PCP was publically introduced in December 1989 with a first general proposal, containing a list of goals. Since these objectives were formulated rather explicitly, point by point, it is easy to now check in how far they have become reality. Although these goals sounded very ambitious at the moment, the funny thing is that most of them have effectively been realized. The following is a partial list of desiderata for the "Principia Cybernetica" project:
YES. The system of philosophy is there (albeit far from finished), partially implemented over the WWW server, and its developers have been working collaboratively in spite of large geographical obstacles (the Atlantic Ocean among other things).
2. To allow these researchers different levels of access to the system according to their role in the project development
YES. The present WWW server allows editors to read and edit all material via passwords, the different contributors to read most material, and to make annotations. Soon they will be able to edit their own annotation (but not other people's)
3. To produce a system of philosophy that can develop dynamically over time, with continuing refinement and expansion
YES. The quasi-hierarchical hypertext structure of linked nodes makes it easy to add or refine concepts and principles, while maintaining a stable core.
4. For the system of philosophy to fully reflect and incorporate the semantic relations inherent among the terms being explicated
Mostly NO. Some semantic relations have been made explicit in a system of typed links for certain nodes, but this is basically an unfinished experiment.
5. To allow the explication of terms and senses of terms, and to unify and synthesize notations and terminology among researchers in different disciplines
Mostly NO. There is some explication of terms and senses of terms (e.g. in the Glossary), but it is far from systematical, and we certainly haven't as yet achieved any terminological unification.
6. To support the process of argument and dialog among experts toward the end of consensus at the level of the meanings of words and the relations among those meanings
MAYBE. PRNCYB-L and the annotations on the server, as well as more traditional meetings and publications can certainly be said to "support" argument and dialog, but the end of consensus is still quite far away.
7. To support the publication of intermediate and final stages of parts or the whole of the philosophical system
YES. Several papers have already been published, and the hierarchical organization of the conceptual network should make it relatively easy to take out parts or the whole and publish them as a book, paper or report.
8. To support bibliographical and historical reference
YES. In a hypertext system this is almost trivial. Just make a link to a node with a historical review or a list of publications. The actual lists of publications and historical overviews are virtually non-existent though.
9. To support mathematical notation and the easy movement among natural language, formal language, and mathematics
Mostly NO. A shortcoming of the HTML markup language for WWW is that as yet it does not provide easy ways to express mathematical notations, though that should be facilated in the future (e.g. by automatic HTML<->TEX conversions). The "easy movement" is rather vague, so it is difficult to conclude in how far it has been achieved.
10. To allow researchers to develop or read the philosophical system in various orders and in various degrees of depth or specificity
YES. The Principia Cybernetica Web can be read in many different orders, and readers can go in depth, or remain more on the surface while still getting a basic picture. More work needs to be done to fill in all the different levels, though.
11. To allow access to the system for both participants who wish to author and users who wish to read, browse, or study
YES. WWW now allows both reading of text and entering of new text through annotation.
12. To support the publication of various special-purpose documents, including dictionaries, encyclopedias, texts on a subject, reference pages, essays, dialogs on a subject, or "streams of consciuosness"
MAYBE. Several of these types of texts have been published, and as stated earlier it should be easy to take out parts of the Web, but it is not clear in how far the generation of these special purpose documents is really "supported".
13. To allow the representation and utilization of knowledge in both its breadth and its depth.
Probably YES. Representation in breadth and depth is certainly supported, but the rest is rather vague. It sounds well but it is not clear in how far PCP knowledge is being "utilized". If the number of people consulting the Web is a measure, it is certainly not being ignored, though one can doubt whether much is retained by the readers.
The Cybernetic Manifesto
Author: V. Turchin, C. Joslyn,
Updated: Oct 1989
Filename: MANIFESTO.html
1.Philosophy
2.Knowledge
3.Freedom, will, control
4.God
5.Metasystem transition
6.Evolution
7. Human intelligence
8.Social integration
9.The era of Reason
10.Global integration
11.Human super-beings
12.Ultimate human values
13.Decline of metaphysical immortality
14.Creative immortality
15.Cybernetic immortality
16.Evolution and immortality
17.Evolution of the human person
18. How integration may occur
19.Integration on the Cosmic scene
20.Current problems
21.Integration and freedom
Reactions, discussions, comments
Author: F. Heylighen, V. Turchin,
Updated: Jul 19, 1994
Filename: REACT.html
The following is a list of reactions and criticisms in different places of the Principia Cybernetica Project and its Web server. See also: User Annotations.
Criticisms of Principia Cybernetica
Author: F. Heylighen & C. Joslyn
Updated: Aug 1993
Filename: CRITIC.html
Turchin an Joslyn originally announced Principia Cybernetica by posting a first general proposal, and "The Cybernetic Manifesto on the CYBSYS-L electronic mailing list in the autumn of 1989 (see the Project history). This led to a a sometimes very heated debate. The most outspoken critic was Joseph Goguen, who interpreted the use of concepts like "control", "hierarchy" and "integration" as signs of a dangerous, totalitarian ideology. Joslyn and Turchin reacted by stressing the essential role human freedom plays in the philosophy, and by remarking that terms like control and hierarchy should be understood primarily in their abstract, technical sense. In fact, the metasystem transition, where a new control level emerges, should be seen as an increase, rather than a decrease, of the freedom of the system. This criticism led to a deeper understanding of the necessity for careful articulation of the ideas behind Principia Cybernetica, in the hope of avoiding misinterpretation.Principia Cybernetica Web and the "Best of the Web" awards
Author: F. Heylighen,
Updated: Jul 19, 1994
Filename: BESWEB.html
Principia Cybernetica Web has participated in the 1994 "Best of the Web" awards, an international competition for the best services on the World-Wide Web. PCP Web was originally nominated for the category "Document Design" with the following quotation:
Principia Cybernetica Web
Document Design" category. The award in this category went to "Travels with Samantha", a narrative with lots of splendid color photographs and an interesting story, but nothing much in the area of hypertext design.
Principia Cybernetica in "Wired" magazine
Author: Wired
Updated: Jul 19, 1994
Filename: REVWIR.html
The following is a quote from WIRED, a popular magazine devoted to cyberspace.
(WIRED: San Francisco, Wired Ventures ltd., nr. 2.08, August 1994, p. 119)
When Science Meets Net.Society.
The Principia Cybernetica Project is an attempt to unify systems theory and
cybernetics, using the tools and methods of cybernetics itself. Managed by
leading researchers from the City University of New York, NASA, and the
Free University of Brussels, Principia Cybernetica is amassing an awesome
and ever-growing info-tube of information on the underlying meme-technology
of the Matrix: self-organizing systems, cybernetics, human-computer
interaction, knowledge structures, cognitive science, artificial
intelligence, philosophy, and evolution, to name a few. No ivory towers
here, simply practical information on web-weaving and Internet use
commingled with academic papers and cyberculture rants, such as Ronfeldt's
Cyberocracy.
References to Principia Cybernetica in different servers
Author: F. Heylighen,
Updated: Jul 23, 1998
Filename: REFSPCP.html
The Principia Cybernetica Web is being linked to by more and more other Web pages. You can get a complete list of the about 5000 sites linking to PCP Web from the AltaVista catalog. Many of them only mention the name of the project as anchor, or include some of our own characterizations of the project, but some of them also add a personal evaluation. (see also the review in Wired magazine, and the nomination for the Best of the Web Awards) find further references to PCP yourself via the Altavista search engine.Personal appreciation
"Principia Cybernetica Project. Philosophy on the Net. As only could be done on the Net. This is complex but amazing." (
Cool links)Evolution Resources on the Internet)Virtual Reality Research)Recommended Internet Resources)http://www.honors.indiana.edu/docs/interest.html)Web Sites With Information on
Systems Science Topics)
Principia Cybernetica" (Onar Aam's Related Servers page)Expanding Your
Consciousness )
Media lab).
"an excellent site" (Wiener: ideas)
Quality related Information Sources)
Frontier organizations on the Web)
Guide to Autopoiesis related Internet Resources)
Psychology and Psychotherapy sources)
Joë de Rosnay's list of Web Future Sites)
Teor*ias Generales de Avanzada)TRAP CITY: A Serial Story)
Reviews by web services
Global Network Navigator)
Netscape's "What's Cool" list)
Net Appeal: 8 [out of 10], Depth of Coverage: 8, Ease of Exploration: 8
Audience: Philosophers, Evolutionists, System Theorists
Description: The Principia Cybernetica Web is the home of a project that promotes the computer-supported collaborative development of an evolutionary-systemic philosophy. This project tackles philosophical questions with the help of cybernetic theories and technologies. Visitors to the site will find an overview of the plan and details of its metasystem transition theory, among others."
(Magellan's review of the PCP site)
The Principia Cybernetica Project is an in-depth look at the whole of philosophical thought, and it's not for
armchair thinkers. Using a system of "nodes," it attempts to fill in the whole of human philosophical
thought, from ethics to physics to evolutionary theory. In its complete form, the authors maintain it will
give you the answer to basic questions like "Who am I? Why am I here?" It's quite involving, though
occasionally we'd be happy with the answer to "What the heck does this mean?" on some of these pages. " (Point's review of the PCP site)
"A platinum site: Overall Rating: 5 stars (out of 5), content: 5 stars, presentation: 4 stars, personality: 4 stars
The Principia Cybernetica Project brings together a number
of scholars from around the globe to tackle age-old
philosophical problems with the aid of modern cybernetic
theories and technologies. If cyberphilosophy is your forte,
you can delve into subtopics that include ethics,
metaphysics, ontology, and many other disciplines identified
by long words. Even people with less arcane interests will
find the Web Dictionary of Cybernetics and Systems useful." (NETGUIDE'S BEST OF THE WEB, details on PCP site)
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Context of Principia Cybernetica
Author: C. Joslyn, F. Heylighen,
Updated: Aug 1993
Filename: CONTEXT.html
PCP as a collaborative attempt to integrate and found existing knowledge has predecessors in general intellectual history (Talmud, Adler), as well as in the history of systems science and cybernetics. In particular different similar attempts to build compendia or "encyclopedia-like" works can be mentioned, such as Krippendorf's Dictionary of Cybernetics, Singh's Systems and Control Encyclopedia, Charles François' Dictionary of Systems and Cybernetics, the work of Troncale and Snow in the context of the International Society for Systems Science, and the Glossary on Cybernetics and Systems Theory developed for the American Society for Cybernetics. Whitehead and Russell's Principia Mathematica, and
the Bourbaki group's cooperative work on the set-theoretic foundations of mathematicsPrincipia Cybernetica-related research in systems and cybernetics
Updated: Aug 1993
Filename: PCPCYBS.html
[Node to be completed]Metasystem Transition Theory
Author: C. Joslyn, F. Heylighen, V. Turchin,
Updated: Jul 7, 1997
Filename: MSTT.html
Metasystem Transition Theory (MSTT) is the name we have given our particular
cybernetic philosophy. Its most salient concept is, of course, the Metasystem Transition (MST), the evolutionary process by which higher levels of complexity and control are generated. But it also includes our views on philosophical problems, and makes predictions about the possible future
of mankind and life. Our goal is to create, on the basis of cybernetic concepts, an
integrated philosophical system, or "world
view", proposing answers to the most fundamental questions about
the world, ourselves, and our ultimate values.Background of the theory
The concept of the metasystem transition was
introduced in Turchin's book The
Phenomenon of Science, which was followed by
Inertia of Fear and the Scientific Worldview.
The basic tenets
of MSTT were formulated by Turchin and Joslyn in "The
Cybernetic Manifesto". As Heylighen joined the Editorial Board, the work on MSTT
intensified, and the Principia Cybernetica
Web was created. A major collection of papers on MSTT by the three
editors and invited authors was published in a special issue of the journal
World Futures entitled "The Quantum of Evolution". MSTT is also being applied to computer science and the foundations of mathematics by Turchin and his colleagues.
The bibliography of PCP includes most publications on MSTT.Methodology for the Development of MSTT
Author: F. Heylighen, C. Joslyn,
Updated: Oct 6, 1997
Filename: METHODOL.html
The methodology used by the Principia Cybernetica Project to build a complete philosophical system is based on a "bootstrapping" principle: the form through which the knowledge is expressed affects its content, and vice versa. Thus, our theories about the evolutionary development of systems are applied to the development of the theory itself, while the structuring of concepts in the form of an evolving semantic network suggests new theoretical concepts (see form and content). A first requirement to develop such concepts is semantic analysis and consensus building about the meaning of terms. This meaning is as much as possible expressed formally through the links between nodes, resulting in a semantic network structure for the web. Multiple Beginnings, Meta-Foundationalism
Author: C. Joslyn,
Updated: Aug 1993
Filename: MULTBEG.html
The emphasis that Principia Cybernetica places on consensus about fundamental concepts and
principles can be criticized as risking the dangers of formalism and
foundationalism, of adopting a deductive strategy in which cybernetic
theory is linearly derived or proved from axioms. The risks of such
approaches are obvious: either the development of an ossified, static
philosophy which cannot adapt to new information; or an endless, futile
search for the ultimate, jointly necessary and sufficient axiom set from
which "truth" could be derived. Multiple axiomatization sets, a metaphor for metafoundationalism
Author: C. Joslyn, F. Heylighen,
Updated: Sep 1993
Filename: MULTAXIO.html
A simple metaphor for our understanding of metafoundationalism can be found in mathematics. Mathematical systems are defined by a set of axioms, from which theorems are deduced. A mathematical theory might be defined as the set of all propositions that are true under the given set of axioms (theorems). For example, a theory of addition would contain propositions like "1 + 2 = 3", "2 + 5 = 3 + 4", and axioms like "a + b = b + a", "a + 0 = a", etc. Now, it is a well-known fact that in general the same theory can be generated by multiple sets of axioms. For example, the Boolean logic of propositions has many different axiomatizations which are formally equivalent (producing the same theorems), though one may be preferred to the other on the grounds of simplicity, esthetic appeal or explicitness. Physical Constructivism
Author: F. Heylighen, C. Joslyn,
Updated: Jan 1992
Filename: PHYSCONS.html
The philosophy of the Principia Cybernetica Project also finds its basis in what we call
"physical constructivism". While constructivism is traditionally known in
its mathematical context, including the denial of reductio ad
absurdum proofs, the existence of actually infinite objects, and the law
of the excluded middle{As described more elsewhere , cite{TUV87a} is a
constructive philosophy of mathematics from the perspective of Principia Cybernetica.}
Cyberneticians especially have championed a broader interpretation
that extends to psychology and the general philosophy of science. Metaphysics
Author: F. Heylighen, C. Joslyn, V. Turchin,
Updated: Sep 10, 1997
Filename: METAPHYS.html
Philosophies traditionally start with a metaphysics: a theory of the essence of things, of the fundamental principles that organize the universe. Metaphysics is supposed to answer the question "What is the nature
of reality?". But we cannot answer this
question without first understanding what is the meaning of metaphysics, if any, and in what respect metaphysics differs from science, which tries to answer similar questions but through more concrete methods.
Metaphysics is traditionally subdivided in ontology, the theory of being in itself, and cosmology, the theory describing the origin and structure of the universe.
Metaphysics
Author: F. Heylighen, C. Joslyn, V. Turchin,
Updated: Sep 10, 1997
Filename: METAPHYS.html
Philosophies traditionally start with a metaphysics: a theory of the essence of things, of the fundamental principles that organize the universe. Metaphysics is supposed to answer the question "What is the nature
of reality?". But we cannot answer this
question without first understanding what is the meaning of metaphysics, if any, and in what respect metaphysics differs from science, which tries to answer similar questions but through more concrete methods.
Metaphysics is traditionally subdivided in ontology, the theory of being in itself, and cosmology, the theory describing the origin and structure of the universe.
The meaning of metaphysics
Author: V. Turchin,
Updated: Sep 1991
Filename: MEANMET.html
A metalanguage is still a language, and a metatheory a
theory. Metamathematics is a branch of mathematics.
Is metaphysics a branch of physics?Knowledge and will
Author: C. Joslyn, V. Turchin,
Updated: Aug 1993
Filename: ^KNOWILL.html
[Node to be completed]From Kant to Schopenhauer
Author: V. Turchin,
Updated: Sep 29, 1997
Filename: KASCHO.html
It was noticed by the ancient Greeks already, that
sensation is the main, and maybe the only, source of our knowledge.
In the new time, Berkley and Hume stressed this in a very strong
manner: things are our sensations.
But rationalists still believed that some crucial ideas are inborn
and have nothing to do with the imperfection of our sense organs.Action
Author: V. Turchin,
Updated: Oct 6, 1997
Filename: ACTION.html
Am Anfang war die Tat
(In the beginning there was the deed)
Goethe.
Schopenhauer's formula
for all that exists is:
the world = will + representation
Will is manifested in action. Will and action are inseparable.
We understand will as the quality that allows
to choose between the (possible) options and act.
Action and will are two faces of essentially the same phenomenon,
and in our philosophy action is its perceivable part.
We rewrite Schopenhauer's formula as follows:
the perceivable world = action + representation
Of these two parts, action has the ontological primacy.
Representation is, in the last analysis, a kind of action --
interaction of the subject and the object of knowledge.
Different subjects may have different representations of the same action.
Only action as such has a definite reality: if it took place, it did.
If did not, it did not.Agent
Author: V. Turchin,
Updated: Oct 6, 1997
Filename: AGENT.html
An agent is a representation of an action. One action may not have
more than one agent, but a single agent may cause more than one action.
The necessity of this representation is seen when we describe
a human being and want to distingush between the human's body and
and the way (s)he acts. Generally, the concept of agent takes on the
cybernetic description of some part of reality, and leaves
physical (as well as chemical and bioligical) description to physics
(chemistry, biology).Event
Author: V. Turchin,
Updated: Sep 1991
Filename: EVENT.html
[Node to be completed]Emergence
Author: V. Turchin,
Updated: Sep 1991
Filename: EMERGE.html
[Node to be completed]Domain
Author: V. Turchin,
Updated: Sep 1991
Filename: DOMAIN.html
[Node to be completed]Distinction
Author: F. Heylighen,
Updated: Nov 25, 1997
Filename: DISTINCT.html
The simplest form or structure we can imagine is a distinction. A distinction can be defined as the process (or its result) of discriminating between a class of phenomena and the complement of that class (i.e. all the phenomena which do not fit into the class). As such, a distinction structures the universe of all experienced phenomena in two parts. Such a part which is distinguished from its complement or background can be called an indication (Spencer-Brown, 1969). If more than one distinction is applied the structure becomes more complex, and the number of potential indications increases, depending on the number of distinctions and the way they are connected.
The operations of distinction, and assimilation of phenomena necessarily go together. If a cognitive system would make no distinctions, only assimilations, it would be unable to perceive different phenomena, it would react to all situations in a uniform way ; hence, it would be unable to adapt to a changing environment. On the other hand, a system which would make no assimilations, only distinctions, would be unable to anticipate; hence it would also be unable to adapt.
Formal Formulations: an extensive website on distinction logics
Laws of Form website
From The Laws of Form.
Miller: Laws of Form
Forth meets the Laws of Form
Boundary Math
Logic of Distinctions. A Protologic for a Theory of Society (book summary)
Freedom
Author: V. Turchin,
Updated: Sep 1991
Filename: FREEDOM.html
[Node to be completed]God
Author: Paul Harrison, F. Heylighen, V. Turchin,
Updated: Nov 5, 1997
Filename: GOD.html Synopsys: Arguments for and against the Existence of God
Author: Paul Harrison
Updated: Apr 3, 1997
Filename: GODEXIST.html
The polytheistic conceptions of God were criticized and derided by
the monotheistic religions. Since the Enlightenment, monotheistic
concepts have also come under criticism from atheism and pantheism.Arguments for the Existence of God
Philosophers have tried to provide rational proofs of God's
existence that go beyond dogmatic assertion or appeal to ancient
scripture. The major proofs, with their corresponding objections, are
as follows:
Objection: You cannot define or imagine a thing into
existence.
Objections: If you allow one thing to exist without cause, you
contradict your own premise. And if you do, there is no reason why
the universe should not be the one thing that exists or originates
without cause.
Objection: The principles of self-organization and evolution
provide complete explanations for apparent design.
Objections: The odds against all possible universes are
equally astronomical, yet one of them must be the actual universe.
Moreover, if there are very many universes, then some of these will
contain the possibility of life. Even if valid, the anthropic
cosmological principle guarantees only that stars and planets and
life will emerge - not intelligent life. In its weak form, the
anthropic cosmological principle merely states that if we are here to
observe the universe, it follows that the universe must have
properties that permit intelligent life to emerge.
Objections: We cannot assume that everything imagined in
mental experiences (which include dreams, hallucinations etc)
actually exists. Such experiences cannot be repeated, tested or
publicly verified. Mystical and other personal experiences can be
explained by other causes.
Objections: The usefulness of a belief does not prove its
truth. In any case, many societies have thrived without these
beliefs, while crime has thrived in theistic societies believing in
heaven and hell.General objection against all the rational proofs for God:
Each of the above arguments is independent of the others and
cannot logically be used to reinforce the others.
The cause argument - even if it were valid - would prove only a first
cause. It would tell us nothing about the nature of that cause, nor
whether the cause was mental or physical. It would not prove that the
first cause was the personal, judging, forgiving God of Judaism,
Christianity, or Islam. It would not prove the existence of a
designer or of a perfect being. Equally, the design argument would
prove only a designer, the ontological argument would prove only the
existence of a perfect being, and so on. None of these arguments
individually can prove that the cause, designer or perfect being were
one and the same - they could be three different beings.
Arguments against the existence of God
Pantheism
Author: Paul Harrison
Updated: Mar 28, 1997
Filename: PANTHEISM.html Synopsys: or
naturalistic pantheism believes that the Universe either originated itself
out of nothing, or has existed forever.
Modern scientific pantheism is materialistic. It believes that design in
the universe can be fully accounted for by principles of
evolution and self-organization. It does not
believe in separate spirits or survival of the soul after death. Pantheists
concerned about personal immortality seek it in realistic ways - through
children, deeds, works, and the memories of the living.Modern pagans frequently claim to be
pantheists. Those who are concerned with logical consistency regard their
various deities as symbolic rather than real. Those who are not so concerned
combine
pantheism with literal polytheism and belief in magic, reincarnation and other
supernatural phenomena.Hegel, and in more
modern times by A. N. Whitehead and Teilhard de Chardin (see also: process metaphysics). Another variant is
the idea that humans are in some way the mind of the universe (see also: the global brain). Our evolution -
indeed our active help - is seen as helping the universe to attain its full
potential (cf. Creative Immortality).Atheism
Author: F. Heylighen,
Updated: Aug 8, 1994
Filename: ATHEISM.html Synopsys: Occam's Razor as justification of atheism)
alt.atheism FAQ Web
Basic Concepts of Science
Author: V. Turchin,
Updated: Sep 1991
Filename: SCICONC.html
[Node to be completed]State of the world
Author: V. Turchin,
Updated: Sep 1991
Filename: STATE.html
[Node to be completed]Space
Author: V. Turchin,
Updated: Sep 1991
Filename: SPACE.html
[Node to be completed]Time
Author: V. Turchin,
Updated: Sep 1991
Filename: TIME.html
[Node to be completed]Historic record
Author: V. Turchin,
Updated: Sep 1991
Filename: HISTOREC.html
[Node to be completed]Objectification
Author: V. Turchin,
Updated: Sep 1991
Filename: OBJFIC.html
[Node to be completed]
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